Publicado en línea: 07 sept 2023
Páginas: 357 - 376
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/bjals-2023-0028
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© 2023 Michael J. Slinger, published by Sciendo
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.
In the second of his three articles in this special issue of the
The struggle particularly worried Great Britain. A victory by the Confederate States of America (“CSA”) posed serious threats to Britain's food supply; its efforts to end global slavery; and its overseas territories (due to the likelihood of increased adventurism by France and Spain). In contrast, a victory by the United States carried with it the prospect of economic ruin as Britain's all-important textile industry would no longer have access to cheap Southern cotton.
As its title suggests, this essay discusses the major elements of Britain's CSA policy. Much of what Britain did came in response to decisions by President Abraham Lincoln that challenged existing international law norms. This essay also will discuss why Britain nearly took up arms against the United States—an action that would have triggered a world war—as well as how the outcome of the Civil War set the stage for a lasting friendship between the two nations.
As is well known, the United States was created following a violent break between Great Britain and 13 of its 15 North American colonies.
The colonies of East Florida and West Florida remained loyal to Great Britain, but at the end of the war reverted to Spanish control. In 1819, they became American territories by virtue of the Adams-Onís Treaty.
In the meantime, the peace between Britain and the United States proved to be a cold one. Britain still controlled large swaths of North America, including Canada and various western territories that eventually would become part of the United States. In addition, Britain continued to occupy forts in the Great Lakes region, the Northwest Territory, and Upper New York, even though the Treaty of Paris required these installations to be turned over to the United States.
Further conflict was threatened by the 1792 war between Britain and France. Although the United States eventually sided with Britain, resulting in the Quasi-War with France (1798–1800), it had been a close call. Many Americans supported France (the United States’ principal ally in the Revolutionary War) and favored starting a new war with Britain.
The Quasi-War ended following the signing of the Treaty of Mortefontaine (1800).
Subsequently, a series of escalating commercial, diplomatic, and maritime disputes between Britain and the United States resulted in the War of 1812.
The War of 1812 was highly controversial in the United States. Delegates to the Hartford Convention (Dec. 15, 1814–Jan. 5, 1815), a meeting of New England's Federalist Party, considered seceding from the United States because of their opposition to it. The first attempt had occurred during the Revolutionary War and was co-led by Benedict Arnold, later America's most infamous traitor but at the time its most esteemed general after George Washington. Among other things, the Battle of New Orleans (Jan. 8, 1815) solidified the reputation of General Andrew Jackson and helped paved his way to the presidency (1829–37). The Treaty of Ghent essentially left everything as it had been prior to the war.
From its inception, the United States was divided economically, geographically, and morally by the institution of slavery. However, in 1776 the Northern states began to make slavery illegal. Thereafter, the economy of the two regions, although interdependent in many ways, developed radically different models. The Northern states became industrial powerhouses that would prove to be serious rivals to Europe. In contrast, the Southern states chose to remain agriculturally based, dependent upon enslaved labor. At the time of the Civil War, there were approximately four million enslaved persons in the United States, all of African descent and nearly all of whom lived in the American South.
The Southern states were vitally important to Britain because of the tremendous success that Southerners had growing cotton. Cotton was one of the principal raw resources that fueled Britain's industrial revolution.
“By the late 1700's cotton products would account for around 16% of Britain's exports; [by] the early 1800's this would multiply to around 42%. Britain was dominating the world market.” Jessica Brain, By 1860, slave labor in the U.S. South was producing over two billion pounds of cotton per year. . . . Between the years 1820 and 1860, approximately 80 percent of the global cotton supply was produced in the United States. Nearly all the exported cotton was shipped to Great Britain, fueling its burgeoning textile industry and making the powerful British Empire increasingly dependent on American cotton and southern slavery.
