<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">

<p>In this article, I intend to show, first of all, that the metaphysical neutrality of the <italic>Logical Investigations</italic> leads to untenable consequences and even threatens the coherence of Husserl's project. In truth, Husserl's distinction between phenomenology and metaphysics and its corollary, the pure and simple exclusion of metaphysical problems - such as that of the reality of the so-called external world - from the field of nascent phenomenology, make it impossible to give a satisfactory form to a problem as central to this new discipline as that of perception. However, my final word will not be on the indissoluble link between the problems that phenomenology poses for itself and those that Husserl would like to be able to “purify” it from the outset. However permeable the boundaries between these two general research directions may be, phenomenology and metaphysics are not equivalent. Phenomenology can even be said to contribute to formulating and solving certain metaphysical problems, starting with the idealism/realism antithesis. It is to this contribution that I will devote the second part of these reflections.</p>
</abstract>

In this article, I intend to show, first of all, that the metaphysical neutrality of the Logical Investigations leads to untenable consequences and even threatens the coherence of Husserl's project. In truth, Husserl's distinction between phenomenology and metaphysics and its corollary, the pure and simple exclusion of metaphysical problems - such as that of the reality of the so-called external world - from the field of nascent phenomenology, make it impossible to give a satisfactory form to a problem as central to this new discipline as that of perception. However, my final word will not be on the indissoluble link between the problems that phenomenology poses for itself and those that Husserl would like to be able to “purify” it from the outset. However permeable the boundaries between these two general research directions may be, phenomenology and metaphysics are not equivalent. Phenomenology can even be said to contribute to formulating and solving certain metaphysical problems, starting with the idealism/realism antithesis. It is to this contribution that I will devote the second part of these reflections.

Idealism/realism: A metaphysical distinction?

Phainomenon

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

{"article-title":"Idealism/realism: A metaphysical distinction?"}

In this article, I intend to show, first of all, that the metaphysical neutrality of the Logical Investigations leads to untenable consequences and even...

Idealism/realism: A metaphysical distinction?

Publicado en línea: 28 abr 2024

Páginas: 95 - 110

Recibido: 01 ene 2024

Aceptado: 01 feb 2024

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/phainomenon-2023-0013

Palabras clave
phenomenology, metaphysics, idealism, realism

© 2023 Claude Romano, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

Idealism/realism: A metaphysical distinction?

Publicado en línea: 28 abr 2024

Páginas: 95 - 110

Recibido: 01 ene 2024

Aceptado: 01 feb 2024

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/phainomenon-2023-0013

Palabras clavephenomenology, metaphysics, idealism, realism

© 2023 Claude Romano, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

Palabras clave
phenomenology, metaphysics, idealism, realism