Although signs of local autonomy can be traced back to the medieval period in the case of free royal cities and counties, there is not a strong tradition of decentralization in Hungary; while larger cities gained privileges, villages and towns did not have functioning local government authorities (Pálné Kovács 2008). Centralization became even more intense in the Communist period. Between 1950 and 1989, local and county councils functioned under hierarchical territorial instructions. In the soviet-type council system, local communities formally elected their councils, but the politically delegated executive committees held effective decision-making powers (Pálné Kovács 2008). To make the system more effective, amalgamation reforms began to be forced through in the 1960s, and were carried out in several waves. The aim of these amalgamations was to stimulate urbanization and to establish more hierarchical administration by merging local councils.
Formally, the number of settlements was decreased by only five percent between 1950 and 1990, the number of local councils was halved in this period (Table 1), and about two thirds of them were joint councils of different settlements. Moreover, these local councils were marginal actors in the hierarchical system, as the country-level councils were the key elements of sub-national coordination: they enforced the directives of the Communist party locally, dispensed the central subsidies among the local councils, and had legal, functional and fiscal control over them (Pálné Kovács 2008).
Territorial reforms in the Communist regime (1950-1990)
Year | Number of settlements | Number of councils |
---|---|---|
1950 | 3,229 | 3,032 |
1960 | 3,273 | 3,087 |
1970 | 3,244 | 2,294 |
1975 | 3,183 | 1,711 |
1980 | 3,122 | 1,525 |
1985 | 3,064 | 1,486 |
1990 | 3,070 | 1,586 |
The democratic transition in 1989–90 brought with it the promise of a new era in decentralization, with significant changes to the Hungarian sub-national levels. The soviet-type council system was abolished, as the settlements became local units of the new sub-national territorial system, instead of local councils (often merged by force). In this new system, every settlement earned the right to form a local government authority, and thus in 1990 more than 3,000 fully autonomous municipalities were established in Hungary. The design of the new sub-national institutional framework can be considered as a response to the highly centralized structure of the Communist era. The legislators of the first parliament regarded local government authorities as an important element of the political system, vital to prevent the revival of an authoritarian regime and as a counterbalance to the central government. In line with the ‘one settlement – one local government authority’ principle, 3,089 local government authorities were established as the lower (NUTS 5) tier of the sub-national territorial system, with nineteen counties and the capital city (Budapest) in the second/ middle (NUTS 3) tier. The newly-formed institutional framework was asymmetric in a diferent way than the one in the Communist regime: local government authorities gained broad autonomy in service providing, with moderate room to manoeuvre regarding their tasks and fiscal autonomy, while the middle level became a ‘missing tier’ (Zongor 1999) with a limited range of tasks and without their own revenues. The elected county government authorities were initially established to provide services that were dificult for local government authorities to provide and to coordinate complex development projects. Since neither the central government nor the local government authorities were interested in filling the institutional vacuum at the middle level (Soós & Kákai 2011), county governments could not become the regions’ strategic planners.
A review of the thirty years over which the Hungarian local government system functioned reveals that most of the problems in the Hungarian local government system were coded into the 1990 establishment of the institutional framework. One of the main issues was the fragmentation at local level. This principle produced more than 3,000 local government authorities, with many villages with less than 500 inhabitants among them (Figure 1).
Number of Hungarian local government authorities by population (2019)
Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office (n.d. a)
Also, this fragmented system was established with no differentiation The diferentiation between tasks only appeared at the middle level: until 2010, the elected county government authorities were to fulfil the functions of complex area development and ensure the services that it was impossible for each municipality to provide (e.g. maintaining hospitals and middle-level educational institutions).
Based on the first experiences of how local government authorities function, scholars and practitioners came to a consensus about the main issues of the local system early (Pálné Kovács 2016a): in relation to the wide scope of their functions, local government authorities were under-financed, while the fragmentation at local level had an adverse effect on quality and costs of local services. The municipalities were overwhelmed by the task of providing local services that could probably be provided more cost-effectively and more eficiently on a larger scale (Gajduschek 2012).
