<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">

<p>School-local cooperation is an inevitable choice for higher vocational education, and the construction of school-local cooperation institutions and mechanisms has become the key to the deep integration of school-local, mutual benefit and win-win, long-term stability. Based on the evolutionary game theory under artificial intelligence technology, this paper establishes a tripartite game interaction model of government-enterprise-university, makes relevant research assumptions for the triple game interaction model, solves the threefold benefit function, and constructs a tripartite payment matrix of game interaction based on the research assumptions. Based on the three-party game payment matrix, the stability of the three-party evolutionary game model is studied by replicating the dynamic equations. To obtain the specific strategy of the institutional mechanism of school-local cooperation, the stability of the evolutionary game model was analyzed by numerical simulation and simulation using MATLAB software. The results show that: when the model parameters satisfy the stability condition H(1,1,1), the university and enterprise can reach stability after 0.4 and 0.2 unit time of evolution respectively, and the tripartite evolutionary stability can be realized when the participation costs of local government, enterprise and university are all 80, which promotes the choice of school-local cooperation strategy and enhances the quality of talent cultivation in higher vocational education.</p>
</abstract>

School-local cooperation is an inevitable choice for higher vocational education, and the construction of school-local cooperation institutions and mechanisms has become the key to the deep integration of school-local, mutual benefit and win-win, long-term stability. Based on the evolutionary game theory under artificial intelligence technology, this paper establishes a tripartite game interaction model of government-enterprise-university, makes relevant research assumptions for the triple game interaction model, solves the threefold benefit function, and constructs a tripartite payment matrix of game interaction based on the research assumptions. Based on the three-party game payment matrix, the stability of the three-party evolutionary game model is studied by replicating the dynamic equations. To obtain the specific strategy of the institutional mechanism of school-local cooperation, the stability of the evolutionary game model was analyzed by numerical simulation and simulation using MATLAB software. The results show that: when the model parameters satisfy the stability condition H(1,1,1), the university and enterprise can reach stability after 0.4 and 0.2 unit time of evolution respectively, and the tripartite evolutionary stability can be realized when the participation costs of local government, enterprise and university are all 80, which promotes the choice of school-local cooperation strategy and enhances the quality of talent cultivation in higher vocational education.

Analysis of the institutional mechanism of school-site cooperation facilitated by artificial intelligence technology in the context of industry-education integration

Applied Mathematics and Nonlinear Sciences

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

School-local cooperation is an inevitable choice for higher vocational education, and the construction of school-local cooperation institutions and mechanisms...

Analysis of the institutional mechanism of school-site cooperation facilitated by artificial intelligence technology in the context of industry-education integration

Publicado en línea: 26 feb 2024

Páginas: -

Recibido: 04 ene 2024

Aceptado: 10 ene 2024

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/amns-2024-0361

Palabras clave
Evolutionary game, Benefit function, Payment matrix, Replicated dynamic equation, Stability analysis, School-local cooperation

© 2024 Hui Li, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Analysis of the institutional mechanism of school-site cooperation facilitated by artificial intelligence technology in the context of industry-education integration

Publicado en línea: 26 feb 2024

Páginas: -

Recibido: 04 ene 2024

Aceptado: 10 ene 2024

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/amns-2024-0361

Palabras claveEvolutionary game, Benefit function, Payment matrix, Replicated dynamic equation, Stability analysis, School-local cooperation

© 2024 Hui Li, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Palabras clave
Evolutionary game, Benefit function, Payment matrix, Replicated dynamic equation, Stability analysis, School-local cooperation