The idea that lowering top marginal tax rates would increase tax revenue is often raised in the popular debate. See, for example,
We analyze this question in the context of Finland, which has one of the world’s highest marginal earned income tax rates on top earners. The Finnish income tax system is progressive, and the top marginal earned income tax rate (including employee social security contributions) was approximately 57% in 2015. Throughout the article, we use the term “top tax rate” to refer to the marginal tax rate of top income earners.
Piketty
We demonstrate that policy conclusions—even the sign of the comparison between current and revenue-maximizing tax rates—depend critically on the assumptions made, for example, on how to calculate the current top marginal tax rate, or whether or not to account for income-shifting in the analysis. Therefore, the policy discussion revolving around top tax rates has little content unless the assumptions in the calcultions are made explicit. We find that the current top tax rate on earnings in Finland is likely to be below the revenue-maximizing rate.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets out the theoretical background behind our calculations. Section 3 provides a discussion of the considerations that need to be taken into account when choosing parameter values in the Laffer curve calculations. Section 4 provides the results for our analysis of the Finnish case. Section 5 makes some further remarks on how the results should be interpreted in the context of making recommendations for tax policy.
The relationship between tax rates and tax revenue is described by the so-called Laffer curve. When taxation is at a moderate level, tax revenue is increasing in the tax rate. At high levels of the tax rate, the disincentive effects of taxation (
The revenue-maximizing tax rate for top incomes depends on how taxable income reacts to taxation (
where
However, the formula presented in equation (1) for the revenue-maximizing income tax rate is applicable only under the assumption that the elasticity
More precisely, in the presence of income-shifting, the ETI is not sufficient to measure the revenue (or welfare) losses from earnings taxation. This is because some of the tax revenue that is lost when the tax on earnings is increased is returned through the other tax base to which income is shifted. In this case, the revenue-maximizing top tax rate on earned income is given by
where
As income-shifting possibilities are prevalent in the Finnish context, we use the case without income-shifting (corresponding to equation (1)) only as a benchmark. In most of the analysis, we use equation (2) to calculate the revenue-maximizing top earned income tax rate for Finland. Empirical evidence on the extent of incomeshifting in Finland is provided by Pirttila and Selin (2011a) and Harju and Matikka (2016).
We now turn to provide a roadmap of the considerations behind the choices of parameter values in the Laffer curve calculations. As we will argue, the assumptions made in the calucations have a crucial impact on the results of the analysis, and it is, therefore, important to make them explicit. For example, assumptions behind calculating the current effective top marginal tax rate are rarely discussed; but obviously, these assumptions affect the benchmark to which the revenue-maximizing tax rate is compared and thus may even affect the sign of the comparison. Without providing an explicit account of the assumptions made, it could even be argued that the calculations have little content when it comes to drawing policy conclusions.
The choice of how to measure the current effective marginal tax rate (EMTR) on top earnings involves several judgements in which the right way to proceed is not obvious. First, how should one treat commodity taxation? Commodity taxation contributes to the deterioration of work incentives, in a similar vein as income taxes do. From an economic theory point of view, commodity taxes should be incorporated in the effective top marginal tax rate. How individuals react to income versus commodity taxes in reality, however, is difficult to test empirically. There is some laboratory evidence indicating that the reactions to the two types of taxes may differ (Blumkin
Second, how should one treat employee and employer social security contributions? There is no general rule as to how social security contributions should be treated in these types of calculations, and the appropriate treatment depends on the details of the tax and benefit system. Social security contributions are part of the tax wedge on labor supply, in the same way as regular income taxes. Further, in principle, it should not matter which side of the market nominally pays the tax, and therefore, social security contributions paid by employers and employees should be treated similarly a priori.
