<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>I discuss, from a phenomenological point of view, the distinction between judgments and norms. I stress the limits of the husserlian canonical analysis in order to rightly account for the sense and content of normative intentionality. Based on some Kelsian insights, I draw a clear distinction between judgments and norms, criticizing some classical trends coming from Husserl himself that consider norms as a kind of intentionality founded upon objectifying acts. However, taking distance from Kelsen, Kaufmann, and Cossio, I stress that the ought-proposition <italic>(Sollsatz)</italic> cannot be a good rendering of the sense-content of norms, based on the phenomenological distinction between the intentional matter and the quality of intentional acts. Finally, I propose my own account based on the concept of ‘ductive force’. I stress that the ductive force of norms cannot be identified witb simple coercion. [ show that there is, even inside the juridical sphere, a variety of ductive forces, going from sheer coercion to council and recommendation. To end, I stress the centrality of the concept of “ductive force” for a phenomenology of the social world.</p></abstract>

I discuss, from a phenomenological point of view, the distinction between judgments and norms. I stress the limits of the husserlian canonical analysis in order to rightly account for the sense and content of normative intentionality. Based on some Kelsian insights, I draw a clear distinction between judgments and norms, criticizing some classical trends coming from Husserl himself that consider norms as a kind of intentionality founded upon objectifying acts. However, taking distance from Kelsen, Kaufmann, and Cossio, I stress that the ought-proposition (Sollsatz) cannot be a good rendering of the sense-content of norms, based on the phenomenological distinction between the intentional matter and the quality of intentional acts. Finally, I propose my own account based on the concept of ‘ductive force’. I stress that the ductive force of norms cannot be identified witb simple coercion. [ show that there is, even inside the juridical sphere, a variety of ductive forces, going from sheer coercion to council and recommendation. To end, I stress the centrality of the concept of “ductive force” for a phenomenology of the social world.

Juízos E Normas Para Uma Fenomenologia Dos Actos Téticos E Dos Actos Nomotéticos

Phainomenon

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

I discuss, from a phenomenological point of view, the distinction between judgments and norms. I stress the limits of the husserlian canonical analysis in...

Juízos E Normas Para Uma Fenomenologia Dos Actos Téticos E Dos Actos Nomotéticos

Publicado en línea: 14 oct 2021

Páginas: 9 - 35

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/phainomenon-2012-0014

Palabras clave
Phenomenology ofLaw, Thetic acts, Norms, Ductive force

© 2012 Pedro M. S. Alves, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Juízos E Normas Para Uma Fenomenologia Dos Actos Téticos E Dos Actos Nomotéticos

Publicado en línea: 14 oct 2021

Páginas: 9 - 35

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/phainomenon-2012-0014

Palabras clavePhenomenology ofLaw, Thetic acts, Norms, Ductive force

© 2012 Pedro M. S. Alves, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Palabras clave
Phenomenology ofLaw, Thetic acts, Norms, Ductive force