<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">

<p>This Article examines the general relationship between the Senate Judiciary Committee and the federal courts using a historical institutionalist analysis. The Senate Judiciary Committee, often known as the “Committee of Lawyers”, has adopted a very lawyer-like decision making process and style. This Article considers whether the large number of lawyers who sit on it serves to protect the federal courts from institutional attacks; it explores how the Committee can influence the number of judges sitting on any given federal court and help determine the boundaries of the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals. The Article explores why the Senate Judiciary Committee often serves as a graveyard for court-curbing proposals approved by the House Judiciary Committee or even the full House. The main focus of the Article is on how the Committee chair has considerable influence on the court-Congress relationship, although the chair must function within the overall decision-making culture of the Senate as a whole. It notes various chairs have approached the Blue Slip process for judicial nominees very differently, depending in part on whether the White House and the Senate are controlled by the same political party. Finally, the Article discusses how the Committee attracts ideologically extreme members of both parties and how this ideological polarization affects the Committee's interactions with the federal judiciary. The Article also provides some comparisons with the House Judiciary Committee on these issues.</p>
</abstract>

This Article examines the general relationship between the Senate Judiciary Committee and the federal courts using a historical institutionalist analysis. The Senate Judiciary Committee, often known as the “Committee of Lawyers”, has adopted a very lawyer-like decision making process and style. This Article considers whether the large number of lawyers who sit on it serves to protect the federal courts from institutional attacks; it explores how the Committee can influence the number of judges sitting on any given federal court and help determine the boundaries of the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals. The Article explores why the Senate Judiciary Committee often serves as a graveyard for court-curbing proposals approved by the House Judiciary Committee or even the full House. The main focus of the Article is on how the Committee chair has considerable influence on the court-Congress relationship, although the chair must function within the overall decision-making culture of the Senate as a whole. It notes various chairs have approached the Blue Slip process for judicial nominees very differently, depending in part on whether the White House and the Senate are controlled by the same political party. Finally, the Article discusses how the Committee attracts ideologically extreme members of both parties and how this ideological polarization affects the Committee's interactions with the federal judiciary. The Article also provides some comparisons with the House Judiciary Committee on these issues.

The Senate Judiciary Committee's Relationship with the Federal Courts

British Journal of American Legal Studies

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

{"article-title":"The Senate Judiciary Committee's Relationship with the Federal Courts"}

This Article examines the general relationship between the Senate Judiciary Committee and the federal courts using a historical institutionalist analysis. The...

The Senate Judiciary Committee's Relationship with the Federal Courts

Online veröffentlicht: 18. Mai 2022

Seitenbereich: 409 - 432

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/bjals-2021-0012

Schlüsselwörter
U.S. Senate, Judiciary Committee, judicial confirmation, institutional culture, lawyers in Congress

© 2021 Mark C. Miller, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

The Senate Judiciary Committee's Relationship with the Federal Courts

Online veröffentlicht: 18. Mai 2022

Seitenbereich: 409 - 432

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/bjals-2021-0012

SchlüsselwörterU.S. Senate, Judiciary Committee, judicial confirmation, institutional culture, lawyers in Congress

© 2021 Mark C. Miller, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Schlüsselwörter
U.S. Senate, Judiciary Committee, judicial confirmation, institutional culture, lawyers in Congress