<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Scholars often appeal to Kant in defending a retributivist view of criminal punishment. In this paper, I join other scholars in rejecting this interpretation as insufficiently attentive to Kant's wider theory of justice, particularly as found in the <italic>Rechtslehre</italic>, a section of the <italic>Metaphysics of Morals</italic>. I then turn to the <italic>Tugendlehre</italic>, where I examine analogies between Kant's treatments of morality and justice. In particular, I argue that Kant's own views about conscience and moral cognition should cause us to rethink the importance of lex talionis (an integral retributive principle) in the criminal justice system, and to adopt a more merciful attitude toward punishable criminals than we might otherwise be inclined to do. I end with a few policy proposals aimed at encouraging such moral cognition in contemporary Anglo-American criminal justice systems</p></abstract>

Scholars often appeal to Kant in defending a retributivist view of criminal punishment. In this paper, I join other scholars in rejecting this interpretation as insufficiently attentive to Kant's wider theory of justice, particularly as found in the Rechtslehre, a section of the Metaphysics of Morals. I then turn to the Tugendlehre, where I examine analogies between Kant's treatments of morality and justice. In particular, I argue that Kant's own views about conscience and moral cognition should cause us to rethink the importance of lex talionis (an integral retributive principle) in the criminal justice system, and to adopt a more merciful attitude toward punishable criminals than we might otherwise be inclined to do. I end with a few policy proposals aimed at encouraging such moral cognition in contemporary Anglo-American criminal justice systems

Moral Cognition in Criminal Punishment

State of Minnesota Board of Public Defense

British Journal of American Legal Studies

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

{"article-title":"Moral Cognition in Criminal Punishment"}

Scholars often appeal to Kant in defending a retributivist view of criminal punishment. In this paper, I join other scholars in rejecting this interpretation...

Moral Cognition in Criminal Punishment

Online veröffentlicht: 29. Mai 2020

Seitenbereich: 143 - 179

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/bjals-2020-0002

Schlüsselwörter
Punishment, Kant, Freedom, Virtue, Lex Talionis

© 2020 Jason R. Steffen, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Moral Cognition in Criminal Punishment

Online veröffentlicht: 29. Mai 2020

Seitenbereich: 143 - 179

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/bjals-2020-0002

SchlüsselwörterPunishment, Kant, Freedom, Virtue, Lex Talionis

© 2020 Jason R. Steffen, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Schlüsselwörter
Punishment, Kant, Freedom, Virtue, Lex Talionis