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What Drives Shareholders' Reaction To CEO Turnovers, Dividend Changes, and Block Trades? A Theoretical Background


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Theoretical concepts and expected impact on shareholder reaction to CEO turnovers

Theoretical concept
Panel A: Direction of shareholder reaction Expected direction
Shareholder wealth effect(Davidson et al., 1990)Signalling effects: the information component and the real component (Bonnier & Bruner, 1989)Internal monitoring mechanisms hypothesis(Denis & Denis, 1995) Two alternative hypotheses:Positive reactionNegative reaction
Improved management hypothesis(Huson et al., 2004)Ability hypothesis(Baik et al., 2011; Chang et al., 2010; Murphy & Zábojník, 2004; Pessarossi & Weill, 2013)Common sense hypothesis(Grusky, 1963; Helmich, 1974; Allen et al., 1979; Dalton & Kesner, 1985; Kesner & Sebora, 1994) Positive reaction
Scapegoat hypothesis(Boeker, 1992; Huson et al., 2004; Khanna & Poulsen, 1995)Vicious-circle theory(Grusky, 1960; Beatty & Zajac, 1987; Ishak & Latif, 2013) Negative reaction
Panel B: Determinants of shareholder reaction Expected impact
Operating performance
Signalling effects – the information component(Bonnier & Bruner, 1989) The company's operating performance before the event is worse than originally expected, the market reaction is negative
Signalling effects – the real component(Bonnier & Bruner, 1989)Internal monitoring mechanisms hypothesis(Denis & Denis, 1995)Improved management hypothesis(Huson et al., 2004)Ability hypothesis(Baik et al., 2011; Chang et al., 2010; Murphy & Zábojník, 2004; Pessarossi & Weill, 2013)Common sense hypothesis(Grusky, 1963; Helmich, 1974; Allen et al., 1979; Dalton & Kesner, 1985; Kesner & Sebora, 1994) Negative relationship between operating performance before the event and the market reactionInvestors expect improvements in operating performance after the event, the market reaction is positive
Company size
Organizational structure hypothesisReinganum (1985)Information asymmetry hypothesis(Miller & Rock, 1985) Negative relationship between company size and the market reaction
Ownership
State ownership concept(Pessarossi & Weill, 2013) Positive relationship between state ownership and the market reaction
Panel B: Determinants of shareholder reaction Expected impact
Expropriation hypothesis(La Porta et al., 2000) Non-linear inverted U-shape relationship between blockholder ownership and the market reaction
Upper echelons theory – managerial ownership(Hambrick & Mason, 1984) Non relationship between managerial ownership and the market reaction
Agency theory(Jensen & Meckling, 1976) Managerial ownership may have a positive or negative impact on the market reaction
Managerial entrenchment hypothesis(Morck et al., 1988; Denis et al., 1997) Negative relationship between managerial ownership and the market reaction
New-appointed CEO characteristics
Improved management hypothesis(Huson et al., 2004)Ability hypothesis(Baik et al., 2011; Chang et al., 2010; Murphy & Zábojník, 2004; Pessarossi & Weill, 2013) A quality of manager (managerial skills) may have a positive impact on the market reaction
Upper echelons theory – age(Hambrick & Mason, 1984) Negative relationship between CEO age and the market reaction
Upper echelons theory – insider/outsider(Hambrick & Mason, 1984) Insider/outsider CEO may have a positive or negative impact on the market reaction
Upper echelons theory – educational background(Hambrick & Mason, 1984) The educational background of a CEO may have a positive or negative impact on the market reaction
Upper echelons theory – functional background(Hambrick & Mason, 1984) The functional background of a CEO may have a positive or negative impact on the market reaction
CEO international experiences concept(Schmid & Dauth, 2014) Nonlinear inverted U-shape relationship between international experiences of a CEO and the market reaction
Extended upper echelons theory – international experiences(Finkelstein et al., 2009) The international experiences of a CEO may have a positive or negative impact on the market reaction
Extended upper echelons theory – past managerial experiences(Finkelstein et al., 2009) Positive relationship between past managerial experiences of a CEO and the market reaction
Gender risk averse and overconfident hypothesis(Huang & Kisgen, 2013) The gender of a CEO may have a positive or negative impact on the market reaction
Incumbent CEO characteristics
Extended upper echelons theory – CEO tenure(Finkelstein et al., 2009) The length of an incumbent CEO tenure may have a positive or negative impact on the market reaction (non-linear U-shape relationship)
Managerial entrenchment hypothesis(Morck et al., 1988) Positive relationship between the duration of an incumbent CEO tenure and the market reaction

Theoretical concepts and expected impact on shareholder reaction to changes in dividend policy (dividend initiation, omission, decrease, and increase)

