<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">

<p>To promote the synergistic development of vocational education and regional economy, this paper proposes to use the separated equilibrium game model to study vocational education and regional economy. Starting from the theoretical foundation of the components of game theory, the separated equilibrium game model oriented to the synergistic development of vocational education and regional economy is constructed by combining the game tree and the separated equilibrium game. According to the calculation formula for evolutionary stabilization strategies and equilibrium analysis, the case analysis of vocational education and regional economies is conducted. The results show that when W2 is taken as 2, 3, or 4, the system evolves towards antagonistic cooperation, but evolution is becoming increasingly slow. When W2=6, the two sides of the school and enterprise choose the strategy tends to (positive cooperation, positive cooperation), which indicates that in the school-enterprise cooperation, the government departments through tax concessions, capital subsidies and other incentives to improve the enthusiasm of enterprises is an effective method. This study analyzes the dispute of interests of school-enterprise cooperation in vocational education development from the game perspective. It provides the basis for the construction of regional economic synergistic development strategy.</p>
</abstract>

To promote the synergistic development of vocational education and regional economy, this paper proposes to use the separated equilibrium game model to study vocational education and regional economy. Starting from the theoretical foundation of the components of game theory, the separated equilibrium game model oriented to the synergistic development of vocational education and regional economy is constructed by combining the game tree and the separated equilibrium game. According to the calculation formula for evolutionary stabilization strategies and equilibrium analysis, the case analysis of vocational education and regional economies is conducted. The results show that when W2 is taken as 2, 3, or 4, the system evolves towards antagonistic cooperation, but evolution is becoming increasingly slow. When W2=6, the two sides of the school and enterprise choose the strategy tends to (positive cooperation, positive cooperation), which indicates that in the school-enterprise cooperation, the government departments through tax concessions, capital subsidies and other incentives to improve the enthusiasm of enterprises is an effective method. This study analyzes the dispute of interests of school-enterprise cooperation in vocational education development from the game perspective. It provides the basis for the construction of regional economic synergistic development strategy.

Exploring the synergistic development strategy of vocational education and regional economy based on the separating equilibrium game model

Applied Mathematics and Nonlinear Sciences

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

To promote the synergistic development of vocational education and regional economy, this paper proposes to use the separated equilibrium game model to study...

Exploring the synergistic development strategy of vocational education and regional economy based on the separating equilibrium game model

Online veröffentlicht: 03. Mai 2024

Seitenbereich: -

Eingereicht: 11. Apr. 2024

Akzeptiert: 24. Apr. 2024

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/amns-2024-0977

Schlüsselwörter
Separating equilibrium, Game model, Game tree, Evolutionary stabilization strategy, Vocational education

© 2024 Jiangwei Li et al., published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Exploring the synergistic development strategy of vocational education and regional economy based on the separating equilibrium game model

Online veröffentlicht: 03. Mai 2024

Seitenbereich: -

Eingereicht: 11. Apr. 2024

Akzeptiert: 24. Apr. 2024

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/amns-2024-0977

SchlüsselwörterSeparating equilibrium, Game model, Game tree, Evolutionary stabilization strategy, Vocational education

© 2024 Jiangwei Li et al., published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Schlüsselwörter
Separating equilibrium, Game model, Game tree, Evolutionary stabilization strategy, Vocational education