1. bookVolume 7 (2015): Issue 40 (May 2015)
Journal Details
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Journal
eISSN
2182-2875
First Published
16 Apr 2017
Publication timeframe
4 times per year
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English
access type Open Access

Zombies Slap Back: why the Anti-Zombie Parody Does Not Work

Published Online: 31 Dec 2018
Volume & Issue: Volume 7 (2015) - Issue 40 (May 2015)
Page range: 25 - 43
Received: 09 Nov 2013
Accepted: 24 May 2015
Journal Details
License
Format
Journal
eISSN
2182-2875
First Published
16 Apr 2017
Publication timeframe
4 times per year
Languages
English
Abstract

In his “anti-zombie argument”, Keith Frankish turns the tables on “zombists”, forcing them to find an independent argument against the conceivability of anti-zombies. I argue that zombists can shoulder the burden, for there is an important asymmetry between the conceivability of zombies and the conceivability of anti-zombies, which is reflected in the embedding of a totality-clause under the conceivability operator. This makes the anti-zombie argument susceptible to what I call the ‘Modified Incompleteness’, according to which we cannot conceive of scenarios. In this paper I also argue that conceiving of the zombiesituation is a good starting point for rendering the zombie argument plausible.

Keywords

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