Acerca de este artículo
Publicado en línea: 05 sept 2023
Páginas: 61 - 85
Recibido: 16 oct 2022
Aceptado: 31 mar 2023
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/jcbtp-2023-0025
Palabras clave
© 2023 Amina Haoudi et al., published by Sciendo
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
The independence of Central Banks is still considered to be a credibility factor in ensuring price stability. Thus, many central banks in transition countries have undergone a change in their statutes in order to achieve greater independence from governments. In this vein, within a decade, North African Central Banks have put in place a new institutional framework for their monetary policy. In this article, we will attempt to assess and measure the legal (de jure) and real (de facto) independence of these Central Banks (Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Egypt).