Although the problems of the local government system became apparent by 1994, successive governments had dificulties reducing the effects of fragmentation (and lack of diferentiation of tasks), since they had to find ways of doing this without violating the municipalities’ formal autonomy. Direct territorial reforms (e.g. top-down initiated amalgamations) were of the table because of the lack of consensus among political parties and the history of forced amalgamations in the Communist era. Therefore, from the late 1990s, governments tried to use indirect approaches (primarily government subsidies) to encourage the different forms of municipal co-operation (development councils, joint administrative offices, local government associations, etc.). These steps eased the problems somewhat but did not transform the fragmented local level. As the recalibration of the local government system required the support of a two-thirds majority of the national parliament, carrying out a comprehensive reform proved to be difficult until 2010.
While local government amalgamations never happened in the thirty-year history of the modern democracy, from the beginning, territorial changes took a diferent direction: between 1990 and 2019, nearly 100 municipal splits occurred in Hungary. Most of them were carried out in the early years, when local communities of formerly merged settlements wished to regain their autonomy. In the Communist era, these local communities were forced to merge with other settlements, i.e. they were not only merged into a joint local council, but also lost their settlement status. During the transition, these joined settlements were maintained and transformed into local government authorities accordingly. Thus, as they were not separate settlements, these local communities were not given the right to establish separate local government authorities. To achieve independence, they initiated splits after the transition.
Although most separations were carried out in the first four years after the democratic transition, municipal splits were not uncommon even in the 2000s. Until 2013, neither attitudes taken by governments, nor legal regulations (for establishing a new municipality) were hostile towards municipal splits.
The following is an analysis of the local territorial changes, namely the municipal splits in the last three decades in Hungary, to map the dynamics, reasons for, and factors affecting secessions. This is followed by a brief description of the reforms and attempts at reform made by 1 the central government to alter the operation of the fragmented system in the last twenty-five years. I argue that the Fidesz-KDNP national electoral victory (and its two-thirds majority in the parliament) in 2010 was a milestone in the handling of territorial issues: while municipal splits became virtually impossible with the new regulation of the split process,
As in many cases in Central and Eastern Europe, the fragmentation at Hungarian local level can be considered as a response to the earlier territorial consolidations introduced by the Communist government (Swianiewicz 2002). The legislators of the first parliament preferred the democratic aspects of local governance over effective functioning (Bekényi & Pajor 2002), thus the regulation was formed in a way that did not hinder the establishment of new municipalities. Therefore, the early fragmentation of the new system was followed by several splits in the first half of the 1990s as municipalities that were merged in the Communist era expressed a wish to regain their autonomy as distinct local government authorities (Figure 2). Almost two-thirds (64 percent) of the Hungarian municipal splits occurred in the first electoral cycle (between 1990 and 1994). Another indicator of the post-Communist realignment is that in eleven cases during the first periods of the municipal splits, the ‘mother’ (old) municipality ceased to exist and split into two distinct municipalities (for example: Mázaszászvár split into Máza and Szászvár in 1991). These old municipalities were the products of the amalgamation processes of the Communist era in every case.
Municipal splits in Hungary (1990-2019)
Source: own calculation based on National Election Office data (n.d. b)
After the initial period, there was a decline in municipal splits. As, formally, new municipalities have been established during local elections since 2002, the splits were concentrated in the election years (2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014). Nevertheless, the decline is obvious. In the last five years, there have been no municipal splits in Hungary (although there was a local election in 2019). One reason for this could be that the local communities are now content with their positions and do not want to separate from the original municipalities, however, as I argue in the following section, the absence of municipal splits might be the result of an amendment to this regulation in 2013.
No clear regional patterns can be identified with regard to splits, although fifty-four percent of them occurred in the Northern Great Plain Region (thirty-one percent) and in the Central Transdanubia Region (twenty-three percent). There are seven NUTS 2 regions in Hungary.
