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Lying and the First Amendment

   | 31. Dez. 2018

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The first amendment does not protect all speech. Should it protect lies? Some argue that the state should intervene to prevent and punish lying because the people are insufficiently rational (they are too emotional, and, therefore vulnerable) or excessively rational (they find it too costly to investigate claims and are, therefore, vulnerable). Others retort that state officials are not neutral or objective, but have their own interests to advance and protect, and, therefore, cannot be trusted. Though certain kinds of lying, like fraud and perjury, are clearly not protected speech, courts have recently seemed sympathetic to the view that the proper response to lying is not government action, but the workings of the marketplace of ideas. The distinguished economist, Ronald Coase, has taken this argument much farther, applying it to commercial speech, but thus far his views have not prevailed.

eISSN:
2049-4092
Sprache:
Englisch
Zeitrahmen der Veröffentlichung:
2 Hefte pro Jahr
Fachgebiete der Zeitschrift:
Rechtswissenschaften, Öffentliches Recht, andere, Rechtsgeschichte, Rechtsphilosophie, Rechtssoziologie, Int. Recht, Auslands-, Völkerrecht, Rechtsvergleichung