<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Supporters of the A-theory of time sometimes refer to an alleged experience of the passage of time in support of their theory. In this paper I argue that it is an illusion that we experience the passage of time, for such an experience is impossible. My argument relies on the general assertion that experience is contingent, in the sense that if it is possible to experience the passage of time, it is also possible to experience that time does not pass. Having established this claim, I argue that it is impossible to experience that time does not pass, and hence that it is impossible to experience the passage of time.</p></abstract>

Supporters of the A-theory of time sometimes refer to an alleged experience of the passage of time in support of their theory. In this paper I argue that it is an illusion that we experience the passage of time, for such an experience is impossible. My argument relies on the general assertion that experience is contingent, in the sense that if it is possible to experience the passage of time, it is also possible to experience that time does not pass. Having established this claim, I argue that it is impossible to experience that time does not pass, and hence that it is impossible to experience the passage of time.

The Illusion of the Experience of the Passage of Time

The Sapir Academic College & The Open University of Israel

Disputatio

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

{"article-title":"The Illusion of the Experience of the Passage of Time"}

Supporters of the A-theory of time sometimes refer to an alleged experience of the passage of time in support of their theory. In this paper I argue that it is...

The Illusion of the Experience of the Passage of Time

Publicado en línea: 31 dic 2018

Páginas: 67 - 80

Recibido: 12 ago 2012

Aceptado: 19 ene 2013

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2013-0006

Palabras clave
Experience, Hume, Kant, passage of time, Wittgenstein

© 2013 Gal Yehezkel, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

The Illusion of the Experience of the Passage of Time

Publicado en línea: 31 dic 2018

Páginas: 67 - 80

Recibido: 12 ago 2012

Aceptado: 19 ene 2013

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2013-0006

Palabras claveExperience, Hume, Kant, passage of time, Wittgenstein

© 2013 Gal Yehezkel, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Palabras clave
Experience, Hume, Kant, passage of time, Wittgenstein