Do immigrants pay a price when marrying natives? Lessons from the US time use survey

We analyze data from the American Time Use Survey (ATUS) for years 2003–18. The ATUS is an annual supplement to the March Current Population Survey.

Documentation and data files for both surveys are at http://bls.gov/tus/

We focus on explaining the time use of respondents who were born in the US and call them “natives,” comparing respondents married to other natives (endogamously) to those intermarried with immigrants. Respondents born abroad to at least one US parent are classified as natives. Immigrants are defined as respondents born abroad whose parents were also born abroad.

Respondents born in Puerto Rico, the US territory, are also considered immigrants.

According to Table 1, relative to other groups, Hispanic and Asian natives are more likely to have immigrant spouses, who in turn are also more likely to be respectively Hispanic or Asian, respectively. Intermarried respondents are more likely to live in metropolitan areas with a higher share of low skill immigrants. Intermarried native men are more likely to have graduate degrees, earn higher wages, and live in higher-income households than their endogamously married counterparts. Intermarried native women are less likely to be employed, more likely to be high school dropouts, earn lower wages, have lower household income. Compared to native wives, immigrant wives are on average less educated and less likely to work for pay, but if employed, may earn higher wages than native women. One out of four immigrant wives arrived before age 10, the same share arrived at age 10–19, and the rest arrived aged 20 and older. Almost half of the immigrant wives are not US citizens. Compared to their native counterparts, immigrant wives are more likely to have at least one child in the household. Immigrant husbands of native women are more likely to either have no high school diploma or to have graduate degrees than native husbands. Immigrant husbands are younger and generally they earn higher wages than native husbands.

In addition to natives and their spouses, we analyze time use of immigrants. Among immigrants, 17% of men and 19% of women have native spouses. Intermarriage rates vary by region of immigrants’ origin.

The various regions of origin can be found in Table A1 in Appendix.

We examine the following categories of daily time use, measured in min, where all categories including related travel:

In defining “chores” we tried to capture activities that people like to avoid when they can afford to, as in Grossbard et al. (2014). However, some elements of household production, such as house decoration or cooking, can be enjoyable and at the end they may be no different from leisure. Some may argue that chores should include non-grocery shopping and use of certain professional services such as banking or legal services, yet we exclude these activities in an attempt to capture only the production of household public goods. Our definition of work excludes human capital investment activities (studying or reading), i.e., potentially work-related activities. Among non- employed individuals, 12% of men and 4% of women report some work activities, and these men and women worked on average 214 min and 169 min, respectively, on the survey day. These numbers are rather large and possibly reflect informal work such as babysitting or handyman services.

We estimate OLS models, even though OLS models do not establish causality.

We considered estimating Instrumental Variable (IV) models, with a first step estimating the individual likelihood of being intermarried, but found it difficult to identify valid instruments.

In the case of native respondents i married to a spouse j, who is either native or immigrant, we estimate the following model:

where Y represents daily in min the respondent spends in an activity (work, chores, or total work). The first subscript stands for the respondent, the second for the spouse. If the respondent is male, Eq. (1) helps us estimate the allocation of time of native men in either NM or NN marriages. If the respondent is female, the equation helps us estimate the allocation of time of native women in either MN or NN marriages.

When Y is own total work a positive coefficient of “Spouse Immigrant” in Eq. (1) indicates that the native respondent has an extra workload in an MN or NM marriage compared to a counterpart in a NN couple. Since we assume that people prefer leisure to work, a positive coefficient for own total work implies a penalty or price the native pays when married to an immigrant. In contrast, a negative coefficient of “spouse immigrant” implies a premium benefiting the intermarried native respondent relative to what his or her time use would be in a comparable all-native NN marriage.

Y could stand for “chores.” To the extent that these represent activities that people would prefer to avoid a premium (penalty) for being in intermarriage may also be reflected in a negative (positive) coefficient of “Spouse Immigrant” in Eq. (1) when Y is defined as own chores.

A respondent could also be an individual j who is either a native or an immigrant married to a native i, as in model 2:

We assume that a native is better off if their spouse spends more time at chores, paid work, or overall total work. Therefore, a positive coefficient on “Immigrant” in Eq. (2) may be a premium to a native individual in an NM or MN intermarriage in comparison to what they would get in an NN marriage.

X is a vector of human capital and demographic and household characteristics may affect an individual’s time allocation, productivity, or preferences. We present regressions first with a restricted and then with a full set of controls. The restricted set of controls includes day (Friday, Saturday, Sunday, holiday), age, age-squared, respondent’s ethnicity (black, Hispanic, Asian), education (no high school, some college, college, graduate, relative to high school), survey year and state.