P. Scott Corbett et al.,
The dependence on the South's cotton put the British in a truly uncomfortable position. In 1833, Britain had made slavery illegal nearly everywhere in its empire,
“During the nearly three centuries of the transatlantic slave trade, more than 2.3 million enslaved people disembarked in Britain's Caribbean colonies, compared with roughly 390,000 in the Thirteen Colonies and the US.” Scanlan, Britain withdrew from the international slave trade in 1807 and thereafter took aggressive steps to stop it: “Between 1807 and 1860, the Royal Navy, West Africa Squadron seized approximately 1600 ships involved in the slave trade and freed 150,000 Africans who were aboard these vessels.” Royal Naval Museum & Portsmouth Historic Dockyard,
In seceding from the Union, the CSA counted on Britain's dependence on “King Cotton” to force it to both recognize and support the CSA. In fact, the CSA's expectation of victory was based largely on its belief that cotton was so indispensable that Britain (and the rest of Europe) would have no choice but to come to the aid of the CSA.
As has been explained elsewhere, “If indeed the Confederacy did cut off Britain's cotton supply, [it was expected] there would be such pressure on the British government to get that cotton flowing freely to England again that it would take whatever steps [were] necessary, including breaking the Union blockade of the Confederate coastline.” Gary W. Gallagher,
While the South was an invaluable economic partner to Britain because of its production of cotton, the North developed diverse industries that became a significant rival to Britain and the rest of Europe. Indeed, “by 1860, the United States was second only to Great Britain and France in manufacturing [output].”
David Jaffee,
Business competition between nations often results in political and sometimes military conflict. It was clear that the British and the Americans viewed each other as significant rivals for control of the world's economy. Either side would consider the industrial failure of the other as a positive outcome. This was particularly the case in Britain because American industrial output was growing by leaps and bounds. The British therefore understood that the Americans, with their access to abundant natural resources and a seemingly inexhaustible supply of immigrant labor, would one day surpass them as the world's top industrial power.
Thus, while the British economy needed the American South, the British knew they would benefit from the harm that would result to their chief economic rival if the Southern states succeeded in leaving the Union and forming their own nation.
The epic story of the decades of conflict which led to the decision by 11 Southern states to secede from the United States and form a new nation based on the perpetual protection of the institution of slavery is beyond the scope of this essay.
Innumerable books have been written about the events that led to the Civil War and the question of whether secession from the Union was legal. Excellent examples include: E
The secession of the South, and the hostilities it engendered, presented Europe with a host of challenges and questions, as well as certain opportunities.
Among other things, the break-up of the United States promised to lessen the threat that the country, founded on democratic principles, posed to the class-based nations of Europe. The chaos and horrors of the French Revolution (1789–99) still haunted Europe's elite, and even France once again was under monarchical rule in the person of Emperor Napoleon III (1852–70).
When the Civil War began, Lincoln made it clear that his sole goal was to restore the Union.
In a letter to the American newspaper publisher Horace Greeley, Lincoln explained:
My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or to destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave I would do it, and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone I would also do that. What I do about slavery, and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save the Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the Union. I shall do less whenever I shall believe what I am doing hurts the cause, and I shall do more whenever I shall believe doing more will help the cause. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Horace Greeley (Aug. 22, 1862), Having received no responses to his previous offer, Lincoln now declared slaves free in nearly all of the CSA's 10 states (by this time Tennessee, the CSA's 11th state, was effectively in Union hands due to the battles of Fort Donelson and Fort Henry and the CSA's failed counterattack at the Battle of Shiloh (Apr. 6–7, 1862)):
I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, by virtue of the power in me vested as Commander-in-Chief, of the Army and Navy of the United States . . . do, on this first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, and in accordance with my [previous proclamation of Sept. 22, 1862], order and designate as the States and parts of States wherein the people thereof respectively, are this day in rebellion against the United States, the following, to wit: Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana (except the Parishes of St. Bernard, Plaquemines, Jefferson, St. John, St. Charles, St. James Ascension, Assumption, Terrebonne, Lafourche, St. Mary, St. Martin, and Orleans, including the City of New Orleans), Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, and Virginia (except the forty-eight counties designated as West Virginia, and also the counties of Berkley, Accomac, Northampton, Elizabeth City, York, Princess Ann, and Norfolk, including the cities of Norfolk and Portsmouth), and which excepted parts, are for the present, left precisely as if this proclamation were not issued. And by virtue of the power, and for the purpose aforesaid, I do order and declare that all persons held as slaves within said designated States, and parts of States, are, and henceforward shall be free; and that the Executive government of the United States, including the military and naval authorities thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of said persons. . . . Proclamation No. 95 (Jan. 1, 1863),
The 11 Southern states that chose to secede from the Union wasted no time in declaring themselves to be an independent nation. Having their self-declared nation recognized as an independent country was a critical goal of the fledgling CSA, because this would entitle it to a host of privileges and rights under international law, including, most importantly, the right to make alliances with other nations.
