Joseph Blado critiqued my probabilistic arguments against Roman papal doctrines by deploying probability arguments, particularly Bayesian arguments, in favor of the papacy. He contends that there are good C-inductive arguments for papal doctrine that, taken together, add up to a good P-inductive argument. I argue that his inductive arguments fail, and moreover that there are three good C-inductive arguments against papal doctrine in the neighborhood of his failed arguments. I conclude by critiquing his retreat to what he calls ‘skeptical papalism’ as a last ditch sort of move to defend papal doctrine.
Keywords
- papal doctrine
- probability arguments
- Luz
- intertextuality
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