Survey year dummies account for social and economic trends over time. Possible state-specific factors of relevance include (other) local cultural norms, marriage laws, other indicators of the price of household help, and geographic dimensions.

The full set of controls also includes the spouse’s characteristics (spouse’s age, age-squared, ethnicity, and years of schooling). It is important to include spouses’ education, age, and ethnicity because they affect preferences, bargaining power in the household, job market opportunities, and marriage market opportunities (see Grossbard-Shechtman and Neuman (1988)). Vector X also includes the following household characteristics: the number of children age 0–2, 3–7, 8–17,

Children can be viewed as exogenous in our daily time use analysis.

We examine interactions of intermarriage status with spouse’s citizenship (US citizen or not), region of origin (western English-speaking countries vs other countries), and age at arrival in the US (arrived age 0–9, age 10–19, or age 20+). Differences by citizenship may be meaningful because having citizenship implies better job market opportunities. Language in the country of origin matters because immigrants from non-English speaking countries may face inferior job market options and need more assimilation. Age at arrival may be an indicator for whether the immigrant speaks with an accent or not and how much assimilation they need.

Some of our regressions include interactions of “spouse immigrant” or “immigrant” with the second generation status of natives. In one of our models, we distinguish between four types of intermarriages: 3+ generation native and immigrant, second generation native and immigrant from the same region, and second generation native and immigrant from a different region, relative to native-native. We assign parental region of origin to second generation natives.

Immigrants whose parents each came from a different region of origin (fewer than 5% observations) are assigned to the mother’s country of origin, and if missing, then father’s origin.

We also estimated Tobit regressions in the case of chores, given that a relatively large percentage of respondents (28% native men and 12% of wives of native men) report no chores on the survey day. The Tobit results turned out overall similar to OLS results, so we only report OLS results.

We also estimate the equivalent of Eqs (1) and (2) for immigrants. In this case, the right-hand-side variables of interest are “spouse native” and “native.” This allows us to establish whether the immigrant pays an “assimilation price” when marrying a native in terms of hours of work (including chores) when hours of work in an intermarriage of type MN or NM are compared to hours of work in a MM marriage with another immigrant.

Even though our models do not establish causality we mostly assume that intermarriage preceded decisions regarding time allocation. However, we recognize that it is also possible that time use decisions influenced individual or family decisions regarding choice of mate. Furthermore, unobserved factors such as traditionalism may simultaneously affect the likelihood of intermarriage and time allocation to work and chores.

The model in Panel A of Table 2A only includes controls for respondents’ traits. It can be seen that immigrant wives of native men work less in the labor force (col. 4) and 25 min more at chores (col. 5). In total, they work about the same time as native women in NN marriages. To the extent that working at chores affects wellbeing negatively, immigrant wives are worse off compared to native wives married to natives. Native men’s allocation of time does not vary by intermarried status (cols 1–3). In Section 2, we assumed that individuals would prefer to work less themselves while benefiting from more work (in chores, and total work) being performed by their spouse. In that sense, native men seem to be better off when intermarried.

The model in Panel B includes the full sets of controls (controls were added for spouse’s and family characteristics).

Full results for Tables 2A and 2B (Panel B) can be found in Tables A2 and A3 in Appendix. Other full regression results are available upon request.

Panels C–E in Tables 2A and 2B present coefficients on the interaction term “Spouse Immigrant” with several immigrant’s characteristics.

It can be observed from Panel C that native men’s allocation of time does not vary across the type of marriage (NM vs NN) if the immigrant wife is a US citizen (cols 1–3) but immigrant wives with citizenship do 17 min more chores and have a heavier workload (23 min more in total work) compared to native women in NN marriages. However, if the wife is not a US citizen, it is the husband rather than the wife who has a heavier workload compared to NN marriages: in an NM marriage, native men spend 35 min more in the labor force and 18 min less at chores, with their overall workload 17 min higher. Native men are worse off in terms of total workload but better off if avoiding chores is important to them. Non-citizen immigrant wives spend 34 min more in chores and 48 min less in the labor force with a somewhat lighter workload than native women (although the coefficient on total work is not statistically significant). These women are worse off than native women in NN marriages provided avoiding chores makes people happy. It appears that wives who are legal immigrants are paying a higher price when marrying a native relative to their non-citizen counterparts. One possible explanation for this contrast between citizens and non-citizens is that the most valuable assimilation services are related to the labor market—such as improvement in language skills and access to the labor market opportunities through spouse’s network—so women who work for pay benefit more from these spousal services, whereas non-citizens are often unable to participate in the labor force. In marriages between native men and non-citizen immigrant women, native husbands seem to pay a price in terms of extra paid work. They may not consider this as price if they are more traditionally-minded; intermarriage to a non-citizen may have selected men who prefer more traditional gender roles.