Most of the newly established municipalities are small villages with less than 1,000 inhabitants. Only 8 of the 97 newly established local government regions have more than 5,000 inhabitants. To map the differences in size in settlements that were affected by the splits, I compared the population of the ‘new’ municipalities (the ones that initiated the splits) to the population of the ‘old’ (abandoned) municipalities
Population characteristics of Hungarian municipal splits (1990-2019)
Source: own calculation based on Hungarian Central Statistical Office data (d. b)
Swianiewicz (2021) makes a distinction between the factors causing municipal splits according to two issues, namely which circumstances are an incentive to initiate a split (environmental factors) and which factors influence the likelihood of a successful split (political factors). Based on this distinction, he identifies types of secessions in the Central and Eastern European region. Below I examine the factors causing the Hungarian municipal splits according to this typology.
To map the environmental and political factors affecting the splits, one option would be to analyse official records, since in every case the initiators of the splits had to create a proposal describing how territory/tasks/properties would be assigned. However, these documents contain only partial information about some environmental factors, and rarely give the real motives of the initiators. Therefore, I conducted a review of national, regional and local media sources to gather information about the motives and examine the circumstances of the separations. According to my analysis, Hungarian municipal splits are examples for almost all the potential motives/factors of Swianiewicz’s classification.
By examining the environmental circumstances, both economic and cultural (or identity-based) factors can be identified. In most separation processes, the initiators of the splits expressed a wish to have public services provided autonomously, as they felt that the ‘mother’ municipality Since local budget data are not available for the years of the secessions, I used the 2019-2020 budget data of the municipalities to calculate the per capita local tax revenues, assuming that a local government authority that is more affluent nowadays was also more affluent when the secession took place.
Regarding the cultural factors, local identity is a key element of municipal splits in Hungary. The majority of the local government authorities involved in the separations were
To summarise, financial reasons, a wish for services to be provided autonomously, and local identity are all adequate answers to the question of why these splits of municipalities take place. Obviously, these motives are connected: a strong local identity creates a wish to have an autonomous infrastructure to provide services, and citizens without local services often feel that they are marginalized and think that they could put the resources of the municipality to more beneficial use for their community.
Among the political factors identified by Swianiewicz (2021), local factors are not relevant in Hungary. Central factors heavily influence the local separations, as the dynamics of Hungarian local splits clearly mirror the
In the first two decades after the democratic transition, the process of splitting municipal authorities was regulated in a manner favourable to the local communities that wanted to leave the original municipalities and form new local government authorities; basically they could decide to leave, while the original municipality could not influence effectively the outcome of the process, and the higher tiers of the political system could only decide on the legality of the split process. To start the process, the municipality established a committee (with at least three members) to create a proposal for the split. This plan included a proposal regarding the territory and the name of the new local government authority, and described how the properties, rights, tasks and the cost of the split should be shared between the ‘new’ municipality and the ‘mother’ local government authority (Act XLI of 1999 8–13. §). The local government authority then held a local referendum on the split. Between 1990 and 2012, only those citizens who lived in the proposed new part of the municipality could vote in the referendum. If the referendum was successful (more than fifty percent of the population participated and more than fifty percent of the voters had the same opinion), the local government authority had to initiate the split at the ministry responsible for local government authorities (usually the Ministry of Interior). The minister decided whether to approve the split (by examining whether the proposal met every legal requirement). If the minister rejected the proposal, the local government authority could seek to have the minister’s decision overturned in court. If the minister approved the proposal, they sent it to the head of state, who then decided to establish a new local authority.
During the 2010–14 local reform, the Fidesz cabinet implemented serious restrictions on the regulation of splits (Act CLXXXIX of 2011 98–99. §). Although since 2013 there have been no explicit population requirements for a new municipality, now every citizen of the original municipality can decide whether they are in favour of the separation, and thus the ‘mother’ municipality can significantly influence the outcome of the split and hinder the separation of the ‘new’ municipality. Furthermore, additional requirements came into effect as of 2013: the ‘new’ municipality is required to show an increasing population during the ten years before the split, its infrastructural conditions are expected to exceed the national average, and the costs of operation (of providing public services) are expected to be below the national average. Obviously, this new regulation created serious obstacles for future splits, as the newly established municipalities have to be constantly growing in population, function more effectively, and be more developed than the average municipality in Hungary. As Figure 2 shows, only one successful split (2014: Balatonakarattya) occurred after the change in the regulations, however in this case the separation was initiated before the reform was introduced, and the local referendum about the split was held in 2012. This means that only citizens of the ‘new’ municipality could vote on the split.