Theoretical concept
Panel A: Direction of shareholder reaction Expected direction
Dividend irrelevance theory(Miller & Modigliani, 1961) Non effect on share prices
Dividend preference theory (‘bird-in-hand fallacy’)(Gordon, 1959, 1963; Lintner, 1956, 1962) Positive reaction to dividend initiation and increaseNegative reaction to dividend omission and decrease
Tax effect theory(Litzenberger & Ramaswamy, 1979) Positive reaction to dividend omission and decreaseNegative reaction to dividend initiation and increase
Clientele effect(Miller & Modigliani, 1961) Two alternative hypotheses:Positive or negative reaction to changes in dividend payouts
Catering theory of dividends(Baker & Wurgler, 2004) Two alternative hypotheses:Positive reaction or negative to changes in dividend payouts
Information content hypothesis (signalling content)(Watts, 1973) Positive reaction to dividend initiation and increaseNegative reaction to dividend omission and decrease
Pecking order theory(Myers, 1984) Positive reaction to dividend initiation and increaseNegative reaction to dividend omission and decrease
Prospect theory(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) Shareholder reaction to dividend omission (dividend decrease) is negative and stronger than investors' response to dividend initiation (dividend increase)
Panel B: Determinants of shareholder reaction Expected impact
Company operating performance
Signalling effects – the information component(Bonnier & Bruner, 1989) Positive relationship between the company's operating performance and the market reaction
Company investment opportunities
Company's life cycle concept(Mueller, 1972)Free cash flow theory(Jensen, 1986) The lower investment opportunities, the stronger positive market reaction to dividend initiation (increase)The lower investment opportunities, the weaker negative market reaction to dividend omission (decrease)
Company leverage
Pecking order theory(Myers, 1984) The higher company leverage, the stronger positive market reaction to dividend initiation and increaseThe higher company leverage, the stronger negative market reaction to dividend omission and decrease
Company life cycle
Company's life cycle concept(Mueller, 1972) The lower stage of company's life cycle, the stronger positive market reaction to dividend initiation (increase)The higher stage of company's life cycle, the stronger negative market reaction to dividend omission (decrease)
Company size
Information asymmetry hypothesis(Miller & Rock, 1985) A stronger signalling effect in the small company than in the biggest one
Company ownership structure
Agency theory(Jensen & Meckling, 1976)Free cash flow theory(Jensen, 1986)Entrenchment hypothesis and private benefits of control There are several hypotheses.The ownership structure (concentrated and dispersed) may have an impact on the market reaction to dividend omission (decrease).
Market business cycleMarket cycle concept(Below & Johnson, 1996) The worse market performance the stronger positive market reaction to dividend initiation (increase)The better market performance the stronger negative market reaction to dividend omission (decrease)
Dividend yieldDividend yield concept(Pettit, 1992) The greater change in dividend yield, the stronger signalling effects of dividend decision
Stock liquidityInformational effect of stock liquidity(Banerjee et al., 2007) The highly liquid stocks, the lower signalling effects of dividend decisions.

Theoretical concepts and expected impact on shareholder reaction to block trades

Theoretical concept
Panel A: Direction of shareholder reaction Expected direction
Shareholder wealth effect:Restructuring hypothesis(Shleifer & Vishny, 1986) Positive reaction
Shareholder wealth effect:Wealth expropriation hypothesis and private benefits of control(Dyck & Zingales, 2004)Entrenchment effect(Claessens et al., 2002) Negative reaction
Signalling effects:Superior information hypothesis(Barclay & Holderness, 1989) Two alternative hypotheses:Positive reactionNegative reaction
Panel B: Determinants of shareholder reaction Expected impact
Share price
Signalling effects:Superior information hypothesis(Barclay & Holderness, 1989) Two alternative hypotheses:Blocks traded at a premium, the market reaction is positiveBlocks traded at a discount, the market reaction is negative
Initiating party (by a buyer/seller)
Signalling effects:Information effect(Close, 1975; Holthausen et al., 1987) Two alternative hypotheses:Blocks initiated by a buyer, the market reaction is positiveBlocks initiated by a seller, the market reaction is negative
Identity of a buyer/seller
Signalling effects:Information effectScholes, 1972; Bozcuk & Lasfer, 2005) Two alternative hypotheses:A block purchase by an institutional investor, the market reaction is positiveA block sale by a controlling shareholder, the market reaction is negative
Block size
Signalling effects:Information effect(Scholes, 1972; Ball & Finn, 1989) Two alternative hypotheses:A purchase of a large block, the market reaction is positiveA sale of a large block, the market reaction is negative
Outside directors on board
Monitoring incentive hypothesis(Barak & Lauterbach, 2012) Positive relationship between the presence of outside directors and the market reaction
Debtholders
Monitoring incentive hypothesis(Barak & Lauterbach, 2012)Free cash flow theory(Jensen, 1986) Positive relationship between a presence of debtholders and the market reaction
Monitoring institutional investor
Monitoring incentive hypothesis(Barak & Lauterbach, 2012) Positive relationship between the presence of institutional investor and the market reaction
Legal institutions (e.g., legal environment, disclosure standards and enforcement)
Monitoring incentive hypothesis(Dyck & Zingales, 2004) The more efficient legal institutions, the higher market reaction
Extra-legal institutions (e.g., product market competition, public opinion pressure, internal policing through moral norms and labour as monitor, government as monitor through tax enforcement)
Monitoring incentive hypothesis(Dyck & Zingales, 2004) The more efficient extra-legal institutions, the higher market reaction
Managerial ownership
Agency theory(Jensen & Meckling, 1976) Positive relationship between a managerial ownership and the market reaction
Company size
Monitoring incentive hypothesis(Barak & Lauterbach, 2012) Two alternative hypotheses:Negative (positive) relationship between company size and the market reaction
Company profitability
Monitoring incentive hypothesis(Barak & Lauterbach, 2012) Two alternative hypotheses:Negative (positive) relationship between company profitability and the market reaction
Company risk
Monitoring incentive hypothesis(Barak & Lauterbach, 2012) Two alternative hypotheses:Negative (positive) relationship between company risk and the market reaction
Company ownership structure (concentrated structure)
Monitoring incentive hypothesis(Barak & Lauterbach, 2012) Two alternative hypotheses:Negative (positive) relationship between ownership structure risk and the market reaction
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Language:
English