Particularities of media systems in the West Nordic countries

The tiny populations of the West Nordic countries might suggest a natural monopoly, as diseconomies of scale abound in their media markets, but foreign observers have been surprised by the varied media diet these markets supply, particularly in Iceland and the Faroes (Noam, 1991; Ørberg, 1984).

The media in the West Nordic countries have come under increased pressure from amplified flow of media content from international media service providers, accompanied by audience and revenue drain of the domestic media, as manifested in newspaper deaths, commercialisation, and poor economic performance of the media in general (Dalsgarð, 2002; Guðmundsson, 2018; Jóhannsdóttir & Ólafsson, 2018; Karlsson, 2004; Karlsson & Broddason, 2018; Ravn-Højgaard, 2019). The West Nordic countries have severely limited capability to react and maneuver against these changes. Often, there is no other option available other than making “the best out of dependency” and adopting new technology and responding to increased international media flow by “flexible adjustment”, as Trappel (1991) claims for media policy dilemmas of small states in general.

Similar to the larger Nordic countries (Syvertsen et al., 2014), media is conceived as a cultural institution vital for the protection of the national language and culture. National sentiments as far as the media are concerned are most apparent in questions about provision of nationally produced content on television. In all the countries, the government uses various measures to encourage domestically produced programming. For example, Iceland has a duty of translation and dubbing of foreign television programmes.

In the Faroes and Iceland, the markets have been afflicted by newspaper deaths, especially since the turn of the century. Dailies are no longer published in the Faroes, and presently, only two are published in Iceland, compared to six in the 1980s and 1990s. Greenland has never had a daily, and there has been a de facto monopoly in the national press since 2010, when the two national papers became jointly owned. Table 2 depicts the press markets in the West Nordic countries from 1950–2018. It highlights the small size of the press in all countries and illuminates their differences owed to the very limited size of the markets and difficulties involved with distribution, as in Greenland, with fewer titles and much lower circulation per capita.

Newspaper circulation has declined for decades but has accelerated with the increasing competition brought about by digital media. In Iceland, a somewhat uniquely strong position of free papers (Bakker, 2013) has not even been able to reverse this trend.

Broadcasting commenced in the West Nordic countries at different times and circumstances, as discussed below. In the three countries, the outlets of private news media are few, and the public service media (PSM) play an important role. Radio was introduced in Iceland by private initiative in 1926, but the state was soon granted broadcasting monopoly, and the public Ríkisútvarpið (RÚV-Radio) went on the air in 1930. This monopoly was abolished in 1986. Since then, a number of private radio channels have been established, mainly broadcasting pop music.

Radio emerged in Greenland with news transmissions via radio telephony in 1926. The broadcasts became regular in 1942 when the newspaper editors started broadcasting during World War II, when Greenland was cut off from Denmark. The broadcasts of what today is called Kalaallit Nunaata Radioa (KNR), the PSM-station, commenced in 1958. The first private radio stations in Greenland were founded in the late 1980s, and today, there are two commercial pop channels on air. A dozen stations, most operated by non-profit organisations, also transmit more or less regularly in the various towns and villages.

The Faroes was the last of the Nordic countries to introduce radio when the public Útvarp Føroya (ÚF) was established in 1957. Hitherto, the Faroese were accustomed to listening to foreign channels, mainly Norwegian and Danish PSM (Andreassen, 1992). Public Faroese television emerged in 1983, and in 2005, television and radio merged into Kringvarp Føroya (KvF). Private radio emerged in the Faroes in 1999. Currently, there are three private radio channels with limited resources, compared with the relatively strong position of the public service channel.

In all three West Nordic countries, introduction of PSM television was initiated in order to prevent external influences, as has been noted in many developing countries (Katz & Wedell, 1977). In Iceland, national television was introduced in 1966, largely in response to transmissions from the American naval base in Keflavík, whose broadcasts became widely receivable in the capital region in the early 1960s. While many welcomed the transmissions, others saw the broadcast “as nothing less than an infringement by a foreign power in the cultural affairs of a sovereign country” (Karlsson & Broddason, 2010: 223). This hastened the foundation of RÚV-TV, probably by several years. Private television began in Iceland in 1986 with the abolition of the broadcasting monopoly. Presently, there are seven private television stations, of which one is a general-interest channel and the others are special-interest channels: sports, religion, local, talk, and so on.

