<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>From the traditional functions of the general principles of the EU law – of interpretation, completion of the gaps and legality control, the principle of balancing seems to meet the most the exigencies of the first of these. The limits of the role of CJEU are certainly put to the test when it is called to settle conflicts between fundamental rights/fundamental freedoms. The trends formulated in Schmidberger (on the conflict between the free circulation of the commodities and the freedom of expression) or Promusicae (on the conflict between the right to the effective protection of the intellectual property and the right to the respect of the private life and the protection of the personal data) are more than illustrative. The doctrine assessments of the action of this principle reflect three fields in which the applicability thereof tends to reserve to the Court a role that is susceptible of creating controversies on its traditional extension. According to the authorized voice of Professor Norbert Reich, the balancing in the jurisprudence on the abusive clauses, the balancing for the avoidance of excessive protection and the balancing in social conflicts (making visible an aggravation of the conflict between fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms) are concerned.</p></abstract>

From the traditional functions of the general principles of the EU law – of interpretation, completion of the gaps and legality control, the principle of balancing seems to meet the most the exigencies of the first of these. The limits of the role of CJEU are certainly put to the test when it is called to settle conflicts between fundamental rights/fundamental freedoms. The trends formulated in Schmidberger (on the conflict between the free circulation of the commodities and the freedom of expression) or Promusicae (on the conflict between the right to the effective protection of the intellectual property and the right to the respect of the private life and the protection of the personal data) are more than illustrative. The doctrine assessments of the action of this principle reflect three fields in which the applicability thereof tends to reserve to the Court a role that is susceptible of creating controversies on its traditional extension. According to the authorized voice of Professor Norbert Reich, the balancing in the jurisprudence on the abusive clauses, the balancing for the avoidance of excessive protection and the balancing in social conflicts (making visible an aggravation of the conflict between fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms) are concerned.

The Contributions Of CJEU In The Name Of The Principle Of Balancing – A Test Of The Role Of The Court?

“Lucian Blaga” University, Sibiu, Romania

International conference KNOWLEDGE-BASED ORGANIZATION

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

From the traditional functions of the general principles of the EU law – of interpretation, completion of the gaps and legality control, the principle of...

The Contributions Of CJEU In The Name Of The Principle Of Balancing – A Test Of The Role Of The Court?

Online veröffentlicht: 24. Nov. 2015

Seitenbereich: 472 - 478

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/kbo-2015-0081

Schlüsselwörter
principle of balancing, fundamental rights, fundamental freedoms, unfair terms

© 2015 Gina Orga-Dumitriu, published by De Gruyter Open

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

The Contributions Of CJEU In The Name Of The Principle Of Balancing – A Test Of The Role Of The Court?

Online veröffentlicht: 24. Nov. 2015

Seitenbereich: 472 - 478

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/kbo-2015-0081

Schlüsselwörterprinciple of balancing, fundamental rights, fundamental freedoms, unfair terms

© 2015 Gina Orga-Dumitriu, published by De Gruyter Open

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Schlüsselwörter
principle of balancing, fundamental rights, fundamental freedoms, unfair terms