From the first line of Panel D, we can see that both husbands and wives as couples consisting of native men and women who immigrated from English-speaking countries (Canada, UK, Australia, and New Zealand) allocate their time the same way as NN couples. However, husbands of women who immigrated from non-English speaking countries spend 17 min more at paid work, while their total work time does not increase significantly, whereas immigrant wives from non-English speaking countries spend 26 min more doing chores (col. 5). As their hours at paid work are lower, their total workload is unaffected. It appears that when compared to NN marriages, NM marriages involving immigrant women from non-English speaking countries are more traditional, with husbands more active in the labor force and wives doing more chores. Women are worse off and men are better off to the extent that women do more chores that men benefit from.

Coefficients reported in Panel E are based on regressions that include interactions between spouse immigrant and the immigrant’s age at arrival to the US. Immigrant women who arrived as children and their native husbands are similar to all-native couples in terms of their total work and time spent on chores (cols 1–6). Women who migrated to the US between the ages of 10 and 19 also have an allocation of time similar to that of native women in NN marriages, but their native husbands are possibly more traditional as they work less at chores and more in the labor force cols 1 and 2 in Table 2A. As for immigrant women who arrived after age 19, they work 40 min more at chores than women in NN marriages (col. 5). This is consistent with a model of competitive marriage markets that a lesser degree is needed to assimilate via intermarriage on the part of immigrants who grew up in the US relative to immigrants who arrived at a later age, and there is a less reluctance to marry immigrants who grew up in the US on the part of potential native spouses.

Wage statistics show that among those who work for pay wages are on average 4% higher for immigrant wives in this group than for native wives, although labor force participation is 6% lower.

Panel F makes a distinction between three categories of natives: 3+ generation native (in the US for at least three generations), second generation natives whose parents emigrated from the same region as the immigrant spouse, and second generation natives whose parents emigrated from a different region. Based on our sample of 2,094 men and 2,431 women, most second generation natives are married to other natives (who can themselves be second generation natives), about 15% of men and 18% of women are married to immigrants of the same origin, and around 5% of men and women are married to immigrants of different origins.

The coefficients in the first row of Panel F suggest that 3rd generation native men and second generation natives married to women of the same origin allocate their time like men in NN marriages. However, immigrant women married to native men of 3+ generation spend more time in chores and less in paid work than native women, and about the same time in total work. Immigrant wives of second generation native men of the same origin work more than native wives: 51 min more chores or 41 min more total work. These may be due to couples sharing the same immigrant culture, and their traditions may place more emphasis on traditional gender roles. It may also facilitate male domination over women, accounting for the higher total workload of these immigrant women. Desire to perpetuate traditional cultural norms may explain both this type of intermarriage and allocation of time.

Celikaksoy et al. (2006) report on educational comparisons between marriages of immigrants to Denmark from Pakistan and Turkey and the Danish-born grown children of immigrants from these seem countries. The evidence is consistent with immigrant parents of Danish natives placing a premium on their traditions being practiced by the next generation.

Results comparing couples with two natives (NN) and those with a native woman and an immigrant man (MN) are presented in Table 2B. Native women’s time allocation is the same in intermarriage as in marriage to a native (cols 1–3, Panels A–E). Immigrant husbands of native women perform fewer household chores than native men (col. 5),and have about the same total workload (col. 6) (Panel D, col. 5). Much of this effect is due to the arrival of immigrant men after age 19: they spend 23 min more in paid work and 18 min less in chores per day than native men.

From Panel F, we learn that immigrant men married to second generation native women whose families migrated from the same regions work 35 min more in chores and 35 min less in the labor force, relative to men in NN marriages. For other types of MN intermarriages, men’s time allocation is the same as in NN marriages. As for second generation native women married to immigrants from different origins, their paid work and total workload are higher than that of their counterparts married to natives, but the standard errors are large, and none of the coefficients is significant.