Television was introduced in the Faroes and Greenland by private initiatives in the 1970s, where illegally taped videos were shipped by individuals in Denmark and aired in private TV-associations that eventually started their own restricted programme production (for a history of television in Greenland, see Rygaard, 2016). Public television emerged in Greenland in 1982 and, as noted, in the Faroes in 1983 (Poulsen, 1980, 1995). In Greenland, there are a few private local television channels in operation offering some local news, though irregularly. They mainly distribute satellite-TV, financed mostly by member fees. In the Faroes, there is still only one Faroese television channel, operated by KvF.

Similar to the larger Nordic countries, the West Nordic countries’ PSM have a strong position in the media market, equally as radio and television are concerned (see Table 3). In Greenland, KNR's radio market share of total listening time among the population was 82 per cent, which is by far the highest for public radio in the Nordic countries. In television, KNR had 54 per cent of television audience market share.

In Iceland, RÚV-Radio had 50 per cent market share, which is the lowest share of PSM radio within the Nordic countries, along with YLE in Finland. The market position of RÚV in television is unequally high in Nordic comparison, as RÚV-TV retained 67 per cent market share in the autumn of 2019. Comparable information is not available for KvF, but according to a Faroese survey from 2017, almost 60 per cent of the respondents said they listened to public service radio on a daily basis; for the private radio stations, the number was approximately 15 per cent or less (Lóður. 2017).

The limited programming capacity in the West Nordic countries is mainly used for producing informative content, news, and sports, and to a lesser degree programmes for children, while fiction is almost exclusively imported. Even in Iceland, with three times the money devoted to public television (see Table 4), production for television, especially of more expensive programmes, drama, and series, is highly restricted. The average daily local domestically produced programmes on RÚV-TV is 6.5 hours (RÚV. 2019), while the daily new output on KvF is less than 2 hours (KvF, 2018) and on KNR, 3.1 hours (KNR, 2020).

Distribution, access, and use of information communication technology (ICT) and new digital media differs between the West Nordic countries. Whereas access to and use of ICTs is almost universal in the Faroes and Iceland (comparable to that in the larger Nordic countries), the uptake in Greenland has been slower, due to a less developed infrastructure (Ravn-Højgaard, 2019). The media in the West Nordic countries have strong online presence, offering various content, streaming and downloading of content, as well as active social media accounts. Additionally, in all the West Nordic countries, there is a plethora of websites, maintained by individuals and various other actors, mostly covering sports and entertainment. In all three countries, the most accessed and used online websites are owned by the larger media actors, signifying high concentration and consolidation online, as in the traditional media markets (for the Faroes, see Lóður. 2017; for Iceland, see Gallup, 2020).

Newspaper consumption has declined with readers moving online. Obtaining a clear overview of the digital media markets in the West Nordic countries is difficult, due to lack of comparable data. Recent research on news consumption in Iceland (Jóhannsdóttir, this issue), illustrates that online sites are Icelanders’ most popular source of news, and among those aged 45 and younger, social media comes second. In the Faroes, online news consumption is generally high, and the private news websites outmatch the public service website. So, while public service is much stronger in radio and television, it is weaker with regard to online news consumption (Lóður. 2017). In Greenland, 56 per cent of the population uses the Internet daily, and 71 per cent use television daily in 2019 (KNR, 2020).

