<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>The main goal of this paper is to defend the thesis that the content of know-how states is an accuracy assessable type of nonconceptual content. My argument proceeds in two stages. I argue, first, that the intellectualist distinction between types of ways of grasping the same kind of content is uninformative unless it is tied in with a distinction between kinds of contents. Second, I consider and reject the objection that, if the content of know-how states is non-conceptual, it will be mysterious why attributions of knowing how create opaque contexts. I show that the objection conflates two distinct issues: the nature of the content of know-how states and the semantic evaluability of know-how ascriptions.</p></abstract>

The main goal of this paper is to defend the thesis that the content of know-how states is an accuracy assessable type of nonconceptual content. My argument proceeds in two stages. I argue, first, that the intellectualist distinction between types of ways of grasping the same kind of content is uninformative unless it is tied in with a distinction between kinds of contents. Second, I consider and reject the objection that, if the content of know-how states is non-conceptual, it will be mysterious why attributions of knowing how create opaque contexts. I show that the objection conflates two distinct issues: the nature of the content of know-how states and the semantic evaluability of know-how ascriptions.

Opacity, Know-How States, and their Content

Disputatio

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

{"article-title":"Opacity, Know-How States, and their Content"}

The main goal of this paper is to defend the thesis that the content of know-how states is an accuracy assessable type of nonconceptual content. My argument...

Opacity, Know-How States, and their Content

Publicado en línea: 31 dic 2018

Páginas: 61 - 83

Recibido: 20 may 2014

Aceptado: 02 jun 2015

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2015-0004

Palabras clave
Accuracy conditions, intellectualism, know-how, non-conceptual content, opacity

© 2015 Josefa Toribio, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Opacity, Know-How States, and their Content

Publicado en línea: 31 dic 2018

Páginas: 61 - 83

Recibido: 20 may 2014

Aceptado: 02 jun 2015

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2015-0004

Palabras claveAccuracy conditions, intellectualism, know-how, non-conceptual content, opacity

© 2015 Josefa Toribio, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Palabras clave
Accuracy conditions, intellectualism, know-how, non-conceptual content, opacity