The influence of civil society on Ukrainian anti-corruption policy after the Maidan

In 2014, Ukrainian experts and scholars founded a network of civil society organisations called the Reanimation Package of Reforms (RPR). The network coordinates the work of 83 non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The RPR network provides action plans for key reforms of the public sector in Ukraine and takes the role of a watchdog during their implementation process. Core topics of the reforms advocated by the RPR network encompass anti-corruption, decentralization and public administration.

This article examines how civil society actors of the RPR have influenced Ukrainian anti-corruption policy after the Maidan events in 2014. We draw on the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) (Jenkins-Smith, Nohrstedt, Weible, & Ingold, 2017; Sabatier, 1987) to trace the influence of the RPR on key anti-corruption reforms and on the implementation of these reforms. The ACF argues that shocks can generate policy change through a redistribution of coalitions’ resources and by changing the conditions to access policy venues (Sabatier and Weible, 2007, p. 199). We argue that the events of the Maidan in Kyiv consisted of a shock that led to both a redistribution of resources among coalitions and a change in policy venue access for civil society actors. Most importantly, the Maidan transferred the most important political resource, the formal legal authority to make policy decision to a pro-reform coalition comprising the RPR. In addition, the crisis following the Maidan increased the leverage of international organisations such as the European Union (EU) or the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on the Ukrainian government. The RPR strategically used the newly gained access to policymaking venues and the increased leverage of international actors to advocate for enhanced anti-corruption policies.

With this article, we aim to contribute to the body of literature on the influence of civil society on policy making, to studies on Ukrainian anti-corruption policy, as well as to the ACF literature. There is a large body of literature focusing on anti-corruption policy more broadly (e.g., Persson, Rothstein & Teorell, 2012) and studies on Ukrainian anti-corruption policy more specifically (Grodeland, 2010; Denisova-Schmidt, Huber, & Leontyeva, 2016). However, only a few recent studies focus on the role of civil society in the anti-corruption policy subsystem in Ukraine (Harasymiw, 2019; Zaloznaya, Reisinger, & Claypool, 2018).

In the growing body of research applying the ACF to explain policy change, there are only a few applications to Central and Eastern Europe (e.g., Poljak, 2018; Albright 2011). Moreover, we contribute to the ACF by shedding light on the role that international actors can play in domestic coalitions. The role of international organisations in domestic advocacy coalitions remains an under-researched topic in the ACF (for an exception, see Kukkonen et al., 2018), and literature on policy advice of international organisations on domestic policy does not refer to the ACF (Fang & Stone, 2012; Schlaufer, 2019).

Methodologically, we rely on a systematic analysis of policy documents and reports by the RPR network, expert reports, as well as of EU, IMF, and OECD international donor reports. Changes in anti-corruption policy are examined through an analysis of Ukrainian legislation. In addition, we conducted semi-structured interviews with experts and stakeholders of the anti-corruption policy subsystem in Ukraine to triangulate the findings from the document analysis.

The remainder of the article is structured as follows. First, we outline the theoretical framework and deduce expectations for the Ukrainian anti-corruption policy case. The methodological section describes the procedure of data collection and analysis. Subsequently, the findings are presented and their implications for the involvement of civil society in the Ukrainian anti-corruption policy are discussed. The article concludes with a short discussion of the contributions of the inquiry for the ACF.

The ACF examines how actors attempt to influence policy in a specific policy subsystem (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2017; Sabatier, 1987; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1994). The policy subsystem is the main unit of analysis of the ACF. Policy subsystems are defined by the substantial focus on a policy topic, territorial boundaries, and the different actors that regularly attempt to influence policy in the subsystem (such as governmental officials, legislators, civil society representatives, think tanks, and researchers) (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2017, p. 139).

According to the ACF, actors form so-called advocacy coalitions to influence policy in the subsystem. In a subsystem, typically two (but sometimes up to four) advocacy coalitions form to advocate for their preferred policy preferences. Actors are organised into advocacy coalitions on the basis of two criteria: 1) actors share common beliefs and 2) actors coordinate their strategies to influence policy (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2017).

The ACF separates the first criteria, belief systems, into three different categories: First, core beliefs, which are hard to change and encompass fundamental beliefs. Second, policy core belief, which are also not easily changeable, but are restricted to a policy subsystem. Policy core beliefs include basic value priorities within the policy subsystem such as perception of the causes of policy problems and preferred solutions for the problem. The third and most easily changeable belief set constitutes secondary beliefs that deal with the subcomponents of the policy subsystem or specific tools to achieve goals. (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2017; Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1994). The second criterion, coordination, maintains that actors who share policy beliefs coordinate their activities, either strongly or weakly (Weible et al., 2019).