The PSM organisations in the West Nordic countries have played a dominant role in the media market (Jóhannsdóttir & Ólafsson, 2018; Paulsen et al., 2018). That demonstrates a high degree of state involvement in their media systems, a characteristic of the democratic corporatist countries (Hallin & Mancini, 2004) and Nordic media welfare states (Syvertsen et al., 2014). As Trappel (2014) and Puppis (2009) argue, small states are prone to regulate and support the media to a large extent, as they are considered important cultural and democratic institutions, rather than merely businesses. Therefore, small states often play an active role in ensuring and stimulating media supply and diversity to counterweigh otherwise dire effects of severely restricted financial resources. Similar to the larger Nordic countries, PSM organisations are perceived as vital for the preservation of local language and culture in light of globalisation (Syvertsen et al., 2014), and they are recognised as cultural institutions that provide content that cannot otherwise be provided in these very small markets.

The West Nordic countries have modelled their legal framework regarding PSM on the Danish model, and in all three countries, a public service remit is negotiated every fourth year. Table 4 highlights the differences between the PSM organisations in the West Nordic countries and those in the larger countries, as well as the internal differences between the PSM organisations in the Nordic micro-societies.

Hallin and Mancini (2004) argue that similar institutional arrangement in broadcasting governance can lead to very different results in majoritarian democracies than in consensual democracies. Consensual governments are predominant in the four larger Nordic countries, and their PSM governance is characterised by a strong separation between politics and broadcasting (Hallin & Mancini, 2004; Moe & Mjøs, 2013). However, as mentioned, the West Nordic countries are characterised by majoritarian rule, and according to Humphreys (1996: 11) “we might expect the publicly-owned media to be more vulnerable to capture by the dominant political tendency”. Table 5 shows the institutional arrangement of broadcasting governance in the West Nordic countries.

Icelandic scholars have argued that RÚV has enjoyed less institutional autonomy than other Nordic PSM companies (Jóhannsdóttir & Ólafsson, 2018; Karlsson & Broddason, 2018) and that the system of PSM governance resembles more what Humphreys (1996) labels the “government model” than the professional model which Hallin and Mancini (2004) claim is prevalent in the Scandinavian countries. The relations between politics and broadcasting have not been systematically studied in the Faroes. In Greenland, the political influence on PSM has diminished since 1980s, as distance between the political system and the PSM has been increasingly institutionalised. However, as argued by Ravn-Højgaard in this issue, the PSM budget is negotiated every year as part of the finance bill, and as there is no long-term media policy, changes can happen quickly.

From the outset, the PSM organisations in Iceland and the Faroes were financed by licence-fees, and later by a special tax, whereas KNR has always been funded directly from the public budget. In all three countries, advertisements are allowed in the PSM (see Table 6). The share of revenue coming from advertising, however, varies, from 34 per cent in RÚV to 8 per cent in KNR to 0 per cent in KvF (see Table 4). In the Faroes, advertising is allowed; however, its revenue is not used to finance the PSM, but goes directly into the state budget in order to prevent unfair competition with private media.

Historically, neither the private media in Iceland nor the Faroes have received government funding. In Iceland's case, there has been near unanimous agreement across the political spectrum that private media should be solely in the hands of the market (Karlsson, 2004), and Icelandic media has been among the least regulated in Europe (Hardarson, 2008). However, increasing global competition and economic hardship of national media has led to policy changes. Media subsidies were introduced in the Faroes in 2017. A bill proposing public support for private media was tabled in the Icelandic parliament in late 2019, but had not been passed as of November 2020 (see Table 7).

The possible introduction of private subsidies in the Faroes and Iceland can be seen as a response to growing competition from foreign media and loss of advertising revenue to global tech giants, due to globalisation and digital technology (Mattoni & Ceccobelli, 2018; Nechushtai, 2018). In Greenland, the media has always been supported, initially as government media, and later as private media (Ravn-Højgaard, this issue). The dominating role of the Greenlandic public sector influences the advertisement market, as the government becomes the most important advertiser, and advertisement policy can therefore be perceived as part of the media policy.

In sum, all three countries have strong PSM institutions, but only Greenland has a tradition of supporting private media, while Iceland and the Faroes have diverged from the Nordic model. However, with the recent introduction of subsidies to private media, the two countries are moving closer towards the Nordic media welfare state ideal.

