The voting of EU members for common consolidated corporate tax base and the tax benefits

	True

Classified	D	~D	Total
+	415	24	439

−	21	108	129

Total	436	132	568

Classified + if predicted Pr (D) >=0,5

True D defined as ¹0

Sensitivity		Pr (– +\|~D)	95.18%

Specificity		Pr (– −\| D)	81.82%
Correctly classified			92.08%

Logit models without selected indicators reported in the form of marginal effects

	Model with 3 indices		Model without indices

Variable	Marginal effects.	p-value	Marginal effects.	p-value
indCIT	0.005	0.000

Indcitincome	0.002	0.010

Indeconsize	0.001	0.006

leftright	−0.058	0.000	−0.080	0.000

prosconsEU	0.549	0.000	0.580	0.000

relEU	−0.264	0.000	−0.500	0.000

term	−0.001	0.946	0.011	0.486

sex	0.018	0.452	0.025	0.428

educ	0.016	0.510	0.007	0.826

age	−0.0004	0.756	−0.0003	0.858

amendment	−0.0004	0.851	−0.002	0.348

NEU	0.146	0.000	−0.142	0.008

LR chi²(13)	38.60		297.36

Prob>chi²	0.000		0.000
Pseudo R²	0.6293		0.4696

Comparison of pseudo R2 for a model with and without selected indicators

Pseudo R²	Model with 4 indicators	Model with 3 indicators	Model without indicators
McFadden	0,642	0,629	0,470

McKelveya and Zavoiny	0,751	0,750	0,630

Count R2	0,921	0,910	0,894
Adjusted count R2	0,659	0,614	0,558

Tax benefit index and its components

2012	Net FDI to GDP (0–highest FDI, 100–lowest FDI)	CIT rate (0 – lowest rate, 100 – highest rate)	CIT revenue (0 – highest revenue, 100 – lowest revenue)	Economy size (0 – lowest, 100 – highest)	Index (the highest index the highest positive impact expected)
Austria	74	57	78	11	55

Belgium	57	92	59	13	55

Bulgaria	0	0	87	1	22

Croatia	30	38	80	1	37

Cyprus	25	0	0	0	6

Czechia	23	34	57	5	30

Denmark	87	57	67	9	55

Estonia	22	42	93	0	39

Finland	82	56	78	7	56

France	82	100	65	76	81

Germany	72	77	70	100	80

Greece	72	38	100	6	54

Hungary	27	41	96	3	42

Ireland	82	10	74	6	43

Italy	71	82	74	58	71

Latvia	33	19	89	0	35

Lithuania	43	19	96	1	39

Luxembourg	33	72	13	1	30

Netherlands	100	57	78	23	65

Poland	39	34	78	14	41

Portugal	51	82	65	5	51

Romania	33	23	83	4	36

Slovakia	26	34	72	2	33

Slovenia	53	31	98	1	46

Spain	66	77	74	37	64

Sweden	70	62	70	15	54
United Kingdom	73	54	65	75	67

The marginal effects of indicators from tax benefit index on the voting behaviour in CCCTB

Variable	marginal effects	p-value
indFDI	−0.003	0.013

indCIT	0.004	0.000

indcitincome	0.004	0.004

indeconsize	0.001	0.005

leftright	−0.056	0.000

prosconsEU	0.537	0.000

relEU	−0.221	0.001

term	−0.004	0.758

sex	0.023	0.318

educ	0.013	0.595

age	−0.0001	0.937

amendment	−0.0001	0.960

NEU	0.045	0.419

LR chi²(13)	395.62

Prob>chi²	0.000
Pseudo R²	0.6424

Decomposition of tax base in formula apportionment

		Firm 1	Firm 2	Firm 3	Together
I	Consolidated tax base	–			S

II	Assets	A₁	A₂	A₃	A₁ + A₂ + A₃ = A

	Employment	E₁	E₂	E₃	E₁ + E₂ + E₃ = E

	Remuneration	R₁	R₂	R₃	R₁ + R₂ + R₃ = R

	Turnover	T₁	T₂	T₃	T₁ + T₂ + T₃ = T

III	Share

	Assets	$\frac{A_{1}}{A} = a_{1}$ {{{A_1}} \over A} = {a_1}	$\frac{A_{2}}{A} = a_{2}$ {{{A_2}} \over A} = {a_2}	$\frac{A_{3}}{A} = a_{3}$ {{{A_3}} \over A} = {a_3}

