<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Mark Heller has recently offered a proposal in defense of a fairly strong version of doxastic voluntarism. Heller looks to the compatibilist theory of free will proposed by R.E. Hobart in the first half of the twentieth century for an account of doxastic control. Heller’s defense of Hobartian Voluntarism is motivated by an appeal to epistemic deontologism. In this paper I argue that Heller’s defense of a version of strong or direct doxastic voluntarism ultimately fails. I finally argue that the failure of his theory of epistemic agency does not imply the untenability of epistemic deontologism.</p></abstract>

Mark Heller has recently offered a proposal in defense of a fairly strong version of doxastic voluntarism. Heller looks to the compatibilist theory of free will proposed by R.E. Hobart in the first half of the twentieth century for an account of doxastic control. Heller’s defense of Hobartian Voluntarism is motivated by an appeal to epistemic deontologism. In this paper I argue that Heller’s defense of a version of strong or direct doxastic voluntarism ultimately fails. I finally argue that the failure of his theory of epistemic agency does not imply the untenability of epistemic deontologism.

Hobartian Voluntarism and Epistemic Deontologism

Disputatio

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{"article-title":"Hobartian Voluntarism and Epistemic Deontologism"}

Mark Heller has recently offered a proposal in defense of a fairly strong version of doxastic voluntarism. Heller looks to the compatibilist theory of free...

Hobartian Voluntarism and Epistemic Deontologism

Online veröffentlicht: 31. Dez. 2018

Seitenbereich: 1 - 17

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2006-0011

© 2006 Andrei Buckareff, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.