In the Faroes and Iceland, the early press was intrinsically connected to growing nationalist sentiments and the formation of political parties (Dalsgarð, 2002; Friðriksson, 2000). The political parties and their aligned newspapers were defined in contrast to each other by their view on the relationship with Denmark (pro-union or anti-union). However, after Iceland became a sovereign state in 1918, class politics took over. The dominant newspapers in both countries were firmly entrenched in party politics, in terms of ownership as well as recruitment of key personnel, editors, managers, and even journalists (Dalsgarð, 2002; Karlsson & Broddason, 2018). Only recently, in the 1990s, has the formal link between papers and parties disappeared in the Faroes and Iceland. Since then, the newspapers have had to rely on their performance in the market (Dalsgarð, 2002; Karlsson, 2004) and financial backing from benefactors with vested interests in businesses and political agendas (Karlsson & Broddason, 2018). The reasons the demise of the party press happened much later in these two countries compared with the larger Nordic countries owes undoubtedly much to late development of the consumer market, and hence limited advertising revenue. Also, changes in the media, increased professionalism among journalists, and political changes more generally had an effect (Karlsson & Broddason, 2018).

In this regard, Greenland differs from Iceland and the Faroes, as the press did not evolve along the political dimensions of independence or class politics. Rather than party affiliation, close ties between the government and the media have shaped Greenland's media landscape (see Ravn-Højgaard, this issue; Stenbaek, 1992). The first national paper was initiated by Danish colonial administrators a century before the formation of political parties, which emerged prior to the introduction of home rule in 1979.

As the press in Iceland and the Faroes detached itself from the political parties, and the Greenlandic papers detached themselves from the government – new sources of income have been necessary. As elsewhere, this has led to an increasing commercialisation of the media (Dalsgarð, 2002; Guðmundsson & Kristinsson, 2019; Jóhannsdóttir, 2020), and while political parallelism has declined in the form of party affiliation, other forms of commercial and political interests have entered the media scene. The news media have professed to journalistic ideals such as autonomy, political neutrality, and objectivity, at least according to their own self-perception, and have sought to appeal to a broader and more diverse public (regarding Iceland, see Guðmundsson, 2012; Guðmundsson & Kristinsson, 2019). However, while political parallelism – understood as formal links between parties and newspapers – has declined, it does not mean that political parallelism in a wider sense has vanished. Guðmundsson (2012: 528) argues that the historical proximity of political parallelism in Iceland, a relatively recent professional-isation of journalists, an unregulated media environment, and an “extreme ownership concentration of the media, where ownership powers and political parties become mixed with each other” have paved the way for the development of a “political commercial media system”. According to Ohlsson and Facht (2017: 93), the Icelandic media market is “characterised by a comparatively tight bond between the political sphere and the domestic enterprise sector” and that links with external stakeholders contribute “to the relationships in the media market being more problematic than they are in the other Nordic countries”. In this regard, it might be more relevant to talk of clientelism rather than political parallelism.

Clientelism is associated with instrumentalisation of the media, that is, the control of the media by external actors seeking political or economic influence (Hallin & Mancini 2004). Examples indicating instrumentalisation can be found in all three West Nordic countries. In Iceland, the owners of Árvakur – the publisher of the oldest newspaper in the country and the most read online news site – are investors with interests in the fishing industry who acquired the company in 2009, purportedly to intervene in the world of politics (Jóhannsdóttir & Ólafsson, 2018; Karlsson & Broddason, 2018). In the Faroes, the largest shipping company is the largest co-owner of one national news website. The small size of these countries inflates the danger of clientelism, as almost everyone knows someone who knows someone in the right places (Kristensen et al., 2020; Kristinsson, 2012).

