<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Wiggins’ (2012) argument against propositional accounts of knowing how is based on a development of some considerations taken from Aristotle’s <italic>Nicomachean Ethics</italic>. Aristotle argued that the knowledge needed for participation in an <italic>ethos</italic> cannot be codified in propositional form so as to let it be imparted to someone who did not already have it. This is because any putative codification would be incomplete, and require that knowledge in order to extend it to novel cases. On a reasonable interpretation of his argument, Wiggins claims that the same goes for practical knowledge in general, and that this shows that a propositional view of knowing how is incorrect. This paper shows that this argument is unsound.</p></abstract>

Wiggins’ (2012) argument against propositional accounts of knowing how is based on a development of some considerations taken from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle argued that the knowledge needed for participation in an ethos cannot be codified in propositional form so as to let it be imparted to someone who did not already have it. This is because any putative codification would be incomplete, and require that knowledge in order to extend it to novel cases. On a reasonable interpretation of his argument, Wiggins claims that the same goes for practical knowledge in general, and that this shows that a propositional view of knowing how is incorrect. This paper shows that this argument is unsound.

Wiggins on Practical Knowledge

Disputatio

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{"article-title":"Wiggins on Practical Knowledge"}

Wiggins’ (2012) argument against propositional accounts of knowing how is based on a development of some considerations taken from Aristotle’s Nicomachean...

Wiggins on Practical Knowledge

Online veröffentlicht: 31. Dez. 2018

Seitenbereich: 113 - 124

Eingereicht: 10. Nov. 2015

Akzeptiert: 05. Mai 2016

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2016-0005

Schlüsselwörter
Knowing how, practical knowledge, intellectualism, David Wiggins, Aristotle

© 2016 Henry Clarke, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Wiggins on Practical Knowledge

Online veröffentlicht: 31. Dez. 2018

Seitenbereich: 113 - 124

Eingereicht: 10. Nov. 2015

Akzeptiert: 05. Mai 2016

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2016-0005

SchlüsselwörterKnowing how, practical knowledge, intellectualism, David Wiggins, Aristotle

© 2016 Henry Clarke, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Schlüsselwörter
Knowing how, practical knowledge, intellectualism, David Wiggins, Aristotle