<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Can a collective be an agent in its own right? Can it be the bearer of moral and other properties that we have traditionally reserved for individual agents? The answer, as one might expect, is ‘In some ways yes, in other ways no.’ The way in which the answer is ‘Yes’ has been described recently by Copp; I intend to discuss his position and defend it against objections. This describes a fairly weak form of autonomy that I will claim does not require the abandonment of methodological individualism or our commonplace intuitions about individual responsibility. I will also discuss, and reject, a stronger conception of autonomy suggested especially by the work of Pettit that would result in methodological individualism.</p></abstract>

Can a collective be an agent in its own right? Can it be the bearer of moral and other properties that we have traditionally reserved for individual agents? The answer, as one might expect, is ‘In some ways yes, in other ways no.’ The way in which the answer is ‘Yes’ has been described recently by Copp; I intend to discuss his position and defend it against objections. This describes a fairly weak form of autonomy that I will claim does not require the abandonment of methodological individualism or our commonplace intuitions about individual responsibility. I will also discuss, and reject, a stronger conception of autonomy suggested especially by the work of Pettit that would result in methodological individualism.

The weak collective agential autonomy thesis

Disputatio

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{"article-title":"The weak collective agential autonomy thesis"}

Can a collective be an agent in its own right? Can it be the bearer of moral and other properties that we have traditionally reserved for individual agents?...

The weak collective agential autonomy thesis

Publicado en línea: 31 dic 2018

Páginas: 215 - 234

Recibido: 14 sept 2010

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2011-0009

Palabras clave
Collective responsibility, collective agency, methodological individualism, supervenience

© 2011 David Botting, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

The weak collective agential autonomy thesis

Publicado en línea: 31 dic 2018

Páginas: 215 - 234

Recibido: 14 sept 2010

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2011-0009

Palabras claveCollective responsibility, collective agency, methodological individualism, supervenience

© 2011 David Botting, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Palabras clave
Collective responsibility, collective agency, methodological individualism, supervenience