Coordination of actors inside a coalition can, for example, take the form of sharing resources to influence policymaking. Advocacy coalitions exploit political resources to strategically influence policy in the subsystem. Political resources of coalitions include formal legal authority to make policy decisions; public opinion; information; mobilizable supporters; financial resources; and skilful leadership (Sabatier & Weible, 2007, pp. 198–201). Nohrstedt (2011) and Heinmiller (2013, 2016) argue that some political resources are more influential than others to influence public policy. A unique status among coalition resources has formal legal authority to make policy decisions. To have coalitional members in a position with formal legal authority is a decisive coalition resource unlike others (Nohrstedt, 2011; Heinmiller, 2013, 2016).

The main goal of the ACF is to explain policy change. The ACF proposes two hypotheses of policy change. The main focus of ACF studies is the first hypothesis that defines significant perturbations external or internal to the policy subsystem, policy-oriented learning, or negotiated agreement as a necessary but not sufficient condition for policy change. The second hypothesis states that policy will not be significantly changed as long as the advocacy coalition that instated the policy remains in power (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2017, p. 147). This second hypothesis has been tested only a few times by scholars focusing on explaining policy stasis alongside policy change (e.g., Hirschi and Widmer, 2010; Kübler, 2001).

The focus of the present study is the first policy change hypothesis. The second policy change hypothesis would require an examination of the question of why anti-corruption policy did not change before the Maidan. Such an analysis is beyond the scope of this article that focuses on the influence of civil society actors on anti-corruption policy after the Maidan. However, our research highlights the importance of new actors coming to power for policy change. We examine this aspect in the context of the first policy change hypothesis, arguing that a perturbation led to a redistribution of legal authority as the most important coalition resource allowing for anti-corruption policy change.

Concerning the first hypothesis, an important role in policy change play perturbations or shocks such as a change in socioeconomic conditions, regime change, crises, or disasters (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2017, p. 145). Such events increase the likelihood of policy change, but they are not sufficient to generate policy change alone. The ACF points to several mechanisms leading from a perturbation to policy change: large-scale events may affect the structures of coalitions, the distribution of the resources of the coalitions, or they may alter the conditions for accessing important policy venues (Albright, 2011; Nohrstedt, 2011). An important mechanism is thereby the redistribution of political resources among coalitions. A perturbation may change the coalition resources to such an extent that the previously minority coalition becomes the dominant coalition in a subsystem. In this case, the most powerful resource, the formal legal authority, is transferred to members of the previous minority coalition (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2017, p. 155; Nohrstedt, 2011). Alternatively, members of minority coalitions or actors, who had previously been excluded from the policy process, may skilfully exploit such perturbations to access new policy venues and have an influence on public policy (Albright, 2011).

To answer our research question of how civil society actors of the RPR have influenced Ukrainian anti-corruption policy after the Maidan, we assume that the Maidan events consisted of a dramatic perturbation of Ukrainian politics and society, and this perturbation led to policy change. We expect that the main mechanism for policy change was that the Maidan transferred the legal authority to make policy decisions to a reform coalition that comprised the civil society actors of the PRP. Thus, the following expectation is drawn from the ACF policy change hypothesis for our case:

Expectation 1: Through the Maidan, the coalition that includes the civil society actors of the RPR gained legal authority to make policy decisions leading to a change in anti-corruption policy.

To answer our research question, we also need to examine how civil society actors of the RPR advocated their preferred anti-corruption policy inside the pro-reform coalition. Anti-corruption literature points to the importance of civil society actors for anti-corruption reforms. Literature suggests that those actors with the legal authority to adopt and implement anti-corruption policies (namely, members of government and parliaments, as well as high-level civil servants) have weak or negative incentives to do so, as these elite actors often benefit from corruption (Abdulai, 2009; Fritzen, 2005; Stapenhurst & Langseth, 1997). This dilemma is made responsible for a variety of unsuccessful anti-corruption reforms, including for the failures of governments that come to power with the promise of fighting corruption. To resolve this dilemma, literature points to the importance of a strong civil society (De Sousa, Hindess, and Larmour, 2012; Mingiu-Pippidi, 2010, 2015). Civil society actors usually advocate for stricter anti-corruption policy than governmental actors do, and they play an important role in overseeing implementation of policies.

