<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">

<p>The study, leaning on the concept of ‘authoritarian equilibrium’ introduced by R. Daniel Kelemen on the one hand, and new intergovernmentalism as a fresh theoretical approach of the European integration on the other hand, investigates if we can talk about the disruption of the ‘authoritarian equilibrium’ as a consequence of the split up between Fidesz and the EPP, and the adoption of the rule of law conditionality mechanism. In other words, whether we can talk about an initial authoritarian dis-equilibrium? Or can we rather talk about a converse process due to the mechanisms of new intergovernmentalism resulting in the further stabilisation of authoritarian governments and the ineffectiveness of the EU measures devoted to the protection of rule of law? Using qualitative resource analysis of the relevant secondary literature and the documents and legal acts of the EU and its institutions the paper comes to the conclusion that while we have witnessed efforts to disrupt the partisan and the financial support of the Hungarian governing party, these efforts were neutralised by the mechanisms of new intergovernmentalism and as a consequence we still cannot talk about an initial authoritarian disequilibrium in the EU.</p>
</abstract>

The study, leaning on the concept of ‘authoritarian equilibrium’ introduced by R. Daniel Kelemen on the one hand, and new intergovernmentalism as a fresh theoretical approach of the European integration on the other hand, investigates if we can talk about the disruption of the ‘authoritarian equilibrium’ as a consequence of the split up between Fidesz and the EPP, and the adoption of the rule of law conditionality mechanism. In other words, whether we can talk about an initial authoritarian dis-equilibrium? Or can we rather talk about a converse process due to the mechanisms of new intergovernmentalism resulting in the further stabilisation of authoritarian governments and the ineffectiveness of the EU measures devoted to the protection of rule of law? Using qualitative resource analysis of the relevant secondary literature and the documents and legal acts of the EU and its institutions the paper comes to the conclusion that while we have witnessed efforts to disrupt the partisan and the financial support of the Hungarian governing party, these efforts were neutralised by the mechanisms of new intergovernmentalism and as a consequence we still cannot talk about an initial authoritarian disequilibrium in the EU.

Efforts to Disrupt the Authoritarian Equilibrium within the EU. Effects and Counter-effects

senior lecturer at the Department of Political Science

Politics in Central Europe

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

The study, leaning on the concept of ‘authoritarian equilibrium’ introduced by R. Daniel Kelemen on the one hand, and new intergovernmentalism as a fresh...

Efforts to Disrupt the Authoritarian Equilibrium within the EU. Effects and Counter-effects

Publicado en línea: 30 dic 2021

Páginas: 723 - 741

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/pce-2021-0038

Palabras clave
European Union, authoritarian equilibrium, new intergovernmentalism, rule of law conditionality, Hungary

© 2021 Krisztina Juhász, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Efforts to Disrupt the Authoritarian Equilibrium within the EU. Effects and Counter-effects

Publicado en línea: 30 dic 2021

Páginas: 723 - 741

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/pce-2021-0038

Palabras claveEuropean Union, authoritarian equilibrium, new intergovernmentalism, rule of law conditionality, Hungary

© 2021 Krisztina Juhász, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Palabras clave
European Union, authoritarian equilibrium, new intergovernmentalism, rule of law conditionality, Hungary