<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">In this paper, I examine al-Fārābī's and Avicenna's conceptions of the conditional. I show that there are significant differences between the two frames, despite their closeness. Al-Fārābī distinguishes between an accidental conditional and two “essential” conditionals. The accidental conditional can occur only once and pragmatically involves succession. In the first “essential” conditional, the consequent follows regularly the antecedent; pragmatically it involves likeliness. The second “essential” conditional can be either complete or incomplete. Semantically the former means “if and only if”; pragmatically it means “necessarily if and only if”. The latter is expressed by ‘if, then’ and means entailment; pragmatically, it involves necessity and the inclusion of the antecedent into the consequent. As to Avicenna, he rejects explicitly al-Fārābī’s complete conditional and distinguishes between the <italic>luzūm</italic> (real implication) and what he calls <italic>ittifāq</italic>. He quantifies over situations (or times) to express the various conditionals. The two universals <bold>A</bold>C and <bold>E</bold>C are expressed by “In all situations, if…, then…”, while the two particulars <bold>I</bold>C and <bold>O</bold>C are expressed by “In some situations, if…, then..”. This gives them a modal connotation, and makes the universals close to strict implications. Pragmatically, <bold>A</bold>C presupposes the truth of the antecedent, but there is no such presupposition in <bold>E</bold>C, while what is presupposed in both <bold>I</bold>C and <bold>O</bold>C is a (possible) conjunction.Despite these differences, in both systems, the conditional is not truth functional, unlike the Stoic conditional.</abstract>

In this paper, I examine al-Fārābī's and Avicenna's conceptions of the conditional. I show that there are significant differences between the two frames, despite their closeness. Al-Fārābī distinguishes between an accidental conditional and two “essential” conditionals. The accidental conditional can occur only once and pragmatically involves succession. In the first “essential” conditional, the consequent follows regularly the antecedent; pragmatically it involves likeliness. The second “essential” conditional can be either complete or incomplete. Semantically the former means “if and only if”; pragmatically it means “necessarily if and only if”. The latter is expressed by ‘if, then’ and means entailment; pragmatically, it involves necessity and the inclusion of the antecedent into the consequent. As to Avicenna, he rejects explicitly al-Fārābī’s complete conditional and distinguishes between the luzūm (real implication) and what he calls ittifāq. He quantifies over situations (or times) to express the various conditionals. The two universals AC and EC are expressed by “In all situations, if…, then…”, while the two particulars IC and OC are expressed by “In some situations, if…, then..”. This gives them a modal connotation, and makes the universals close to strict implications. Pragmatically, AC presupposes the truth of the antecedent, but there is no such presupposition in EC, while what is presupposed in both IC and OC is a (possible) conjunction.Despite these differences, in both systems, the conditional is not truth functional, unlike the Stoic conditional.

The Semantics and Pragmatics of the Conditional in al-Fārābī’s and Avicenna’s Theories

Faculté des Sciences Humaines et Sociales de Tunis

Studia Humana

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

In this paper, I examine al-Fārābī's and Avicenna's conceptions of the conditional. I show that there are significant differences between the two frames,...

The Semantics and Pragmatics of the Conditional in al-Fārābī’s and Avicenna’s Theories

Publicado en línea: 29 may 2017

Páginas: 5 - 17

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/sh-2017-0002

Palabras clave
Essential accidental conditional, entailment, strict implication, strict equivalence, quantified conditionals

© 2017 Saloua Chatti, published by De Gruyter Open

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

The Semantics and Pragmatics of the Conditional in al-Fārābī’s and Avicenna’s Theories

Publicado en línea: 29 may 2017

Páginas: 5 - 17

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/sh-2017-0002

Palabras claveEssential accidental conditional, entailment, strict implication, strict equivalence, quantified conditionals

© 2017 Saloua Chatti, published by De Gruyter Open

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Palabras clave
Essential accidental conditional, entailment, strict implication, strict equivalence, quantified conditionals