However, a further complication arises here. To the extent that social security contributions confer direct personal benefits in the future, their effects may differ from those of general taxation. In Finland, employer social security contributions mostly consist of pension contributions and there is a direct link to future pension benefits. In such a setting, the benefits related to the contribution payments largely accrue to the consumer himself or herself in the form of future consumption and a case can be made for treating employer social security contributions as a form of savings. For exact equivalence to hold, this argument presumes a funded pension scheme in which the return is the same as the rate of return on individual savings and that there are no borrowing constraints. For a related theoretical argument on income taxes and public provision of private goods, see Blomquist
It is hard to determine which fraction of social security contributions should ideally be regarded as distortionary taxes, and we are not aware of such estimates for Finland. We choose to make a simple compromise—admittedly a somewhat arbitrary one—of taking employee social security contributions into account in full, whereas leaving out employer social security contributions altogether. This division has the additional benefit that it corresponds to the way in which the baseline tax rates are constructed for the estimations of the ETI in Matikka (2016), which form an integral part of our calculations (see below).
The treatment of social security contributions is an example of a case in which the appropriate solution clearly depends on the details of the tax system in each country. In the Finnish case, the link between employer social security contributions and pension benefits is more direct than in many other countries. For example, in Sweden, a neighboring country that is otherwise quite similar to Finland, there is no direct link between the employer social security contributions paid and the level of pension and benefits collected for high-income individuals (Pirttila and Selin 2011b). More specifically, the Swedish pension system involves a ceiling such that for incomes under the ceiling, there is a direct link between employer social security contributions and the level of pension benefits. However, for incomes above the ceiling, the employer still pays the contributions, but the individual does not obtain any extra benefits, and pension contributions can, therefore, be considered a pure tax for high-income individuals. In contrast, there are no such ceilings in the Finnish context.
With the above considerations in mind, the top marginal earned income tax rate including employee social security contributions was approximately 57% in Finland in 2015. This rate applies to taxable income above € 90,000. The rate of commodity taxation, calculated as the share of indirect taxes in aggregate consumption expenditure, was approximately 22% in 2014. At the time of writing, the numbers for 2015 were not available.
As mentioned earlier, Finland applies a dual income tax system in which earned income (
For top income earners, one of the most convenient and empirically relevant ways to legally shift income from the wage tax base to the capital income dividend tax base is to withdraw dividends from a privately held corporation instead of wage income. In the Finnish tax system, dividends from a privately held corporation are subject to specific tax regulations. Dividend income below a 8% computational return on net assets of the firm (assetsliabilities) is subject to a tax rate of 26%. Therefore, for the parameter The personal tax rate on dividends increases slightly to 28.5% if personal capital income is above € 30,000, but this has no significant effect on the results of our calculations. A more detailed description of the Finnish dual income tax system and the dividend tax schedule of privately held corporations and the principles of dividend taxation in Finland can be found, for example, in Harju and Matikka (2016).
Naturally, the choice for the
Going through the empirical ETI literature in any detail is beyond the scope of this paper. The broad conclusion from this literature is that the ETI is fairly small on average—see Saez
The above discussion relates to the average ETI, whereas for our analysis, the ETI for high-income individuals is relevant. The evidence on how the ETI differs between income groups is fairly limited. Matikka (2016) does not find a significant difference between the average ETI and the ETI for high-income individuals, although there is quite a bit of uncertainty associated with the income-group-specific estimates, and the data do not allow for estimating the ETI separately for very top earners with necessary precision.
Another key parameter relates to how much of the ETI is due to income-shifting. There is good evidence that top income earners actively respond to the incentives described earlier and income-shifting indeed does take place (see,
The results of the top tax rate calculations are quite sensitive to assumptions made about the values of the parameters on the right-hand side of equations (1) and (2). We, therefore, consider several values for the parameters. As outlined earlier, Matikka (2016) estimates the average taxable income elasticity in Finland to be 0.2, with no statistically significant differences between income groups. We also consider other possible values for the elasticity (
The revenue-maximizing top tax rate is also affected by the shape of the income distribution, captured by the Pareto parameter, The data used in the calculations are a register-based representative data set including a wide variety of income and tax record information. The data set is originally formed for microsimulation purposes, and it includes approximately 820,000 observations for 2014 (approximately 15% of the population).