Professionalism is associated with autonomy, a public service orientation, and distinct professional norms (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). All three West Nordic countries have codified professional norms and ethical rules for the journalism profession. Greenland and the Faroes have adopted the Danish press ethical codes, which are widely accepted as ideals for the profession. Professional norms are also widespread among journalists in Iceland. However, there are factors indicating that journalistic professionalism is weaker in the West Nordic countries, compared with the larger Nordic countries where “respect for journalistic autonomy” is more “deeply held” (Strömbäck et al., 2008: 19).

The smallness of the West Nordic societies influences journalistic professionalism in several ways. Journalists are not anonymous, and they inevitably meet their sources in the supermarket or at family gatherings. Journalists develop different strategies to cope with this in small societies. One strategy is to try to maintain a strict division between private relations and professional relations with sources, and another strategy is self-censorship (Hussain, 2018; Þorláksson, 2015). Two-thirds of journalists in the Faroes report having been on the receiving end of unfriendly pressure because of their job, while one-fifth report having been directly threatened, physically or otherwise (Føroysk Miðlafólk, 2017). Such personal consequences may lead journalists to seek other professions (Rask, 2017). It can also lead to other sanctions, such as withdrawal of advertisers (Weihe, 2017). In small societies, advertisers are fewer, which makes the media vulnerable to such sanctions, and can undermine journalistic autonomy. The instrumentalisation of the media, apparent particularly in the Faroes and Iceland, as discussed above, has the same effect. Frequent libel suits against journalists can also be interpreted as an indicator of a weak profession. Faroese journalists have been sued in libel cases, which, according to a former editor-in-chief at KvF, generates self-censorship among journalists (Weihe, 2017). In Iceland, the number of libel cases filed against journalists has increased in the last decade. At the same time, the number of complaints to the Journalist Union Ethics Committee have decreased, and they receive relatively fewer complaints about editorial content than their counterparts in the larger Nordic countries (Axelsson & Gylfadóttir, 2015).

Moreover, small communities with strong social control may entail a weak deliberative culture. According to Paul Krarup (2017), editor-in-chief of the Greenlandic newspaper Sermitsiaq,

In Iceland, a quarter of journalists have a journalist education, and just over two-thirds of journalists have either a bachelor's or a master's degree, according to a survey (Kolbeins, 2012). In the Faroes, just under half of journalists responding to a survey in 2017 had specialised in journalism, whereas 70 per cent had a university education (Føroysk Miðlafólk, 2017). In Greenland, as of August 2020, most journalists working in KNR have a bachelor's degree in journalism.

While Iceland and Greenland offer a degree in journalism, the Faroes does not – most of Faroese journalists are educated in Denmark. However, the Greenlandic media relies on journalists imported from Denmark, as the media are not able to hire enough local journalists. In February 2020, between one-third and one-half of the journalists and editors in the newsrooms at Sermitisiaq.AG and KNR were educated in Denmark and had no prior knowledge of Greenlandic. The same is not the case in the Faroes, where practically all journalists speak Faroese.

Staff turnover is high in the media in all the West Nordic countries. It can largely be ascribed to journalists moving to better-paid jobs, for example, in the public sector. In Greenland, the turnover is also influenced by the large proportion of especially Danish journalists moving back to Denmark. Historically, layoffs have been very few, and vacant positions are common. In Iceland and the Faroes, on the other hand, journalists’ job security has decreased, and layoffs have been frequent.

Changes in the digital age have undermined the media business models everywhere and led to increasing competition, which has implications for job security and autonomy of journalists (see, e.g., Mattoni & Ceccobelli, 2018; Nechushtai, 2018; Witschge et al., 2016). This applies to the West Nordic countries, but little is known about the possible impact this has had on the practice and values in journalism in these countries. Jóhannsdóttir (2020) observes that commercialisation has increased in Icelandic online news, and journalists have incorporated the practice of instant publishing, as noted elsewhere. Guðmundsson and Kristinsson (2019: 17) conclude that media companies have “assumed the power to define formal journalistic principles to fit their interests”. Guðmundsson's (2015) findings indicate that the discourse on social media has greatly influenced the news and news values of journalists and their tendency for self-censorship. Comparable research is not available in the Faroes or Greenland.