To explore the The Hungarian National Election Office has no data on local referenda before 1999, therefore in this section, I examine splits between 1999 and 2019.
Secession processes in Hungary (1999-2019)
Source: own elaboration
On the one hand, the statistics suggest that the central government’s attitude towards splits was not hostile, as higher tiers of the political system prevented the split in only five cases after referenda were held. One of the proposals was rejected by the head of state: the President of the Republic prevented the separation in the case of Magdolnavölgy (in 2007), because it was presumably prompted by business interests and was initiated in connection with a property development project. The four proposals that were rejected by the central government (the minister) were dismissed based on legal regulations. In one case (2009: Miskolctapolca), the separation process was carried out unlawfully, while in two cases (Mátrafüred in 2007 and Mözs in 2008) the parts of the municipalities that initiated the splits were always part of their ‘mother’ municipalities and they were not distinct units from a geographical standpoint. Finally, in the case of Bokros (in 2009), the Minister of Local Government dismissed the proposal based on the functional requirements of the regulation introduced in 1994: he argued that the standard of public services would drop significantly in the new municipality after the split.
On the other hand, the central government’s intention to prevent further fragmentation is manifested clearly in the law that regulates splits (Act CLXXXIX of 2011) and in the effect of that law. Until Fidesz’s local government reform, successive governments introduced only mild requirements to prevent splits in extreme cases: only very small communities with underdeveloped infrastructure and services were unable to meet these prerequisites. Since 2013, a part of a municipality that wishes to separate from its ‘mother’ municipality has to show a better financial performance and provision of services, and greater demographical tendencies than the average Hungarian local government authority. Also, in practice, it has to obtain permission to leave from the other part of the community from which it wishes to secede. Under Fidesz’s regulation, only three percent of the 1990-2019 municipal splits could be carried out, if the citizens of the ‘mother’ municipality voted against the split uniformly (see Figure 3).
The analysis shows that municipal splits can be divided into three periods based on the environmental circumstances and political factors. The first period, between 1990 and 1994, can be characterized as realignment after the Communist era. The splits in this period were driven by the local identity and the memory of having local government in the past. The legal framework was clearly favourable for the initiators of the separations. In the second period (1995–2013), local communities had various reasons (local identity, finance, autonomous provision of services) to initiate a split from their ‘mother’ municipality, and they had the freedom to carry it out. Finally, from 2013, political factors changed: municipal splits became virtually impossible following the Fidesz government’s new regulation, which substantially obstructed the separation process.
Amalgamation of municipalities has been possible and well regulated in Hungary since the post-Communist transition (Act LXV of 1990 54. § and Act CLXXXIX of 2011 100. §). Based on the rules, the initiation of the amalgamation process is in the hands of the local community. First, the municipalities that wish to merge hold local referenda on the amalgamation and collectively propose a name for the new municipality. This means that the amalgamation must be a voluntary act of every participant. After a successful referendum, the minister responsible for local government (currently the head of the Ministry of Interior) decides whether to advocate the amalgamation. The minister can reject In this case, the municipalities can ask for review at the Budapest-Capital Regional Court.
In practice, amalgamation of local government authorities was never considered a political alternative in Hungary, because the forceful amalgamations of municipalities in the Communist era are still present in the memories of the people (Fekete et al. 2002). Local identity seems to be a decisive factor: since 1999 The National Election Office has no data on local referenda before 1999.
As the autonomy of local communities proved to be untouchable, no governments tried to carry out amalgamations by force. On the one hand, no political actors had the ability to change the rules until 2010 The only exception could be the Horn cabinet, which had the necessary two-thirds majority in the parliament to change the rules between 1994 and 1998, but the members of the governing coalition could not agree on the direction of the local government reform (Pálné Kovács 2016b).
