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<p>In this book symposium contribution, I raise a question about Correia and Rosenkranz’s version of the Growing Block Theory: Is it meant to be a Four-Dimensionalist theory (with a commitment to temporal parts), or a Three-Dimensionalist theory (according to which an object is wholly present whenever it is present)? I argue that a downside of giving the first answer to this question (that the theory is committed to temporal parts) is that in that case their theory will be vulnerable to the Epistemic Objection to the Growing Block Theory. I further argue that an important advantage of giving the second answer to my question (that the theory does not come with a commitment to temporal parts) is that the Three-Dimensionalist version of the Growing Block Theory is not susceptible to the Epistemic Objection. And I also suggest that an apparent disadvantage of saying that their theory is a Three-Dimensionalist theory, namely, that in that case they will have difficulty answering questions about the properties of non-present objects (such as parrots from the distant past), can be dealt with in a way that does not commit them to either zombie parrots or bare particulars.</p>
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In this book symposium contribution, I raise a question about Correia and Rosenkranz’s version of the Growing Block Theory: Is it meant to be a Four-Dimensionalist theory (with a commitment to temporal parts), or a Three-Dimensionalist theory (according to which an object is wholly present whenever it is present)? I argue that a downside of giving the first answer to this question (that the theory is committed to temporal parts) is that in that case their theory will be vulnerable to the Epistemic Objection to the Growing Block Theory. I further argue that an important advantage of giving the second answer to my question (that the theory does not come with a commitment to temporal parts) is that the Three-Dimensionalist version of the Growing Block Theory is not susceptible to the Epistemic Objection. And I also suggest that an apparent disadvantage of saying that their theory is a Three-Dimensionalist theory, namely, that in that case they will have difficulty answering questions about the properties of non-present objects (such as parrots from the distant past), can be dealt with in a way that does not commit them to either zombie parrots or bare particulars.

The Growing Block, the Epistemic Objection and Zombie Parrots

Disputatio

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

In this book symposium contribution, I raise a question about Correia and Rosenkranz’s version of the Growing Block Theory: Is it meant to be a...

The Growing Block, the Epistemic Objection and Zombie Parrots

Publicado en línea: 26 abr 2023

Páginas: 399 - 410

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2021-0022

Palabras clave
epistemic objection, growing block theory

© 2021 Ned Markosian, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

The Growing Block, the Epistemic Objection and Zombie Parrots

Publicado en línea: 26 abr 2023

Páginas: 399 - 410

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2021-0022

Palabras claveepistemic objection, growing block theory

© 2021 Ned Markosian, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Palabras clave
epistemic objection, growing block theory