1. bookVolume 13 (2021): Issue 60 (May 2021)
Journal Details
First Published
16 Apr 2017
Publication timeframe
4 times per year
access type Open Access

Practical Identity and Duties of Love

Published Online: 17 Jul 2021
Volume & Issue: Volume 13 (2021) - Issue 60 (May 2021)
Page range: 27 - 50
Journal Details
First Published
16 Apr 2017
Publication timeframe
4 times per year

This paper defends the view that we have special relationship duties that do not derive from our moral duties. Our special relationship duties, I argue, are grounded in what I call close relationships. Sharing a close relationship with another person, I suggest, requires that both people conceive of themselves as being motivated to promote the other’s interests. So, staying true to oneself demands being committed to promoting the interests of those with whom we share a close relationship. Finally, I show that the proposed account of special relationship duties circumvents two problems facing self-conception accounts of special relationship duties.


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