Since the recalibration of the local government system required a two-thirds majority in the national parliament, governments had little room to manoeuvre to ease the effects of a fragmented local government system: as (forced) amalgamations were of the table, and even explicit functional rescaling required a two-thirds majority, the tools of financing continued to be the main instruments for controlling local government authorities until 2010.
Firstly, they established the system of development councils at county level (Act XXI of 1996), which forced local government authorities to create common, consistent development plans and cooperate. To obtain resources, the local government authorities organized themselves into associations. Secondly, governments supported the establishment of joint offices in smaller municipalities with special subsidies. This meant that the autonomy of small settlements remained unaffected (they had their own elected local councils) but the administration of the local government authorities could be organized into larger units. Thirdly, they encouraged the establishment of another form of inter-municipal cooperation (Act CXXXV of 1997): municipalities could get central subsidies to form local government associations (“társulás”) and fulfil any local government tasks and provide public services jointly. This can be considered as a successful tool for organizing local government authorities into more manageable units, as ninety percent of the local government authorities were members of associations by 1998 (Winkler 2001). Fourthly, European integration also stimulated formation of associations in the late 1990s: access to EU funds was an incentive to cooperate in development policy for local government authorities, as they were motivated to organize themselves into small regional associations (“kistérségi társulás”). Finally, the government regulated the system of small regional associations (Act CVII of 2004), and used it to rationalize operation of the local public services (Pálné Kovács 2016b).
To summarise, as successive governments had no political capability to carry out extensive reforms, they used the tools of finance to incite local government authorities to cooperate to achieve common development goals and provide public services more efficiently. These measures could ease the problems of fragmentation somewhat but they were not able to set the local government system on a new course.
In 2010, after its landslide parliamentary victory, the right-wing Fidesz had the means (a two-thirds majority) to make a number of drastic changes to the Hungarian political system. One of them was reform at a local level. The preamble of the new law on local government is clear about the new direction in local politics: while the basic principle during the establishment of the local government system in 1990 was the broad autonomy of the local communities, this resulted in ineffective and uneconomical functioning. Therefore, the new rules will establish a cost-efficient, task-oriented system, in which local autonomy has to be imposed in a more rigorous framework (Act CLXXXIX of 2011).
Firstly, as local elections took place about six months after the general elections, Fidesz quickly started to restructure the local political system after its parliamentary victory in 2010. The declared aim of the electoral reform (Act L of 2010) was to cut costs by decreasing the number of councillors by one third. According to the calculation based on the municipal population data of 2018 and the old and new electoral rules, the difference between numbers of local seats is 7,730 (-31.5 percent).
Secondly, the recalibration of the local government system started in 2012 and was conducted in the name of cutting costs and the separation of local and state duties. The main principle of the reform was that local government authorities should deal only with local issues and services, and anything else could be transferred to the central government. To deal with the transferred duties, the Fidesz government established a new meso-level administrative structure with 175 districts (“járás”) in the counties, and 23 in the capital (Act XCIII of 2012). These are administrative units whose task is to represent the central administration at local level. In this reform, many tasks that were formally assigned to local government authorities were transferred to district offices (e.g. social services, healthcare, aid for elderly people). The transfer clearly affected the administrative capacities of the local government authorities: in the name of saving money, the government reduced the maximum number of staff in the local government administrative offices (called the “mayors’ offices” – “polgármesteri hivatalok”), and then the district offices asked for civil servants to establish their own personnel. The idea behind this was that the mayors’ offices’ workload would decrease due to transfer of tasks, and therefore the ‘unnecessary’ staff could be transferred to the districts. However, comparing the proportion of the tasks transferred to the proportion of manpower transferred, there are huge differences, as considerably more administrative staff were transferred than tasks – especially in the municipalities with larger populations (see Dobos 2016).
