<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>According to David Lewis’ contextualist analysis of knowledge, there can be contexts in which a subject counts as knowing a proposition just because every possibility that this proposition might be false is irrelevant in those contexts. In this paper I argue that, in some cases at least, Lewis’ analysis results in granting people non-evidentially based knowledge of ordinary contingent truths which, intuitively, cannot be known but on the basis of appropriate evidence.</p></abstract>

According to David Lewis’ contextualist analysis of knowledge, there can be contexts in which a subject counts as knowing a proposition just because every possibility that this proposition might be false is irrelevant in those contexts. In this paper I argue that, in some cases at least, Lewis’ analysis results in granting people non-evidentially based knowledge of ordinary contingent truths which, intuitively, cannot be known but on the basis of appropriate evidence.

Relevant Alternatives Contextualism and Ordinary Contingent Knowledge

Disputatio

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

{"article-title":"Relevant Alternatives Contextualism and Ordinary Contingent Knowledge"}

According to David Lewis’ contextualist analysis of knowledge, there can be contexts in which a subject counts as knowing a proposition just because every...

Relevant Alternatives Contextualism and Ordinary Contingent Knowledge

Publicado en línea: 31 dic 2018

Páginas: 281 - 294

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2008-0002

© 2008 Franck Lihoreau, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.