Volumen 39 (2021): Heft 1 (December 2021)
SUCCESSES AND FAILURES IN ECONOMIC LIFE

Ludwik Wołowski was a Polish November emigrant in France. There, he gained recognition as an outstanding economist, banker and republican politician. The article focuses on the issue of mortgage loan, which is extremely important for Wołowski. It presents both the theoretical concepts of the Pole from 1834, his political activity in the years 1848–1851 aimed at changing the provisions of the mortgage law in France, and finally the moment of co-creation by Wołowski Crédit Foncier, the first modern mortgage bank in France, and the further history of the bank managed by Wołowski, in the board of which he sat until his death in 1876. In the first part, the text presents not only the criticism of the French mortgage system by Wołowski (primarily the so-called secret mortgages), but also his draft changes and the loan and mortgage model proposed by him and the companies that may grant it. In the second, it shows the parliamentary activity of Wołowski, an attempt to force through appropriate changes in the banking law and the reasons for its defeat. In the third, the most extensive, the article describes not only the very moment of establishing Crédit Foncier and the two-year period of management by Wołowski, but also the further, controversial operation of the bank until the second half of the 1870s. All this against the backdrop of the changing French Monarchy of July, the Second Republic and the Second Empire.

This paper examines the ideologies informing the expansion of Japanese rule at c. 1900. The core feature discussed is the idea of tenka (天下; literally translated: all under heaven), constituting the group of ruled in terms of a universalist indigenat (kokumin 国民), which allowed its expansion beyond the Japanese archipelago at government discretion. The concept of the universalist indigenat, having been tied to the Confucian perception of the world as a well-ordered and change-absorbing entity, conflicted with the European concept of the nation as a particularistically conceived type of group, tied to the perception of the world as a dynamic and largely unruly entity. During the latter third of the nineteenth and the early years of the twentieth century, some Japanese intellectuals came to appreciate the dynamism enshrined in the European perception of the world and worked it into established universalism. The fusion produced a powerful ideology of colonial expansion targeted primarily at East and Southeast Asia as well as the South Pacific. By contrast, European military strategists and political theorists, unaware of the Japanese strategic conceptions, expected that solely Russia formed the target of Japanese military expansion.

Cocoa production has been a major source of income and revenue to many citizens and the governor of Ghana respectively through time. Historically, although attributed to Tetteh Quarshie, records have shown that prior to Tetteh Quarshie’s achievement, the Dutch and Basel Missionaries had experimented with the crop in the Gold Coast. Since its introduction in the country, cocoa production has expanded and spread across all the regions in Ghana. The production of cocoa has affected every facet of development in the country since its inception and has once led Ghana to be world’s major exporter of the beans. Cocoa production in Ghana has gone beyond its agricultural and economic significance with its impacts felt across socio-cultural, religious and political life of Ghanaians. That notwithstanding, scholars have made partial effort at addressing the impact of cocoa production among Ghanaians between 1879 and 1976. Using a qualitative approach rooted in both primary and secondary sources, the current study sought to address the gap aforementioned by tracing the relationship between cocoa production and economics, politics and social-religious practices among Ghanaian between 1879 and 1976. Findings from the discourse revealed that though an agricultural product, cocoa can no longer be said to belong to that sphere alone. The product and its associated gains have permeated the entire life of Ghanaians since its inception.

While often operating the margins of propriety, advertisers and marketers are constrained by the social mores of their times. During the early nineteenth century, product promotion opportunities were limited to a mix of newspapers, hoardings and pamphlets. Some enterprising entrepreneurs and innovative individuals pushed the envelope of the acceptable, effectively creating new standards. This paper presents the first case study where the advertising and marketing strategies of a single French entrepreneur are being examined in depth.

To successfully promote his products, the small-scale paint manufacturer Louis Viard employed a range of strategies. These ranged from the true and tried media of newspaper advertisements, product packaging and advertising cards to more innovative modes of promotion, such as mobile advertising on delivery carts as well as flamboyant street processions, to clever and engaging use of billboards and product placement in plays. In addition, he maintained a workforce of loudly attired roaming painters, who combined promotion and marketing at the same time.