	Employment	$\frac{E_{1}}{E} = e_{1}$ {{{E_1}} \over E} = {e_1}	$\frac{E_{2}}{E} = e_{2}$ {{{E_2}} \over E} = {e_2}	$\frac{E_{3}}{E} = e_{3}$ {{{E_3}} \over E} = {e_3}

	Remuneration	$\frac{R_{1}}{R} = r_{1}$ {{{R_1}} \over R} = {r_1}	$\frac{R_{2}}{R} = r_{2}$ {{{R_2}} \over R} = {r_2}	$\frac{R_{3}}{R} = r_{3}$ {{{R_3}} \over R} = {r_3}

	Turnover	$\frac{T_{1}}{T} = t_{1}$ {{{T_1}} \over T} = {t_1}	$\frac{T_{2}}{T} = t_{2}$ {{{T_2}} \over T} = {t_2}	$\frac{T_{3}}{T} = t_{3}$ {{{T_3}} \over T} = {t_3}

IV	Tax base

	Firm 1	$S * (\frac{1}{3} * a_{1} + \frac{1}{2} * \frac{1}{3} * e_{1} + \frac{1}{2} * \frac{1}{3} * r_{1} + \frac{1}{3} * t_{1})$ {\bf{\it S}}\left( {{1 \over 3}{{\bf{\it a}}_1} + {1 \over 2}{1 \over 3}{{\bf{\it e}}_1} + {1 \over 2}{1 \over 3}{{\bf{\it r}}_1} + {1 \over 3}*{{\bf{\it t}}_1}} \right)

	Firm 2	$S * (\frac{1}{3} * a_{2} + \frac{1}{2} * \frac{1}{3} * e_{2} + \frac{1}{2} * \frac{1}{3} * r_{2} + \frac{1}{3} * t_{2})$ {\bf{\it S}}\left( {{1 \over 3}{{\bf{\it a}}_2} + {1 \over 2}{1 \over 3}{{\bf{\it e}}_2} + {1 \over 2}{1 \over 3}{{\bf{\it r}}_2} + {1 \over 3}*{{\bf{\it t}}_2}} \right)
	Firm 3	$S * (\frac{1}{3} * a_{3} + \frac{1}{2} * \frac{1}{3} * e_{3} + \frac{1}{2} * \frac{1}{3} * r_{3} + \frac{1}{3} * t_{3})$ {\bf{\it S}}\left( {{1 \over 3}{{\bf{\it a}}_3} + {1 \over 2}{1 \over 3}{{\bf{\it e}}_3} + {1 \over 2}{1 \over 3}{{\bf{\it r}}_3} + {1 \over 3}*{{\bf{\it t}}_3}} \right)

Summary statistics of variables used

Variable	Observations	Mean	Standard deviation	Min	Max
vote	574	0.76	0.43	0	1

leftright	574	4.28	1.6	1	8

prosconsEU	574	0.70	0.46	0	1

relEU	574	0.38	0.23	0.03	0.84

indFDI	568	60.98	22.38	0	100

indCIT	568	60.04	26.09	0	100

indCITincome	568	72.40	13.03	0	100

indeconsize	568	40.02	36.20	0	100

term	574	1.86	1.16	1	8

sex	574	0.36	0.48	0	1

educ	574	0.38	0.49	0	1

age	574	54.18	10.95	29	81

amendment	574	1.08	5.69	0	75
NUE	574	0.29	0.45	0	1

eISSN:: 2543-6821
Language:: English

Publication timeframe:: Volume Open
Journal Subjects:: Business and Economics, Political Economics, Economic Theory, Systems and Structures, Microeconomics, Macroecomics, Economic Policy

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The voting of EU members for common consolidated corporate tax base and the tax benefits

Published Online: Sep 09, 2020

Page range: 56 - 71

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/ceej-2020-0005

Keywordscommon consolidated corporate tax base, corporate income tax, political economy, voting behaviour

© 2020 Wojciech Dąbroś et al., published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

Classification table

Logit models without selected indicators reported in the form of marginal effects

Comparison of pseudo R2 for a model with and without selected indicators

Tax benefit index and its components

The marginal effects of indicators from tax benefit index on the voting behaviour in CCCTB

Decomposition of tax base in formula apportionment

Summary statistics of variables used

Keywords
common consolidated corporate tax base, corporate income tax, political economy, voting behaviour