<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">

<p>In this text I argue that a phenomenological conception of reality cannot simply consider ‚reality’ to be a feature of the objects of our experience, nor can ‚reality’ be understood as a somehow subconscious experience of resistance, as Max Schelers notion of a „primary resistance“ tries to show. In opposition to these insufficient conceptions I suggest – following some husserlian inspirations – that the notion of ‚reality’ is to be understood as a elementary feature of our <italic>experience</italic> of objects – not of the objects of our experience. Is this perspective accepted, a minimal ‚realism’ appears as a presupposition of the concept of intentionality.</p>
</abstract>

In this text I argue that a phenomenological conception of reality cannot simply consider ‚reality’ to be a feature of the objects of our experience, nor can ‚reality’ be understood as a somehow subconscious experience of resistance, as Max Schelers notion of a „primary resistance“ tries to show. In opposition to these insufficient conceptions I suggest – following some husserlian inspirations – that the notion of ‚reality’ is to be understood as a elementary feature of our experience of objects – not of the objects of our experience. Is this perspective accepted, a minimal ‚realism’ appears as a presupposition of the concept of intentionality.

Phänomenologischer Realismus. Voluntative und intentionalistische Realitätsbegründung bei Scheler und Husserl

Gestalt Theory

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

In this text I argue that a phenomenological conception of reality cannot simply consider ‚reality’ to be a feature of the objects of our experience, nor can...

Phänomenologischer Realismus. Voluntative und intentionalistische Realitätsbegründung bei Scheler und Husserl

Publicado en línea: 31 ago 2021

Páginas: 199 - 214

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/gth-2021-0018

Palabras clave
Realism, Intentionality, Transcendental Philosophy

© 2021 Peter Schwind, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

Phänomenologischer Realismus. Voluntative und intentionalistische Realitätsbegründung bei Scheler und Husserl

Publicado en línea: 31 ago 2021

Páginas: 199 - 214

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/gth-2021-0018

Palabras claveRealism, Intentionality, Transcendental Philosophy

© 2021 Peter Schwind, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

Palabras clave
Realism, Intentionality, Transcendental Philosophy