Based on the research potential of the Wrocław higher education center and its achievements in mathematics and automation, Wrocławskie Zakłady Elektroniczne “Elwro” was launched in the capital of Lower Silesia, in the late 1950s. Starting with the production of relatively simple electrotechnical devices, the company transformed in just a few years into a manufacturer of digital machines of its own design, “Odra”. They have found wide application in science, administration, communication and industry − both in Poland and abroad, mainly in the Comecon member states. The 1970s were the period of the peak development of WZE “Elwro”, in which apart from devices of its own design, computers belonging to the so-called Uniform System of Digital Electronic Machines of Comecon countries, were also being produced. The effects of the economic crisis of the 1980s abruptly reduced the orders for computers produced in “Elwro”, and their development and production was slowed down by problems with obtaining materials that were scarce in the country and foreign currency for foreign purchases. The technological distance between the “Elwro” offer and the equipment manufactured in the leading countries of the West was growing. After the start of the system transformation in the country, the management of “Elwro” attempted to carry out radical organizational transformations and grant the company the status of a joint-stock company. However, they were held back for too long by both the lack of government support and the concerns of the works council. Meanwhile, deteriorating economic results forced the management of “Elwro” to reduce employment and sell more and more assets. Ultimately, in 1993, the plants were transformed into a sole-shareholder company of the State Treasury, and then sold to the German concern “Siemens”. For the new owner, the only thing that mattered was the access to the Polish telecommunications market obtained in this way. He did not use the still existing human resources and production potential of “Elwro” and, shortly after the purchase, practically liquidated the company. In 2000, its remains were sold to the American telecommunications company “Teletec Holding”, which changed the name of the company to “Teletec Polska” S.A.

The forecast of a Post-WWII depression is contrasted against the vigorous growth that actually happened. Economists called for continued control over the economy to prevent the feared depression. But, in spite of the warning, returning soldiers were rapidly demobilized and the economy decontrolled. While economists dismissed indications toward the end of the war of pent-up demand as unsustainable, pent-up demand played an important role in the smooth transition from a wartime to a peacetime economy. Indicators of pent-up demand included buying plans and the accumulation of liquid assets. This study tracks expectations of a post-war depression of the general public, business and economists during this period. It shows that, in 1947, all three groups expected a recession, if not a depression. Yet, no such thing occurred. In the case of the general public, a time series of expectations is extracted from heterogeneous survey data.

This paper compares nationalisation campaigns in the German Democratic Republic and socialist Poland, with particular focus on industry. It is based on secondary literature as well as material from both the German and Polish statistical offices. The main finding is a surprising lack of simultaneity in the nationalisation campaigns in the two countries, which possibly had a significant impact on the course of economic transformation in East Germany and in Poland.

The post-war economic policy of West Germany (FRG) is largely associated with the so-called economic miracle (German: Wirtschaftswunder) and therefore its causes are the subject of many different analyzes. They include the correlation between the rate of economic growth in Germany and the development and transport potential of transport, including rail and road-car transport. This position prompted the author to try to search for long-term interdependencies and thus verify the thesis using the analysis of time series (1950–1989) available for West Germany and using original econometric methods in this field, e.g. unit root test to determine the stationarity and the Engle-Granger cointegration test.

In addition to the introduction, the article consists of three parts and conclusions. The broadest one includes the description of the assumptions and stages of the research procedure and its results, both on the empirical and methodological level. It is based on synthetic theoretical foundations presented on the basis of a review of international literature on the subject and review of the essence of the German economic miracle and the main trends in changes in the field of economic growth and transport development in Germany after World War II. The research presented in this way fits into the principles of the new economic history paradigm, which is still not very popular in Europe.

In the history of Poland after 1945, the functioning of the railway was one of the most important elements of everyday life – great migrations, modernity, commuting to work or holidays, military or employment. The largest transport in history was recorded by the state carrier at the end of the seventies. In reality, however, the activity of PKP was paid for by numerous compromises – outdated rolling stock, organizational structure and network in fact reflecting the beginning of the 20th century, the pursuit of electrification of almost all sections with a limited degree of motorization, mass transport and the abandonment of many potential customers. The aim of the article is to summarize the state of research and indicate questions that will allow to answer the question posed in the title. The inspiration came from the thesis of M. Jarząbek, expressed a few years ago, that the railway in this epoch from a symbol of modernity became an unwanted choice out of necessity.

The years of activity of the PNZ (Państwowe Nieruchomości Ziemskie – State Agrarian Real Estate) fell into the period of post-war agricultural reconstruction and management of Recovered Territories. Initially, their main task was to prepare for the parceling out of large landed estates, which was important for the settlement campaign. The target task was to run specialized farms that would supply the entire agriculture with seed and breeding material. After the escape of S. Mikołajczyk, the communists changed the priorities of PNZ activity, which from then on were to deal with large-scale production, and above all, manage about 1,200 hectares of agricultural land. The vast majority of the area used by PNZ was located in the western and northern regions of the country. The best conditions existed in those areas for establishing a state sector in agriculture. In spite of many achievements, PNZ was liquidated because the communists wanted to get rid of the prewar staff of specialists, mostly landowners, from the enterprise. This decision was political in nature. State farms were then created to replace PNZ.