The event and the (non-)phenomenon: Marion/Derrida

The issue of the event and its relation to the concept of phenomenon has been widely spread in the French phenomenology of the last decades. Firstly, this article aims at retracing some general aspects of the role of the event in what has been called the “New phenomenology in France” and raises the problem of a distinction between different uses of this concept. Secondly, it analyses in two phases the presence of this topic in Marion’s phenomenology. On the one hand, it has to be shown that the concept of the event occupies an increasingly important role in Marion’s thinking, for it characterises givenness and phenomenality as such. On the other hand, I intend to problematize the position of Marion, in so far as it leads to an integral givenness and unfolds on the basis of an ambiguous overlap of the themes of givenness and intuition. Finally, Marion’s analysis will be contrasted to Derrida’s thinking, which allows us to think at the event as an impossible that happens, as a constitutive non-givenness and therefore as an essential limitation for phenomenology.