<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">

<p>This paper considers a low carbon supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer under the condition that the demand is uncertain. We first establish three games, including manufacturer Stackelberg (MS), retailer Stackelberg (RS) and Nash according to the different power structure of the firms. We then determine that the equilibrium stocking factors, emission reduction levels, wholesale prices and retail prices for the three models, respectively. After that, we demonstrate the effects of power structure. Results show that when the power shifts from the retailer to the manufacturer, the stocking factor decreases, whereas the wholesale price increases. Finally, we discuss the impacts of the random demand. We find that the expected profits of the firms, the emission reduction levels and the retail prices are increasing with respect to the market potential and low-carbon sensitivity coefficient, respectively. Meanwhile, they decrease with respect to the price sensitivity coefficient.</p>
</abstract>

This paper considers a low carbon supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer under the condition that the demand is uncertain. We first establish three games, including manufacturer Stackelberg (MS), retailer Stackelberg (RS) and Nash according to the different power structure of the firms. We then determine that the equilibrium stocking factors, emission reduction levels, wholesale prices and retail prices for the three models, respectively. After that, we demonstrate the effects of power structure. Results show that when the power shifts from the retailer to the manufacturer, the stocking factor decreases, whereas the wholesale price increases. Finally, we discuss the impacts of the random demand. We find that the expected profits of the firms, the emission reduction levels and the retail prices are increasing with respect to the market potential and low-carbon sensitivity coefficient, respectively. Meanwhile, they decrease with respect to the price sensitivity coefficient.

Game theoretic model for low carbon supply chain under carbon emissions reduction sensitive random demand

Hubei Key Laboratory of Power System Design and Test for Electrical Vehicle

Applied Mathematics and Nonlinear Sciences

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

This paper considers a low carbon supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer under the condition that the demand is uncertain. We...

Game theoretic model for low carbon supply chain under carbon emissions reduction sensitive random demand

Online veröffentlicht: 14. Okt. 2022

Seitenbereich: 1 - 18

Eingereicht: 01. Dez. 2020

Akzeptiert: 25. Feb. 2021

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/amns.2022.1.00101

Schlüsselwörter
low carbon, demand uncertainty, power structure, game theory

© 2023 Chao Ma et al., published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

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Game theoretic model for low carbon supply chain under carbon emissions reduction sensitive random demand

Online veröffentlicht: 14. Okt. 2022

Seitenbereich: 1 - 18

Eingereicht: 01. Dez. 2020

Akzeptiert: 25. Feb. 2021

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/amns.2022.1.00101

Schlüsselwörterlow carbon, demand uncertainty, power structure, game theory

© 2023 Chao Ma et al., published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Fig. 1

Fig. 2

Fig. 3

Fig. 4

Fig. 5

Fig. 6

Schlüsselwörter
low carbon, demand uncertainty, power structure, game theory