Lincoln was adamant that the secession of the Southern states was a mere rebellion without legal authority and therefore had no right to either domestic or international legal protection. He therefore was determined to do all he could to see that the CSA was denied foreign recognition. This would require the United State to walk a legal, military, and political tightrope that was likely put it in conflict with international law and might lead to war with Britain and the rest of Europe.
William H. Seward, the pugnacious U.S. Secretary of State, summarized matters by saying: “The Government will not shrink from using all the means which they consider necessary to restore the Union. A contest between Great Britain and the United States would wrap the world in fire, and at the end it would not be the United States which would have to lament the results of the conflict.” William Howard Russell,
In 1861, international law consisted largely of common law practices, bolstered by a few multiple-nation treaties. Largely undefined were the rights of belligerents, with a sharp distinction existing between American and European practice. Americans supported the idea that U.S.-style democracy should be encouraged throughout the world. As a result, the country had a liberal test for granting recognition to new nations, including those seeking independence through revolution.
The United States traditionally had championed neutrality and the free-trade rights of neutrals (even with belligerents); refrained from threatening military action against Europe's great powers; and encouraged the speedy recognition of organized rebellions in the Western Hemisphere (typically involving former Latin American colonies).
The liberal policy of the United States put it squarely at odds with the more conservative interpretation favored by European officials.
As Lauterpacht noted:
The question whether France committed a breach of international law by her early recognition of the United States in 1778; the protracted controversy concerning the Spanish protests against the recognition of the Latin American Republics by the United States and Great Britain; the demand of the Confederate States for recognition during the American Civil War, a demand which was discussed mainly not from the point of view of the right of the Confederacy to recognition, but by reference to the propriety of such a step in relation to the United States; . . . all these incidents have occupied international lawyers as questions of premature recognition. It is generally agreed that premature recognition is more than an unfriendly act; it is an act of intervention and an international delinquency.
With international law rules unclear regarding the recognition of a new state claiming independence during a civil war, and with a country as powerful as the United States threatening retaliation against any nation that did recognize the CSA, Britain and the other nations of Europe faced a diplomatic dilemma that resulted in a reinterpretation of their own rules governing recognition:
During the American Civil War, Great Britain had occasion once more to formulate principles of recognition including the indirect acknowledgment of the duty to recognize the seceding community as soon as it fulfills the necessary requirements. In the British answer to the pressing demands of the Confederacy for recognition we find the following passage: “In order to be entitled to a place among the independent nations of the earth, a State ought to have not only strength and resources for a time, but afford promise of stability and permanence.”
The French view admitting the right to recognition was also expressed at that time. While assuring the United States that no hasty or precipitate action would be taken with regard to the recognition of the independence of the Confederacy, the French Government affirmed that “the practice and usage of the present century had fully established the right of
By this time, Lincoln had decided to adopt a hybrid strategy that prioritized taking whatever steps were necessary to win the war, but with a nod to international law, even if generally accepted international rules would not be followed. In effect, Lincoln was daring the British and other nations to acquiesce, or at least not interfere, with what he was doing. The consequences for any nation strictly following the rules of international law would be war with the United States.
Lincoln's war policies included a demand that there be no recognition of, or official support for, the CSA; a naval blockade that would defy the conventional rules of international law; the treatment of captured rebels as prisoners of war rather than traitors; and the confiscation of property of both Americans and foreigners even if this violated international law customs.
One of Lincoln's first major strategic decisions was to declare a blockade against the CSA's coast.
