<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Fictionalists claim that instead of believing certain controversial propositions they accept them nonseriously, as useful make-believe. In this way they present themselves as having an austere ontology despite the apparent ontological commitments of their discourse. Some philosophers object that this plays on a distinction without a difference: the fictionalist’s would-be nonserious acceptance is the most we can do for the relevant content acceptance-wise, hence such acceptance is no different from what we ordinarily call ‘belief’ and should be so called. They conclude that it is subject to the norms applicable to paradigmatic empirical beliefs, and hence, <italic>pace</italic> fictionalists, ontological commitments must be taken seriously. I disentangle three strands in the objector’s thought: the ‘What more can you ask for?’ intuition, a linguistic/conceptual claim, and a claim about norms. I argue that the former two are compatible with ontological deflationism, and therefore do not entail applicability of the norms. Nevertheless, if indeed there is no more robust acceptance with which to contrast the supposed nonserious acceptance, then the fictionalist’s claim to austere ontology must be abandoned. Is there a reason to suppose there is any merit to the distinction-without-a-difference charge? I argue that there is, clarify it, and defend against objections, focusing on Daly 2008.</p></abstract>

Fictionalists claim that instead of believing certain controversial propositions they accept them nonseriously, as useful make-believe. In this way they present themselves as having an austere ontology despite the apparent ontological commitments of their discourse. Some philosophers object that this plays on a distinction without a difference: the fictionalist’s would-be nonserious acceptance is the most we can do for the relevant content acceptance-wise, hence such acceptance is no different from what we ordinarily call ‘belief’ and should be so called. They conclude that it is subject to the norms applicable to paradigmatic empirical beliefs, and hence, pace fictionalists, ontological commitments must be taken seriously. I disentangle three strands in the objector’s thought: the ‘What more can you ask for?’ intuition, a linguistic/conceptual claim, and a claim about norms. I argue that the former two are compatible with ontological deflationism, and therefore do not entail applicability of the norms. Nevertheless, if indeed there is no more robust acceptance with which to contrast the supposed nonserious acceptance, then the fictionalist’s claim to austere ontology must be abandoned. Is there a reason to suppose there is any merit to the distinction-without-a-difference charge? I argue that there is, clarify it, and defend against objections, focusing on Daly 2008.

Names of Attitudes and Norms for Attitudes

Disputatio

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

{"article-title":"Names of Attitudes and Norms for Attitudes"}

Fictionalists claim that instead of believing certain controversial propositions they accept them nonseriously, as useful make-believe. In this way they...

Names of Attitudes and Norms for Attitudes

Online veröffentlicht: 31. Dez. 2018

Seitenbereich: 1 - 24

Eingereicht: 03. Jan. 2014

Akzeptiert: 22. Feb. 2015

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2015-0001

Schlüsselwörter
Fictionalism, ontological deflationism, doublethink, make-believe, nonserious acceptance

© 2015 Inga Nayding, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Names of Attitudes and Norms for Attitudes

Online veröffentlicht: 31. Dez. 2018

Seitenbereich: 1 - 24

Eingereicht: 03. Jan. 2014

Akzeptiert: 22. Feb. 2015

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2015-0001

SchlüsselwörterFictionalism, ontological deflationism, doublethink, make-believe, nonserious acceptance

© 2015 Inga Nayding, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Schlüsselwörter
Fictionalism, ontological deflationism, doublethink, make-believe, nonserious acceptance