<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">

<p>The German debt brake forces the German government to target a very specific public deficit to GDP ratio. A ruling of the German constitutional court has drawn attention to the debt brake, as it is to be enforced more tightly than the federal German government previously thought. In this article, the author argues that the debt brake should be abolished. It does not do what it is supposed to do – the sustainability of public debt depends on the European Central Bank’s Dealer of Last Resort function and nothing else. As a side effect, the debt brake curtails government spending at a time of close to zero net public investment and huge requirements for more public spending.</p>
</abstract>

The German debt brake forces the German government to target a very specific public deficit to GDP ratio. A ruling of the German constitutional court has drawn attention to the debt brake, as it is to be enforced more tightly than the federal German government previously thought. In this article, the author argues that the debt brake should be abolished. It does not do what it is supposed to do – the sustainability of public debt depends on the European Central Bank’s Dealer of Last Resort function and nothing else. As a side effect, the debt brake curtails government spending at a time of close to zero net public investment and huge requirements for more public spending.

Quo Vadis, Debt Brake? On the Sense and Nonsense of Detailed Deficit and Debt Regulations in the German Constitution

Wirtschaftsdienst

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Quo vadis, Schuldenbremse? Über Sinn und Unsinn detaillierter Defizit- und Schuldenregelungen im Grundgesetz

The German debt brake forces the German government to target a very specific public deficit to GDP ratio. A ruling of the German constitutional court has drawn...

Quo Vadis, Debt Brake? On the Sense and Nonsense of Detailed Deficit and Debt Regulations in the German Constitution

Publicado en línea: 23 ene 2024

Páginas: 25 - 28

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/wd-2024-0010

© 2024 Dirk Ehnts, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.