On May 1, 1862, the Union did manage to capture New Orleans, the CSA's largest port. However, the capture of most of the CSA's other major ports—including, Galveston, Mobile, Norfolk, Pensacola, Savannah, and Wilmington, North Carolina—did not occur until near the end of the war.
International law authorized a nation establishing a legal blockade to interdict and seize foreign ships on the high seas if they were suspected of trading with the enemy, something Lincoln believed was vital to stem the flow of imported goods to the rebels. However, Lincoln was running a tremendous risk in establishing what, under international law, appeared to be an illegal blockade, because an illegal blockade was considered an act of war that gave other nations the right to go to war against the United States.
There was strong sentiment in favor of the CSA among many in the British government—including Lord Palmerston, the country's prime minister (1855–58; 1859–65).
At the same time, the government included a sizeable number of U.S. advocates. Britain's working class, being anti-slavery, also favored the Union.
In responding to the United States’ blockade, Queen Victoria accepted the advice of Lord John Russell, Britain's foreign secretary, who believed that the best course was neutrality.
Under international law, belligerency is defined as “the condition of being in fact engaged in war. A nation is deemed a belligerent even when resorting to war in order to withstand or punish an aggressor. A declaration of war is not necessary to create a state of belligerency.” One reason for Lincoln's reticence was the fear of provoking a war with Britain. The other was that the British had decided not to bestow on the CSA the full panoply of rights normally accorded belligerents:
A close examination of the wording [of Queen Victoria's proclamation] showed that Russell had taken away many of the advantages that belligerent status has initially seemed to give to the Confederacy. He had invoked the rarely used 1819 Foreign Enlistment Act, under which British subjects were forbidden to volunteer for a foreign cause or encourage others to do so. The act also prohibited the selling or arming of warships to either belligerent; those who disobeyed the proclamation would be prosecuted, and the offending items confiscated. F
Despite their country's official position, British nationals surreptitiously sold the CSA arms and other articles of war; built it warships; and supplied other needed goods. Many of the “blockade runners” who brought these items to the CSA were British citizens. The British also provided sanctuary in Canada for the CSA's Secret Service; sheltered CSA warships and privateers in safe harbors;
In 1856, at Britain's insistence, privateering had been made illegal under international law.
Lincoln's decision to blockade the CSA's ports was not merely suspect under international law. It also led to a domestic legal challenge, dubbed
Particularly worrisome for Lincoln was the fact that Roger B. Taney, who had been appointed chief justice in 1836 by President Andrew Jackson, was still on the bench. In 1857, Taney had authored the infamous
Lincoln and Taney were far from friends. Lincoln had made a reputation for himself by criticizing the 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487).
The appellants in
Lincoln implemented the blockade, and took several other constitutionally questionable actions, while Congress was in recess.
These additional actions included creating a 75,000-man army; funding the military; and suspending the writ of passed resolutions granting the President the prospective power to declare parts of the country in “insurrection” and to proscribe commerce to and from such parts. . . . For reasons that remain obscure, Congress did not enact a specific statute ratifying Lincoln's measures but rather approved them in a roundabout rider tacked onto a statute increasing pay for federal troops.
Lee,
In
At the U.S. Supreme Court, several legal theories were relied on by the appellants, including inadequate notice of the commencement of the blockade and the absence, under both United States and international law, of any right to institute a blockade. On March 10, 1863, by a 5–4 vote, the Court upheld the blockade.
Pride and resentment had a great deal of influence on the relations between Great Britain and the United States during the American Civil War. These traits were most pronounced in two of the most powerful politicians in their respective countries.
British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston (Henry John Temple, 3rd Viscount Palmerston) had little respect or affection for the United States. As such, he had a strong desire to support the CSA because it would hurt (perhaps irreparably) the United States. Born in Westminster on October 20, 1784, Palmerston had been Britain's Secretary at War during the War of 1812.
Palmerston's chief antagonist was U.S. Secretary of State William H. Seward.
