Online veröffentlicht: 19. Mai 2017
Seitenbereich: 41 - 57
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/bjals-2017-0004
Schlüsselwörter
© 2017 Jane Marriott
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.
This paper examines Justice Scalia’s approach to campaign finance adjudication, in particular his skepticism of legislative motive. Three distinct strands of skepticism are identified: power-grabbing, incumbent-bracing and speech-preventing. As regards democracy Justice Scalia is identified as being caught in definitional dilemma whereby his campaign finance jurisprudence appears to serve a particular vision of democracy, which is, itself, the identifiable creature of his approach to constitutional adjudication. Ultimately, it is argued that, whilst a liberal dose of mistrust of government might well be warranted in cases concerning the devices of democracy, in the task of scrutinising campaign finance regulation and reform, a strong argument emerges for suspicion of judicial motives too since there is as much danger to democracy posed by the tenured fox as by the incumbent one.