<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>I consider the problem of reflective knowledge faced by views that treat sensitivity as a sufficient condition for knowledge, or as a major ingredient of the concept, as in the analysis I advance in <italic>Scepticism and Reliable Belief</italic>. I present the problem as concerning the correct analysis of SATs — beliefs to the effect that one of my current beliefs is true. I suggest that a plausible analysis of SATs should treat them as neither true nor false when they ascribe truth to a non-existent belief. I argue that the problem is inescapable if we construe SATs as ascribing the property of truth to a belief. Deflationism manages to avoid the problem of reflective knowledge, but it does so by violating alethic priority — the principle that our account of representation must be built on our account of truth. I argue that we can avoid the problem of reflective knowledge while preserving alethic priority with a pragmatist account of truth — according to which truth is explicated in terms of the rules that govern the practice of assessing judgments and related items as true or false.</p></abstract>

I consider the problem of reflective knowledge faced by views that treat sensitivity as a sufficient condition for knowledge, or as a major ingredient of the concept, as in the analysis I advance in Scepticism and Reliable Belief. I present the problem as concerning the correct analysis of SATs — beliefs to the effect that one of my current beliefs is true. I suggest that a plausible analysis of SATs should treat them as neither true nor false when they ascribe truth to a non-existent belief. I argue that the problem is inescapable if we construe SATs as ascribing the property of truth to a belief. Deflationism manages to avoid the problem of reflective knowledge, but it does so by violating alethic priority — the principle that our account of representation must be built on our account of truth. I argue that we can avoid the problem of reflective knowledge while preserving alethic priority with a pragmatist account of truth — according to which truth is explicated in terms of the rules that govern the practice of assessing judgments and related items as true or false.

Reflective Knowledge and the Nature of Truth

Disputatio

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{"article-title":"Reflective Knowledge and the Nature of Truth"}

I consider the problem of reflective knowledge faced by views that treat sensitivity as a sufficient condition for knowledge, or as a major ingredient of the...

Reflective Knowledge and the Nature of Truth

Publicado en línea: 31 dic 2018

Páginas: 147 - 171

Recibido: 19 jul 2016

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2016-0009

Palabras clave
Reflective knowledge, truth, pragmatism, meaning, sensitivity

© 2016 José L. Zalabardo, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Reflective Knowledge and the Nature of Truth

Publicado en línea: 31 dic 2018

Páginas: 147 - 171

Recibido: 19 jul 2016

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2016-0009

Palabras claveReflective knowledge, truth, pragmatism, meaning, sensitivity

© 2016 José L. Zalabardo, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Palabras clave
Reflective knowledge, truth, pragmatism, meaning, sensitivity