Seward was born in Orange County, New York, on May 16, 1801. Before the Civil War, he was one of the country's leading abolitionists. Like Lincoln, he had sought the Republican Party's 1860 presidential nomination. A decided Anglophobe, he had made it clear he would welcome a war with Britain if it offered recognition to the CSA. Charles Francis Adams, Sr., was born in Boston on August 18, 1807, and was the third son of U.S. Founding Father John Adams. He served as U.S. Envoy (chief diplomat) to Great Britain from May 16, 1861, to May 13, 1868.
The spark of actual military conflict between Britain and the United States nearly was lit by the Mason and Slidell were picked to replace three other CSA diplomats—Ambrose D. Mann, Pierre A. Rost, and William L. Yancey—who for months had failed to make any progress in convincing Europe to side with the CSA.
On October 12, 1861, Mason and Slidell began their trip by boarding the
By this time, Mason and Slidell's plans had come to the attention of Captain Charles Wilkes, the commander of the USS
Americans loyal to the Union cheered the arrests and Congress passed a resolution expressing its appreciation to Wilkes and his crew. In contrast, CSA sympathizers were dismayed by the news but hoped the event would bring Britain into the war on their side. The British response was sheer outrage. Palmerston, believing it was time to teach the United States a lesson,
Upon learning of the incident, Lincoln remarked to Attorney General James Speed:
I am not getting much sleep out of that exploit of Wilkes’, and I suppose we must look up the law of the case. I am not much of a prize lawyer, but it seems to me pretty clear that if Wilkes saw fit to make that capture on the high seas he had no right to turn his quarter-deck into a prize court.
Titian J. Coffey,
Lincoln clearly understood the harm that might result from the seizure and told his cabinet he was willing to fight only one war at a time.
Two letters were prepared by the British, both harsh in their condemnation of the United States’ actions. Neither left much room for a peaceful resolution. The drafts were sent to Queen Victoria for her approval. Although dying from typhoid fever, Prince Albert, the queen's beloved husband, edited the drafts and added language that gave the two sides a graceful way out of the crisis.
After considerable debate—and the realization that a war with Britain while fighting the CSA would be disastrous—the United States accepted Prince Albert's view that Wilkes had acted without orders. Although a formal apology was not issued, Mason and Slidell and their secretaries were released from Fort Warren on January 1, 1862, and reached Southampton, England, four weeks later. Feelings on both sides of the Atlantic continued to be hurt, but war had been avoided.
Despite Queen Victoria's decree of neutrality forbidding British subjects to support either side,
supplies and money still flowed from Britain into the southern states throughout the Civil War. These resources were vital to sustaining the Confederate war effort, especially following the North's imposition of the blockade of the South, beginning in April, 1861. Obtaining a supply of goods and money from Britain required only private business relationships with British merchants and factory owners, not popular or government approval. Britain's premier port of Liverpool offered a trading environment that was favorable to dealing with the renegade states of the Confederacy, and this city soon became a primary base of southern support.
Chris Williams et al.,
The most important aid given by the British to the CSA involved the building of warships:
James Dunwoody Bulloch, the Confederacy's chief foreign agent in Great Britain, led [the] effort to obtain Confederate ships in Liverpool. He particularly negotiated with John Laird Sons & Co. in Birkenhead, across the Mersey River estuary from Liverpool, to build warships for the South. British neutrality meant that warships could not legally be built in the country for either side, but Bulloch circumvented this problem by ensuring that the ships, while clearly designed for battle, were not actually fitted with armaments in Britain. Through this strategy, the ships could be presented as civilian vessels when they left British jurisdiction, but they would then travel to Terceira, a Portuguese island located in the North Atlantic archipelago of the Azores, where they were armed. Bulloch's subterfuge was blatant, but it successfully confused the legal definition of what could be defined a warship in Great Britain.
Britons also participated in the fighting. According to British-American historian Amanda L. Foreman, 50,000 British citizens served in various capacities in the American Civil War.
The first year of the war (April 1861 to April 1862) saw a string of CSA military victories. France had been pressuring the British to join it in insisting that the two American sides submit to international mediation to end the conflict.