There is a contrast between the results obtained for immigrant women married to native men (Table 2A) and immigrant men married to native women (Table 2B). Compared to their native counterparts in NN marriages, immigrant women in NM marriages spend more time at chores whereas immigrant men in MN marriages spend less time at chores. The results for immigrant women are consistent with a competitive marriage market analysis: in a few instances intermarried immigrant wives appear to pay a price when intermarried; native men may get a premium in the form of more chores performed. In contrast, intermarried immigrant husbands seem to get a premium: less time at chores and no extra total work, which amounts to native women paying a price when marrying immigrants (since we assume that time one spouse spends in chores benefits the other).

Results in Panel F of Table 2A are consistent with the competitive marriage market analysis. Immigrant wives married to sons of immigrants from the same region may pay a penalty (do additional works) than other immigrant wives: they do almost an extra hour of chores and their total workload is considerably higher when compared to NN women. Immigrant men from the same type of marriage get more benefits from intermarriage, compared to native men: they save 34 min of chores (this is triple the price that all native women pay in terms of husband not doing chores according to Panel B). This case fits into a scenario in which gender roles in the countries of origin of both the immigrant and the wife’s parents are more traditional. In marriages between second generation natives and immigrants, women are worse off, whether they are the native or the immigrant. They either work harder at chores or they obtain fewer minutes of a husband’s chores.

Whether second generation or 3+ generation, native women do not seem to be able to exploit their competitive marriage market advantages the way native men do. The culture shared in intermarriages between immigrants and second generation natives growing up in families from the same region may be particularly conducive to male domination in marriage. It could also be that the female migrants stand to lose more than the male immigrants if their marriages collapse, especially if they do not have any marketable skills allowing them to succeed in the labor force or business. A further possible explanation for the difference between native men and women intermarried with immigrants is that native men discriminate more against immigrants than is the case with native women. As shown in Section 2, assuming marriage markets are competitive, the price differential Y– Y’ that natives can obtain for their work in marital production is a function of how many natives are willing to switch between native and immigrant spouses. The closer the natives they consider that immigrant and native spouses as interchangeable, the smaller will be the difference in the market price between two markets. If native men discriminate more against immigrant spouses than native women, it is likely that, under the assumption of competitive marriage markets in equilibrium, that is, after natives have moved between the two markets and prices are settled, there will be an extra price paid by immigrant women marrying native men, but immigrant men do not do additional work by marrying native women.

Our results follow from bargaining theories of intra-allocation of resources that women will be better able to further their personal interests in marriage when they have paid jobs in the labor force, as their income may help them bargain for less in a total workload. They may also enter into arrangements such that women will do less chore works and husbands or men will do more chore works. This conclusion does not follow the competitive marriage market analysis based on GS84 where an individual’s value of time is not determined in a two-way bargaining within a couple but by all factors influencing demand and supply of household production time benefiting a spouse (see Grossbard (2015)). The models presented in Tables 2A and 2B were reestimated separately for couples with two earners (dual earners, Tables 3A and 3B, Panels A–D) and male-earner couples (Panels E–H).

A major observation from comparing the panels for dual earners and male-earner couples in Table 3A is that the excess total workload of immigrant wives in male earner couples is larger than that of their counterparts in dual-earner couples, which reinforces the bargaining story. For example, wives who are US citizens do 48 min of extra daily work if they are not employed in the labor force (Panel E), but only 21 min if they are employed. Two groups of wives do the most extra work, contributing more than 1 h of extra daily work compared to native wives: adult immigrants in male-earner couples and wives of second generation native men of the same origin in both types of couples.

Second generation native women married to immigrants who came from the same region of their parents work substantially more than other native women, whether in the labor force (Panel D) or not (Panel H). Two groups of men work less in intermarriage than in endogamous marriage: those who marry immigrants from English speaking countries (44 min less total work) and those married to women who migrated as young children (38 min less total work). This is not the case among dual-earner couples.

Contrarily, based on Table 3B, it seems that native women married to immigrants are better off if they are in male-earner couples (Panels E–H) than if both are employed (Panels A–D). Native wives in dual earner couples are worse off being married to an immigrant than they would be in a NN marriage. They tend to spend more time in chores and total work when married to immigrants, although the coefficients are not always statistically significant. For example, working wives of US citizens spend 21 min extra in total work, wives of non-US citizens spend 15 min more in chores, and wives of men who migrated age 10–19 spend 20 min more in chores. Furthermore, their immigrant husbands tend to spend less time in chores and total work than native men, although the coefficients are rarely statistically significant. For instance, immigrant husbands who married native women whose parents emigrated from the same region work 39 min less at chores.

