A potential flooding version number attack against RPL based IOT networks
Online veröffentlicht: 22. Sept. 2022
Seitenbereich: 267 - 275
Eingereicht: 28. Juli 2022
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/jee-2022-0035
Schlüsselwörter
© 2022 Mehdi Rouissat et al., published by Sciendo
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
Routing protocol for low power and lossy networks (RPL) has been proposed for power, memory, and processing constrained devices. Owing to their constrained, RPL-based networks are exposed to a wide range of security attacks that mainly include control message tampering. In this paper we propose and study a modified version number attack, based on flooding the network by falsified incremented version numbers. The obtained results show that the modified attack led to an immense increase in the overhead, 1426%, compared with the attack-free case, and an increase of 182 % in the total energy consumption. When it comes to PDR a degradation to 4.7% has been recorded, affecting the reliability of the network. On the other hand, the latency also showed an increase from 0.24 s in the attack-free case to 0.89 s, which is mainly due to the high congestion created by the attack.