<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>This study challenges the common belief that the ‘Trump tariffs’ are protectionist or a deliberate attack on China, the USA’s economic rival. By focusing specifically on Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and equating its use to Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, this study instead demonstrates how the U.S. administration is actively repurposing protectionist laws to function as unilateral enforcement tools. Thus, this study argues that the tariffs enacted on steel and aluminium in 2018 under the guise of national security are not meant to protect the domestic market or to hurt the Chinese, but rather to ‘protect’ the ability of U.S. businesses to make profits abroad. By contrasting the justification for the tariffs to factual application, China is not identified as a target but rather as a convenient fig leaf. The article goes into further detail to demonstrate how the U.S. (ab)uses these tariffs during negotiations with South Korea, Japan, and other nations and finds multiple examples of how others have been affected significantly more than China. Here, the article describes how U.S. officials have mastered the art of simultaneously creating leverage, exchanging it for concessions, and keeping it.</p></abstract>

This study challenges the common belief that the ‘Trump tariffs’ are protectionist or a deliberate attack on China, the USA’s economic rival. By focusing specifically on Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and equating its use to Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, this study instead demonstrates how the U.S. administration is actively repurposing protectionist laws to function as unilateral enforcement tools. Thus, this study argues that the tariffs enacted on steel and aluminium in 2018 under the guise of national security are not meant to protect the domestic market or to hurt the Chinese, but rather to ‘protect’ the ability of U.S. businesses to make profits abroad. By contrasting the justification for the tariffs to factual application, China is not identified as a target but rather as a convenient fig leaf. The article goes into further detail to demonstrate how the U.S. (ab)uses these tariffs during negotiations with South Korea, Japan, and other nations and finds multiple examples of how others have been affected significantly more than China. Here, the article describes how U.S. officials have mastered the art of simultaneously creating leverage, exchanging it for concessions, and keeping it.

Trump vs. China? Tariffs under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 Revisited

Vienna Journal of East Asian Studies

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

This study challenges the common belief that the ‘Trump tariffs’ are protectionist or a deliberate attack on China, the USA’s economic rival. By focusing...

Trump vs. China? Tariffs under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 Revisited

Publicado en línea: 13 sept 2020

Páginas: 207 - 251

Recibido: 03 may 2020

Aceptado: 17 jul 2020

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/vjeas-2020-0008

Palabras clave
Trade war, United States, China, tariffs, Section 232

© 2020 Eric Hanada, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Trump vs. China? Tariffs under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 Revisited

Publicado en línea: 13 sept 2020

Páginas: 207 - 251

Recibido: 03 may 2020

Aceptado: 17 jul 2020

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/vjeas-2020-0008

Palabras claveTrade war, United States, China, tariffs, Section 232

© 2020 Eric Hanada, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Palabras clave
Trade war, United States, China, tariffs, Section 232