Analysis of enterprise management technology and innovation based on multilinear regression model
, y | 15 dic 2021
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Publicado en línea: 15 dic 2021
Páginas: 523 - 532
Recibido: 16 jun 2021
Aceptado: 24 sept 2021
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/amns.2021.1.00078
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© 2021 Fangfang Du et al., published by Sciendo
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Analysis of descriptive statistical results
| R&D investment (R&D) | 0.0727 | 0.0778 | 0 | 0.9839 |
| Technological innovation efficiency (D_1) | 0.1223 | 0.4972 | 0 | 15.51 |
| Equity concentration (CR3) | 0.5154 | 0.1299 | 0.0445 | 0.9412 |
| State-owned Equity (NEY) | 0.0423 | 0.2016 | 0 | 1 |
| Independent Director (IDR) | 0.3743 | 0.0561 | 0.333 | 0.667 |
| Two Shares in One (LST) | 0.4256 | 0.4946 | 0 | 1 |
| Board of Supervisors shareholding (BSS) | 0.5052 | 0.5002 | 1 | 1 |
| Executive ownership [MIT] | 0.1940 | 0.1973 | 0 | 0.8968 |
The efficiency expectation relationship between enterprise management and technological innovation
| Concentration of ownership | + | + |
| The nature of the state-owned shareholding | − | − |
| Proportion of independent directors | + | + |
| Two jobs in one | + | − |
| The Board of Supervisors holds shares | + | + |
| Executive equity incentives | + | + |
| Debt to asset ratio | − | − |
| Suppliers rely on | − | + |
Study variables and explanations
| The explained variable | Investment in technological innovation | R&D | R&D investment/business investment |
| Explanatory variable | Technological innovation efficiency | D-1 | Development investment/R&D investment |
| Concentration of ownership | Cr3 | The sum of the shareholding ratio of the top three shareholders | |
| Nature of the largest shareholder | ney | State ownership is marked as 1, otherwise marked as 0 | |
| Proportion of independent directors | idr | Number of independent directors/total number of board members | |
| Chairman and general manager | lst | The combination of two jobs is marked as 1, otherwise as 0 | |
| Two jobs in one | |||
| The Board of Supervisors holds shares | bss | Number of shares held by members of the Board of Supervisors/total share capital | |
| Executive equity incentives | mit | Number of shares held by managers/total share capital | |
| Debt to asset ratio | debt | Total liabilities/total assets | |
| Suppliers rely on | spe | Top 5 Supplier Product Amount/Total Product Value | |
| Control variables | Company size | size | The natural logarithm of assets in tens of millions |
| Corporate performance | roe | Net profit/total assets | |
| Industry characteristics | ich | For high-tech enterprises, it is 1, otherwise it is 0 |
Pearson coefficient test results analysis
| Cr3 | 1.0000 | −0.0614 | 0.0152 | 0.0813 | −0.2384 | 0.1403 | −0.0807 | 0.0866 |
| ney | −0.0614 | 1.0000 | −0.1152 | −0.1637 | −0.0838 | −0.1689 | 0.0397 | −0.0365 |
| idr | 0.0152 | −0.1152 | 1.0000 | −0.0015 | −0.0323 | 0.1417 | −0.0553 | −0.0853 |
| lst | 0.0813 | −0.1637 | −0.0015 | 1.0000 | −0.0054 | 0.6012 | −0.0276 | 0.0803 |
| bss | −0.2384 | −0.0838 | −0.0323 | −0.0054 | 1.0000 | 0.0655 | −0.1309 | 0.0362 |
| mit | 0.1403 | −0.1689 | 0.1417 | 0.6012 | 0.0655 | 1.0000 | −0.1150 | 0.0960 |
| debt | −0.0807 | 0.0397 | −0.0553 | −0.0276 | −0.1309 | −0.1150 | 1.0000 | −0.1799 |
| spe | 0.0866 | −0.0365 | −0.0853 | 0.0803 | 0.0362 | 0.0960 | −0.1799 | 1.0000 |
Regression analysis
| Cr3 | + | 0.210 |
0.134 | 2.97 | 0.003 |
| ney | − | −0.130 |
0.086 | −2.11 | 0.010 |
| idr | + | 0.447 | 0.307 | 0.75 | 0.410 |
| lst | − | 0.033 |
0.042 | 1.77 | 0.044 |
| bss | + | 0.026 |
0.035 | 2.14 | 0.009 |
| mit | + | 0.074 | 0.109 | 0.68 | 0.499 |
| debt | − | −0.111 |
0.119 | −2.78 | 0.005 |
| spe | + | −0.036 | 0.090 | −0.4 | 0.687 |
| size | + | 0.001 | 0.027 | 0.03 | 0.974 |
| roe | − | −0.013 |
0.022 | −4.00 | 0.000 |
| ich | − | 0.002 | 0.145 | 0.11 | 0.916 |