<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">

<p>The main purpose of this paper is to rationally reconstruct Nozick’s account of unproductivity, especially <italic>vis-à-vis</italic> his characteristically libertarian, and hence uncompromising, ban on fraud. We posit that, when Nozick’s theory is interpreted charitably, it does not yield to contradictory prescriptions concerning permissibility. That is, there does not have to be any inconsistency in the Nozickian ban on certain exchanges, with the ban tracking two properties of the said exchanges; that is, either (1) their unproductivity or (2) their fraudulence. When analyzing economic exchanges, our interest is focused on both productive and unproductive <italic>blackmail</italic> exchanges. However, we suggest that Nozick’s banning exchanges along the lines of their unproductivity tallies poorly with his avowed libertarianism since his position predicts prohibiting unproductive and yet non-fraudulent exchanges. Hence, and we suggest resolving the said tension in a principled libertarian (deontological) manner; that is, by banning <italic>fraudulent exchanges</italic> and allowing <italic>non-fraudulent</italic> ones, <italic>ceteris paribus</italic>, while submitting that the properties of exchanges such that <italic>being productive</italic> or <italic>being unproductive</italic> are morally inert.</p>
</abstract>

The main purpose of this paper is to rationally reconstruct Nozick’s account of unproductivity, especially vis-à-vis his characteristically libertarian, and hence uncompromising, ban on fraud. We posit that, when Nozick’s theory is interpreted charitably, it does not yield to contradictory prescriptions concerning permissibility. That is, there does not have to be any inconsistency in the Nozickian ban on certain exchanges, with the ban tracking two properties of the said exchanges; that is, either (1) their unproductivity or (2) their fraudulence. When analyzing economic exchanges, our interest is focused on both productive and unproductive blackmail exchanges. However, we suggest that Nozick’s banning exchanges along the lines of their unproductivity tallies poorly with his avowed libertarianism since his position predicts prohibiting unproductive and yet non-fraudulent exchanges. Hence, and we suggest resolving the said tension in a principled libertarian (deontological) manner; that is, by banning fraudulent exchanges and allowing non-fraudulent ones, ceteris paribus, while submitting that the properties of exchanges such that being productive or being unproductive are morally inert.

Blackmail, Unproductive Exchanges, Fraud, and the Libertarian Theory of Voluntariness

Polish Political Science Review

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

The main purpose of this paper is to rationally reconstruct Nozick’s account of unproductivity, especially vis-à-vis his characteristically libertarian, and...

Blackmail, Unproductive Exchanges, Fraud, and the Libertarian Theory of Voluntariness

Publicado en línea: 27 jun 2024

Páginas: 76 - 93

Recibido: 15 oct 2023

Aceptado: 17 abr 2024

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/ppsr-2024-0005

Palabras clave
blackmail, fraud, Nozick, unproductive exchanges

© 2024 Igor Wysocki., published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

Blackmail, Unproductive Exchanges, Fraud, and the Libertarian Theory of Voluntariness

Publicado en línea: 27 jun 2024

Páginas: 76 - 93

Recibido: 15 oct 2023

Aceptado: 17 abr 2024

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/ppsr-2024-0005

Palabras claveblackmail, fraud, Nozick, unproductive exchanges

© 2024 Igor Wysocki., published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

Palabras clave
blackmail, fraud, Nozick, unproductive exchanges