Volumen 12 (2016): Heft 3 (December 2016)

In recent decades, the most remarkable feature of East-Central European (ECE) states has been their engagement in a deconsolidation process that necessitates the reconceptualising of European Studies and the theory of democracy. In the early ’90s, during the “revolution of high expectations,” consolidation was the key term in the conceptual framework of the transitology paradigm, but this approach was questioned increasingly in the 2000s and rejected in the 2010s. In its place, deconsolidation was introduced as one of a wide array of similar terms referring to the decline, backsliding or regression of democracy and later as one of a whole “other” family of opposite terms like (semi-)authoritarian system and competitive/elected autocracy. Indeed, rather than a transition to democracy, a tendency to transition to authoritarian rule has been observed in the ECE states in general and in Poland and Hungary in particular. In the last quarter century, the twin terms of Europeanisation and democratisation, which denote normative approaches, have been the main conceptual pillars of analyses of the ECE states. It turns out, however, that the opposite processes of de-Europeanisation and de-democratisation can now also be observed in these countries.

Aim of this paper is to analyse the behaviour of Czech MEPs in the topics related to Europe 2020 Strategy. This Strategy is one of the most important documents of recent decade on the European level and it is not so often studied on the level of the European Parliament. The purpose of this text is to find out if Czech political parties in the European Parliament are cohesive or not. The second question is related to the voting patterns, whether Czech MEPs create some kind of voting coalitions or not and if these coalitions reflect the national coalition. Methodology is based on the analyses of roll-call votes. The research period is the first two years of the 8th term of the European Parliament.

This comparative paper examines the reasons and the features of the rising Euroscepticism in Italy and in Hungary in the light of economic, financial, and political crisis. The financial crisis became the main focus of the political debates and discourses among the Italian and the Hungarian political parties between 2008 and 2013. In Italy and Hungary, Euroscepticism is still on the rise. In the first chapter, I will shortly summarise the conceptual framework of Euroscepticism. In the second chapter, I provide an overview of the way Hungarian and Italian political discourse has envisioned Europe in the post-bipolar, or post-Maastricht, period that began in the early 1990s. The fall of the Berlin wall had a decisive impact on the domestic politics of Hungary and Italy, and subsequent international changes created the basis for different forms of transitions in both countries. Hungary left behind dictatorship and the one-party system to create a functioning democracy, whereas Italy experienced the end of the political party system of the “First Republic,” giving birth to the highly promising “Second Republic.”

The case study presented in this paper applies the business-firm party concept to two political entities active in the Czech party system after 2010: the Public Affairs Party (VV) and the Action of Dissatisfied Citizens (ANO 2011) movement. We assess whether these actors meet the criteria of the business-firm party model and, thus, whether they can be considered representatives of this type of political party in the Czech Republic. The study concludes with a comparison of VV and ANO 2011 as two possible variations on what is known as the business-firm party model.

The Visegrad Group celebrated its 25th anniversary in February 2016. Established as an initiative of three statesmen from the Central and Eastern European (CEE) region, this cooperation has experienced booms and crises. The aim of this paper is to analyse the function of this regional integration in the years following the end of bipolar system as Visegrad Group members headed down the road to Euro-Atlantic integration. To this end, I apply different theoretical approaches and attempt to explain the influence of key former politicians as well as new scenarios for the Visegrad Group’s position in the European Union. This analysis also covers the latest foreign policy changes and challenges facing CEE due to the involvement of a wider region that creates a counter-balance to the core EU. Statistical data and official documents from the Visegrad Group’s website strengthen these findings.