Drawing on this literature, we assume that the change in government following the Maidan cannot solely explain anti-corruption policy change. We expect that civil society actors advocating for stricter reforms played an important role. To successfully advocate for stricter anti-corruption policy inside the reform coalition, the RPR needed access to policy venues. The ACF maintains that external perturbations may also open policymaking venues for new actors (Albright, 2011; Jenkins-Smith et al., 2017; Nohrstedt, 2011). We, therefore, expect that:

Expectation 2: The Maidan events increased venue access for civil society actors of the RPR.

In addition, sustained pressure of international organisations can assist in pressuring governmental actors towards anti-corruption reforms. International organisations can influence national anti-corruption policy through a variety of positive and negative incentives, such as the provision or withdrawal of financial aid or the imposition of sanctions (Heineman & Heimann, 2006). We expect that the Maidan increased pressure and leverage of international organisations on Ukrainian policymakers to adopt anti-corruption policies. Civil society actors could, therefore, not only directly advocate for their policy preferences through increased access to governmental policy venues, but also indirectly through collaborating with international organisations.

Research design: We rely on a single case study design to examine our expectations. Policy change in the Ukrainian anti-corruption policy subsystem after the Maidan is seen as a typical case of policy change after a major event (Gerring, 2007, p. 91–93; Seawright and Gerring, 2008). Typical cases provide valuable insights about what processes and causal mechanisms lead to a certain outcome (Bennett, 2004; George & Bennett, 2004).

Data collection: The case study draws primarily on a systematic document analysis and uses semi-structured interviews to illustrate the findings from the document analysis. The documents included in the analysis consist of: 1) Ukrainian policy documents and legal acts on anti-corruption adopted since 2014; 2) policy recommendations issued by the RPR in the years 2014–2019, the RPR roadmap for reforms, RPR reports, and the RPR website; 3) the reports, recommendations, and requirements of international actors to the Ukrainian government. We included documents on anti-corruption policy published between 2014 and 2019 by the three major international actors involved in the reform process in Ukraine: the European Union External Action Service (EEAS), the IMF, and the Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD). Documents concerning the reforms of anti-corruption policy included EEAS project reports, IMF country reports, and the OECD Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan for Ukraine and its progress reports; 4) expert reports on Ukrainian corruption policy; 5) the available secondary literature on corruption policy in Ukraine (see Appendix 1 for a list of primary documents included in the analysis).

The document analysis was triangulated with semi-structured interviews. We conducted interviews with three experts on Ukrainian anti-corruption policy. We selected the interview partners based on their knowledge of the role of the RPR and of international organisations in the Ukrainian anti-corruption policy subsystem. The three experts work for a key member NGO of the RPR, for an international organisation collaborating with the RPR, and for an international donor providing finance to the RPR. The interviews took around one hour and were conducted over skype. The interview guidelines can be found in Appendix 2.

Operationalisation and data analysis: We drew on qualitative content analysis (Mayring, 2010, 2014) to analyse the documents and interview notes. All the texts were coded using a systematic coding scheme with deductive categories. We used the qualitative coding software MAXQDA that allows assigning parts of texts to coding categories. After coding, textual data with the same codes were re-read, interpreted, and summarised by the researchers. The development of the coding system and the interpretation of the data followed several steps: First, before the examination of our expectations, we identified all changes in Ukrainian anti-corruption policy after the Maidan through an analysis of the policies and legal acts adopted after the Maidan. Second, we documented the anti-corruption policy subsystem in Ukraine before and after the Maidan, searching for actors, the cooperation among them, and their belief systems. Third, we examined the recommendations and policy goals promoted by the RPR. For expectation 1, we analysed the resources of the coalitions before and after the Maidan. For expectation 2, we first analysed the potential influence of civil society actors of the RPR on policy. To do so, we searched for evidence on the access of RPR actors to old and new policymaking venues and on the influence of civil society actors on specific policies and legal acts. To test expectation 3, we compared the recommendations of the RPR with the recommendations of the EU, IMF, and the OECD, and examined the leverage of these international actors on Ukrainian policymaking. Table 1 provides a summary of the procedures of coding and analysis.

