<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>This paper maps Leeper and Walker (2011) model into a game theory framework to study about the strategic aspects of monetary and fiscal interaction under a fiscal stress caused by an ageing population problem. The paper reveals that the outcomes of the game depend on the parameters of the underlying model, the size of the projected transfers and the public inflation expectation. The findings show that commitment to the target (inflation, government transfers) plays a crucial role in the policy interaction.</p></abstract>

This paper maps Leeper and Walker (2011) model into a game theory framework to study about the strategic aspects of monetary and fiscal interaction under a fiscal stress caused by an ageing population problem. The paper reveals that the outcomes of the game depend on the parameters of the underlying model, the size of the projected transfers and the public inflation expectation. The findings show that commitment to the target (inflation, government transfers) plays a crucial role in the policy interaction.

Monetary Consequences of Fiscal Stress in a Game Theoretic Framework

University of Economics - The University of Danang

Journal of Central Banking Theory and Practice

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Public License.

{"article-title":"Monetary Consequences of Fiscal Stress in a Game Theoretic Framework"}

This paper maps Leeper and Walker (2011) model into a game theory framework to study about the strategic aspects of monetary and fiscal interaction under a...

Monetary Consequences of Fiscal Stress in a Game Theoretic Framework

Publicado en línea: 16 jul 2020

Páginas: 125 - 164

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/jcbtp-2020-0026

Palabras clave
Monetary-fiscal interaction, Game theory, Ageing population, Dynamic leadership, Stochastic timing

© 2020 Dat Thanh Nguyen et al., published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Public License.

Monetary Consequences of Fiscal Stress in a Game Theoretic Framework

Publicado en línea: 16 jul 2020

Páginas: 125 - 164

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/jcbtp-2020-0026

Palabras claveMonetary-fiscal interaction, Game theory, Ageing population, Dynamic leadership, Stochastic timing

© 2020 Dat Thanh Nguyen et al., published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Public License.

Palabras clave
Monetary-fiscal interaction, Game theory, Ageing population, Dynamic leadership, Stochastic timing