Things do not look bad for intermarried native women in single earner couples. On average they spend 23–26 min less in chores than women in endogamous marriages. In particular, native women enjoy more leisure in intermarriage when married to men from non-English-speaking countries or to men who migrated before age 20. Second generation native women married to immigrants of different origin enjoy the most leisure relative to their counterparts in NN marriages: work extra 48 min per day. On the other hand, native wives of immigrants from English speaking countries and adult immigrants gain no extra leisure from intermarriage.

In sum, we learn from the four tables so far that immigrant women tend to pay a price when intermarried with natives, but it will not be very bad if they are employed. Immigrant men tend to benefit when intermarried with natives but that is limited to dual-earner marriages. Being employed protects the wellbeing of immigrant women married to natives when compared with native women in NN marriages. To avoid the pitfalls of being married to an immigrant (a higher workload for them, a lower workload for the husbands), native women may want to find match with immigrants willing to be the sole earner.

So far, this analysis has focused on the comparison between intermarriages and all-native marriages. Next, we examine how intermarried immigrants fare in terms of paid work and chores compared to endogamous married immigrants. Table 4 offers a comparison of time use in intermarriages between natives and all-immigrant marriages. An advantage of analyzing a sample of immigrants is that we can now control for other immigrant characteristics as well as the culture of the country of origin. We use female labor force participation in the country of the immigrant’s origin as indicator of culture/gender equality. Blau et al. (2020) have shown that first-generation immigrants, both women and men from the same countries, with more gender equality allocate tasks more equally with gender equality.

Our samples of immigrants consist of 6,116 men and 6,864 women. Mean values are in Table A4 in Appendix. Intermarried immigrant men and women live in smaller households, earn higher wages, have fewer children, and their household income is higher. They are more likely to be white, US citizens, come from an English speaking country, and have spent more years in the US than non-intermarried immigrants.

Table 4 reports regression coefficients on “spouse native” in regressions of time use for immigrants. Few of the coefficients are significant suggesting that being married to a native does not change the work behavior of most immigrants. Immigrant men and women work as much in intermarriage as they do in marriages with immigrants. One exception is men who marry second generation native women and in those marriages, immigrant men work 25 min less in chores and thus enjoy more leisure. Men who are married to natives of 3+ generation spend 13 min more in chores than other immigrants. These findings are consistent with a competitive marriage market analysis: these men may be paying a price when intermarried.

Most immigrant women also do not increase their contribution to paid work or chores in intermarriage. One exception is women married to second generation natives of the same origin: these immigrant wives spend 28 min more in paid work and 39 min more in total work than their counterparts in MM marriages. They are thus worse off than similar women who marry other immigrants. This type of marriage is likely to stand out in terms of adherence to traditional gender roles. In contrast, immigrant men married to second generation native women whose parents came from the same region are better off than those who marry other immigrants as they spend less time at chores.

Many women spend less time in chores and paid work in intermarriage, particularly, non-US citizens spend 16 min less in chores, women who migrated as children spend 26 min less in total work, and finally wives of second generation natives of different origin spend an hour less in paid work than their counterparts in MM marriage. It thus appears that even though immigrant women in NM intermarriage are worse off than their native counterparts in NN marriages, they are better off than other immigrant women married to immigrants.

The coefficients on female LFP suggest that if immigrant women arrive from countries with higher female labor force participation they are more likely to participate in the labor force and spend less time in chores in the US. For example, if the rate of female labor force participation is 10% points higher in her country of origin the immigrant woman performs 10 min more paid work and 7 min less in chores.

We expand the definition of chores to broader household production that includes care as well. Care is the time spent in primary childcare, care of adults and pets. Tables A5 and A6 in Appendix present tables similar to Tables 2A and 2B, but presented with new dependent variables in columns 2, 3, 5, and 6. The conclusions are overall similar, although some estimates need precision. Native men spend less time in chores and second generation native men whose ancestry differs from that of their immigrant wives work less for pay. On average, compared to their native counterparts, immigrant women spend 34 min longer in household production and 13 min longer in total work. The extra workload is particularly large for women who are US citizens, adult immigrants, and spouses of second generation natives of the same origin.

Native women’s time allocation does not vary substantially with intermarriage, although second generation native wives work more overall if their husbands are of different ancestry. Immigrant husbands of native women spend 17 min less in household production than native husbands, and spouses of second generation native wives show the most traditional allocation of time: they work 35 min more for pay and 45 min less in household production, compared to native men.