Drawing on the ACF, this article has examined three expectations about how civil society actors of the RPR had influenced the Ukrainian anti-corruption policy in the aftermath of the Maidan. First, our data shows that, through the Maidan, the coalition that included the RPR gained the most important political resource, namely, formal legal authority to make policy decisions. This allowed the new government to adopt a comprehensive new legal framework and to create new anti-corruption institutions. Our analysis shows that the adopted anti-corruption policies were precisely those that were advocated for by the RPR. To advocate their policy recommendations, the RPR could rely on improved access to policymaking through personal contacts and access to roundtables, working groups, and newly created dialogue platforms. Third, the RPR advocated policy recommendations also through international organisations, who made the anti-corruption reforms proposed by the RPR a condition for their financial support.

An important result of our case study is that civil society organisations could influence anti-corruption policy effectively through their collaboration with international organisations. International organisations had increased leverage on the Ukrainian government after the Maidan, as the country was threatened by default and relied on international assistance. This finding is in line with another recent study on the role of civil society in Ukrainian anti-corruption policy (Harasymiw, 2019). Harasymiw speaks of a ‘sandwich’ strategy, where civil society organisations apply pressure on the government from below while international organisations apply pressure from above. Harasymiw argues that ‘an ad hoc alliance of civil society organizations with international aid organizations which together have succeeded in pressuring the Ukrainian government in several instances into adopting universally accepted anti-corruption measures’ (Harasymiw, 2019, p. 289). Our study could confirm this ‘sandwich’ strategy.

However, another recent study on the role of civil society in anti-corruption reforms in Ukraine argued that, after 2016, civil society actors were deliberately excluded from anti-corruption reform venues (Zaloznaya et al., 2018). Our interviewees also explained that, after 2016, the Ukrainian government took a stronger role in anti-corruption reforms and became less accessible for anti-corruption civil actors (interviews NGO expert, international experts 1 and 2). The interviewed NGO expert argued that the role of the RPR diminished after the implementation of the first round of reforms. Also, the mission of the RPR has now shifted to coordination and training activities.

This raises the question of how sustainable and effective the Ukrainian anti-corruption reforms are. There are indications that the policy reforms have, to a certain extent, been effective (Lough and Dubrovskiy, 2018). The reforms led to a slight improvement in Ukraine's score in the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of Transparency International. The CPI measures the perceived corruption on a scale from 1 to 100. In 2013, Ukraine reached 25 points out of 100 in the CPI. In 2019, the CPI of Ukraine was 30 points out of 100. Although this means a slight improvement, Ukraine is still only ranked 126 out of 180 countries. The experts interviewed in the framework of this study all agreed that the situation slightly improved between 2014 and 2019. According to the interviewed NGO expert, the changes of the past five years led to the establishment of a full institutional framework in the anti-corruption field. Another expert pointed to the positive changes in governmental openness and transparency, where the Ukrainian level is today comparably higher than in many other countries (interview international expert 1).

Despite these improvements, many challenges remain (Lough and Dubrovskiy, 2018). Enforceability of anti-corruption laws remains one of the most important bottlenecks of effective anti-corruption policy in Ukraine. After a phase of rapid change after the Maidan, the speed of reforms has slowed down. It remains an open question how the government Zelensky will advance in the anti-corruption field.

The purpose of this article was to examine how civil society actors of the RPR have influenced the Ukrainian anti-corruption policy after the Maidan events in 2014. Our analysis has shown that the Ukrainian anti-corruption policy has undergone significant changes in the past years. These changes were crucially influenced by civil society actors and the RPR especially. Most importantly, our research highlights how domestic NGOs can use international actors who have higher leverage to influence policy reforms.

These findings contribute in three ways to the ACF. First, they confirm the previous ACF research that demonstrates how a significant perturbation external to the subsystem can lead to a redistribution of resources and motivate policy change (e.g., Albright, 2011; Nohrstedt, 2011). Second, our research highlights the importance of international actors inside advocacy coalitions. While previous ACF studies have examined the role of advocacy coalitions in globalised policy issues (Litfin, 2000), the present study introduces another strand of argument by focusing on the role of international organisations inside domestic advocacy coalitions. Third, the present research focuses on the processes of advocacy among partners of the same coalition.

Despite these contributions to the ACF and to the debate on the influence of civil society in policymaking, this study also has limitations to address. First, these results have been deduced from one single case in the specific context of Ukraine. Second, the case study includes only three interviews. To address this limitation, we triangulated interviews with a systematic document analysis. Also, the interviewed experts were selected based on their thorough knowledge of the Ukrainian anti-corruption policy subsystem. Therefore, further investigations are needed into the relationship between governments, civil society organisations, and international actors.