<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">

<p>The concept of legal gap is tackled from a number of logical perspectives and semantic methods. After presenting our own goal (Section 1), a first introduction into legal logic refers to Bobbio’s works and his formalization of legal statements (Sections 2 and 3). Then Woleński’s contribution to the area is taken into account through his reference to the distinction between two juridical systems (viz. Common Law vs Civil Law) and the notion of conditional norms (Section 4). The notion of reason is also highlighted in the case of Raz’s legal logic, thereby leading to a future connection with von Wright’s logic of truth and an analogy made with an anti-realist reading of truth-values and norms (Section 5). Our personal contribution is introduced through a reflection on how logic should deal with the logical form of norms (Section 6), before entering a number of crucial definitions and distinctions for the concepts of norm, legal statement, and promulgation (Section 7). The final point is a proposed semantics for legal statements, which is both many-valued and gap-friendly (Section 8). A distinction between a number of requirements for permission and forbiddance leads to a set of non-classical juridical systems in which non-permission and forbiddance are not equivalent with each other any more; this does justice to Woleński’s former distinction between Common Law and Civil Law, also leading ultimately to a non-classical square of legal oppositions in which several legal operators may collapse into other ones (Section 9).</p>
</abstract>

The concept of legal gap is tackled from a number of logical perspectives and semantic methods. After presenting our own goal (Section 1), a first introduction into legal logic refers to Bobbio’s works and his formalization of legal statements (Sections 2 and 3). Then Woleński’s contribution to the area is taken into account through his reference to the distinction between two juridical systems (viz. Common Law vs Civil Law) and the notion of conditional norms (Section 4). The notion of reason is also highlighted in the case of Raz’s legal logic, thereby leading to a future connection with von Wright’s logic of truth and an analogy made with an anti-realist reading of truth-values and norms (Section 5). Our personal contribution is introduced through a reflection on how logic should deal with the logical form of norms (Section 6), before entering a number of crucial definitions and distinctions for the concepts of norm, legal statement, and promulgation (Section 7). The final point is a proposed semantics for legal statements, which is both many-valued and gap-friendly (Section 8). A distinction between a number of requirements for permission and forbiddance leads to a set of non-classical juridical systems in which non-permission and forbiddance are not equivalent with each other any more; this does justice to Woleński’s former distinction between Common Law and Civil Law, also leading ultimately to a non-classical square of legal oppositions in which several legal operators may collapse into other ones (Section 9).

Legal Gaps and their Logical Forms

Studia Humana

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

{"article-title":"Legal Gaps and their Logical Forms"}

The concept of legal gap is tackled from a number of logical perspectives and semantic methods. After presenting our own goal (Section 1), a first introduction...

Legal Gaps and their Logical Forms

Online veröffentlicht: 28. Apr. 2024

Seitenbereich: 23 - 40

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/sh-2024-0017

Schlüsselwörter
forbiddance, juridical system, legal gap, legal statement, permission

© 2024 Matheus Gabriel Barbosa, et al., published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Legal Gaps and their Logical Forms

Online veröffentlicht: 28. Apr. 2024

Seitenbereich: 23 - 40

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/sh-2024-0017

Schlüsselwörterforbiddance, juridical system, legal gap, legal statement, permission

© 2024 Matheus Gabriel Barbosa, et al., published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Schlüsselwörter
forbiddance, juridical system, legal gap, legal statement, permission