France's call for mediation was not motivated by humanitarian concerns. Instead, it was part of its plan to seize Mexico (in violation of America's “Monroe Doctrine”). In 1862, France went ahead with its plan and set up a puppet government in Mexico. Immediately after the Civil War ended, the United States helped to evict the French from Mexico. As has been explained elsewhere,
International law permitted intervention by neutral nations to prevent irreparable harm in their own interests. The British people were not required to stand by as witnesses to economic chaos and political unrest in their homeland caused by other peoples’ quarrels. That summer, British ministers and Parliament seriously debated all options from mediation to mandated arbitration, with force if necessary, which almost certainly would have led to Confederate independence. No one doubted [that the British] had the navy to do it. Dwight Hughes,
As noted earlier in this essay, it was during this time that Lincoln made his fateful decision to turn the war from simply a battle to save the Union into a war for freedom by issuing his preliminary Emancipation Proclamation.
Fearing that the proclamation might be viewed as little more than an act of desperation given how the war was going, Lincoln decided to hold off announcing it until he had a Union victory in hand. That victory came at the Battle of Antietam on September 17, 1862.
Antietam was the single bloodiest day of combat in American history. Although more of a technical victory than a decisive win, it gave Lincoln what he needed.
The reaction among the British working class and liberals in Parliament was electric. Although many in the British press were skeptical and viewed Lincoln's announcement as a mere ploy to gain European sympathy, the British people now considered the Civil War a war for freedom.
As one source has explained, “The British people strongly opposed slavery. When they heard that the slaves would be freed, they gave their support immediately to President Lincoln and the North.”
The CSA believed that Britain's economy could not survive without Southern cotton. As a result, the CSA felt it was inevitable that Britain (and the rest of Europe) would join its fight for independence. In making this calculation, the CSA overlooked three important facts.
First, due to a food shortage in Europe, the British desperately needed corn and wheat from the Northern United States. These items were much more critical to the maintenance of daily life in Britain than Southern cotton. Second, prior to the commencement of the Civil War, the British had realized that the flow of Southern cotton would be imperiled. As a result, its merchants had gone on a buying binge. This stockpile helped to mitigate the subsequent damage to Britain's economy. Third, recognizing that no stockpile would be enough, the British began to encourage the expansion of cotton growing in Egypt and India. This effort proved highly successful in replacing Southern cotton during the latter stages of the war.
For a further discussion, see Frenise A. Logan,
By the spring of 1865, the CSA's armies had been defeated and the Southern economy was in shambles. Four years of civil war had resulted in at least 720,000 military deaths and an unknowable number of civilian casualties. The war's final chapter saw the tragic assassination of Lincoln by Southern stalwart John Wilkes Booth (Apr. 14, 1865) followed by a torturous period referred to as “Reconstruction” (1865–77). Hard feelings between the victorious North and the vanquished South resulted in decades of estrangement. Freedom for the enslaved was made permanent by the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which Lincoln had championed. However, a bitter period of racial segregation and discrimination known as “Jim Crow” would last nearly a century.
Jim Crow laws in the Southern states ensured second class citizenship and rank discrimination against African Americans. Shamefully, these laws were upheld repeatedly by the U.S. Supreme Court until
Although the war was over, the U.S. Congress could neither forget nor forgive the surreptitious support the British had given the CSA. Even though the British argued that any such support had been illegal and was unsanctioned by the Crown, Congress believed otherwise and demanded that the British be held to account.
As explained earlier in this essay, British shipyards had built several ships for the CSA.
These ships were responsible for at least 150 captures or sinkings of U.S. ships. The
The resulting dispute over these ships became known as the Charles Sumner, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, argued that British aid to the Confederacy had prolonged the Civil War by 2 years, and indirectly cost the United States hundreds of millions, or even billions of dollars (the figure Sumner suggested was $2.125 billion). Some Americans adopted this argument and suggested that Britain should offer Canada to the United States in compensation.
M
Following six years of negotiation, Britain agreed to arbitrate the matter and eventually paid the United States $15.5 million (the equivalent today of $389 million).
The U.S. Civil War, of course, was a uniquely American event. But the vital role played by Great Britain—and the decisions it made as the conflict raged on—should not be overlooked. Indeed, the war cannot be fully understood without a careful examination of Britain's actions and inactions.