<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">

<p>Expressivism, as applied to a certain class of statements, evaluative ones, for instance, is constituted by two doctrines, only the first of which will concern me in this paper. Evaluative statements, according to this doctrine, aren’t propositional (susceptible of truth or falsity). In this paper, I will argue that one of the vexing problems (that I label the “logical problem”) this doctrine engenders for the expressivist is equally pressing for some cognitivists (who think evaluative statements <italic>do</italic> have a truth-value). I will present the difficulty and argue that some constructivists, who <italic>are</italic> cognitivists, cannot contend with it at all, and others must resort to more complex ways than the one available to other cognitivists.</p>
</abstract>

Expressivism, as applied to a certain class of statements, evaluative ones, for instance, is constituted by two doctrines, only the first of which will concern me in this paper. Evaluative statements, according to this doctrine, aren’t propositional (susceptible of truth or falsity). In this paper, I will argue that one of the vexing problems (that I label the “logical problem”) this doctrine engenders for the expressivist is equally pressing for some cognitivists (who think evaluative statements do have a truth-value). I will present the difficulty and argue that some constructivists, who are cognitivists, cannot contend with it at all, and others must resort to more complex ways than the one available to other cognitivists.

Who Is Afraid of the Logical Problem in Meta-Ethics?

Disputatio

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

{"article-title":"Who Is Afraid of the Logical Problem in Meta-Ethics?"}

Expressivism, as applied to a certain class of statements, evaluative ones, for instance, is constituted by two doctrines, only the first of which will concern...

Who Is Afraid of the Logical Problem in Meta-Ethics?

Online veröffentlicht: 05. Okt. 2023

Seitenbereich: 411 - 426

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2022-0020

Schlüsselwörter
cognitivism, expressivism, Frege-Geach, meta-ethics

© 2022 Ruth Weintraub, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Who Is Afraid of the Logical Problem in Meta-Ethics?

Online veröffentlicht: 05. Okt. 2023

Seitenbereich: 411 - 426

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2022-0020

Schlüsselwörtercognitivism, expressivism, Frege-Geach, meta-ethics

© 2022 Ruth Weintraub, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Schlüsselwörter
cognitivism, expressivism, Frege-Geach, meta-ethics