The restructuring of local government authority finance was a vital point. Firstly, to decrease the costs of administration, the government merged the mayors’ offices of municipalities with less than 2,000 inhabitants. This mandatory merging is in contrast to the earlier approach, when governments used incentives to encourage local co-operation (i.e. the establishment of joint mayors’ offices was only a recommendation for the small municipalities). Formally, this reform step did not violate the autonomy of the municipalities since they could elect their own representatives, but in practice, it put an end to the citizens’ access to local administration in many settlements. Following the imposed merger of the mayors’ offices of municipalities with less than 2,000 inhabitants, eighty-three percent of the municipalities now operate in a joint office system, and sixty percent of the settlements do not have their own mayor’s office; forty-five percent of local government authorities do not even have a part-time branch office.
Secondly, in the name of cost-cutting, the central government changed the method of finance in the local government system from per capita grants to activity-based finance in 2013, granting the municipalities a sum based on the calculated cost of each activity. Then, they forced local government management into a more rigorous framework of operation. For example: local government authorities cannot plan a deficit in their yearly budget; they can only provide voluntary services if this does not endanger the fulfilment of their mandatory tasks; voluntary services must be covered from local government authorities’ own revenue (e.g. local taxes, incomes from their own projects).
To summarise, the provisions concerning the new local government system mirror the idea that the operability of local government is the first priority, and they can be forced into more responsible management by being given little elbowroom. Formally, there has been no change to autonomy of local government authorities, as the central government only streamlined the system and took over tasks that can be fulfilled more effectively by the state. However, a diferent picture emerges if one differentiates between the formal and practical operations of local government authorities. To examine their effective autonomy, I use the Local Autonomy Index (LAI), which is a composite index developed to measure the different aspects of local autonomy, such as institutional settings, the range of tasks for which local government authorities are effectively responsible, fiscal autonomy financial transfers, taxation, etc. (see Ladner et al. 2019). The extent of autonomy of local government authorities was examined in research in thirty-nine countries between 1990 and 2014. Most of these countries are not EU member states (for instance Albania, Georgia, Moldova, Turkey).
Autonomy of Hungarian local government authorities in international comparison (1990-2014)
Source: own elaboration based on Ladner et al. (2019)
To summarise, while the local government system established after the Communist era faced problems of fragmentation and of no diferentiation in allocation of tasks from the beginning, successive governments were unable to resolve these issues effectively until 2010. In 2010–2014, the Fidesz government significantly altered the local government system. Although specific territorial consolidation reforms and amalgamations never happened, a centralization process was carried out by reshaping local functions and fiscal conditions.
In 1990, a new local government system was established in which the main principle was the extensive autonomy of local communities. This framework resulted in a highly fragmented local government system which was operationally deficient in several ways. As local autonomy seemed to be untouchable, political actors made no direct attempts to decrease this fragmentation with territorial consolidation (amalgamation). Regulations on establishing new municipalities (by municipal splits) remained quite liberal until 2013, as attempts at reform concentrated on functional rescaling instead of amalgamation. However, with the local reform conducted by the Fidesz government in 2010–2014, several important changes were made.
Firstly, the government effectively prevented further fragmentation of the system by changing the way in which municipal splits were regulated. Since 2013, no secession processes have been initiated as the new municipalities would have to fulfil requirements that are hardly fulfillable by any local communities. Secondly, although the formal autonomy of local government authorities remained the same (as every local community has the right to elect their representatives and they can independently regulate and administrate the affairs of their local government authority), there was a drastic decrease in the level of effective local autonomy. Thirdly, an overview of the local reforms in Hungary shows that although specific amalgamations never happened, governments found ways to decrease the fragmentation of the system. Until 2010, the main tools for achieving this were financial incentives, after which the Fidesz government took more drastic action and made changes to provision of services and representative and administrative conditions at local level. The decreasing number of local representatives (-31.5 percent) means that there are less elected officers responsible for representing local interests, while the transfer of tasks and resources to district level (making them the responsibility of the state) decreases the effective autonomy of local government authorities. Finally, the case of the joint mayors’ offices is the most evident sign of the
A series of reforms that decreases local autonomy and results in a local government system which has considerably less duties, less elected officers to represent local interests, and less administrative capacities in fewer offices, can be considered as a