<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>A traditional view is that all necessary truths are analytic. A frequent objection is that certain claims of color incompatibility – e.g., ‘Nothing is both red and green all over’ – are necessarily true but not analytic. I argue that this objection to the traditional view fails because such color incompatibility claims are either analytic or contingent.</p></abstract>

A traditional view is that all necessary truths are analytic. A frequent objection is that certain claims of color incompatibility – e.g., ‘Nothing is both red and green all over’ – are necessarily true but not analytic. I argue that this objection to the traditional view fails because such color incompatibility claims are either analytic or contingent.

Necessity and Color Incompatibility

Disputatio

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

{"article-title":"Necessity and Color Incompatibility"}

A traditional view is that all necessary truths are analytic. A frequent objection is that certain claims of color incompatibility – e.g., ‘Nothing is both red...

Necessity and Color Incompatibility

Publicado en línea: 31 dic 2018

Páginas: 235 - 237

Recibido: 17 mar 2011

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2011-0010

Palabras clave
Necessity, analyticity, color, color incompatibility

© 2011 Brian Kierland, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Necessity and Color Incompatibility

Publicado en línea: 31 dic 2018

Páginas: 235 - 237

Recibido: 17 mar 2011

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2011-0010

Palabras claveNecessity, analyticity, color, color incompatibility

© 2011 Brian Kierland, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Palabras clave
Necessity, analyticity, color, color incompatibility