We can now compare the current top earned income tax rate with the revenue-maximizing rate. Table 1 calculates the revenue-maximizing top tax rate for different parameter values. We start from a benchmark in which we assume that there is no income-shifting. This case is presented on the first row of Table 1. Given that this is only a benchmark, we consider only one value for the taxable income elasticity (Matikka 2016) in this case. When there is no income-shifting, assuming a modest elasticity (0.2) is reasonable. In this case, the revenue-maximizing top income tax rate would be 63%, which is very similar in size compared to the current top rate of 65%. (Note that all numbers refer to the effective marginal top tax rate that includes commodity taxation and empolyee social security contributions, as discussed earlier.)
The revenue-maximizing top earned income tax rate for different parameter values.ETI ( Share of income-shifting in ETI ( Paretoparameter ( Top tax rate on dividends (including commodity tax) ( Revenue-maximizing top tax rate ( 0.2 0 3 - 0.63 0.1 0.5 2.25 0.40 0.85 0.2 0.5 2.25 0.40 0.75 0.3 0.5 2.25 0.40 0.68 0.5 0.5 2.25 0.40 0.58 0.1 0.7 2.25 0.40 0.87 0.2 0.7 2.25 0.40 0.78 0.3 0.7 2.25 0.40 0.71 0.5 0.7 2.25 0.40 0.62
Given the prevalence of income-shifting among top earners, it is important to calculate the revenue-maximizing income tax rate in such a way that income-shifting possibilities are taken into account. This is done on the remaining rows of Table 1. For example, for the ETI estimate of 0.2 from Matikka (2016) and making the assumption that income-shifting accounts for 50% of the overall response of top earners, the revenue-maximizing top earned income tax rate will be 75%. Therefore, the revenue-maximizing top tax rate for these parameter values is clearly higher than the current EMTR, 65%.
On the other hand, if the ETI at the top of the income distribution is considerably higher than that found in Matikka (2016), then the current top tax rate may be quite close to the revenue-maximizing one. For the current top tax rate to exceed the revenue-maximizing rate, the ETI would have to be above 0.42 (if the share of income-shifting in the ETI is 0.7) or above 0.35 (if the share of income-shifting is 0.5). Given that the ETI estimates in the relevant literature (
Some futher notes concerning the above calculations are in order. First, as mentioned earlier, we have included consumption taxes in calculating the current top tax rate. As consumption taxes affect work incentives, in our view, it is advisable to take consumption taxes into account in the calculations. However, to our knowledge, none of the ETI estimates in the literature actually take into account consumption taxes. While there are good reasons for this practice in the ETI literature, for example, ensuring that ETI estimates are more comparable across countries, it implies that there is somewhat of a discrepancy between the EMTR used in our calculations and the ETI estimates. To eliminate the discrepancy, existing ETI estimates should be revised downwards. This is because baseline tax rates including consumption taxes are higher than the baseline tax rates used in the ETI studies—and therefore, baseline net-of-tax rates including consumption taxes are correspondingly lower. Hence, a 1% change in the baseline net-of-tax rates in the ETI studies corresponds to a more than 1% change in the netof-tax rate including consumption taxes. A 1% change in net-of-tax rates including consumption taxeswould, therefore, lead to a smaller response than those typically estimated in ETI studies.
Finally, we have not accounted for the possibility of tax-motivated emigration in our calculations. If high taxes were to cause a significant proportion of high-income individuals to emigrate, this would call for lower tax rates at the top (Brewer
In this paper, we have discussed the role of income-shifting in evaluating the revenue-maximizing top tax rate on earned income. Taking into account income-shifting from the earned income tax base to the more leniently taxed capital income tax bases increases the estimate for the revenue-maximizing rate. Under reasonable assumptions on overall tax elasticities estimated for Finland and other Nordic countries, income-shifting responses imply that the current top tax rates are below the revenue-maximizing rates.
However, it is important to note that the Laffer curve calculations do not imply that top earned income tax rates should be increased. First, the analysis was conducted keeping the capital income tax rate fixed. When tax rates on both earned income and capital income can be adjusted, income-shifting considerations are typically regarded as providing an argument for moving the two tax rates closer together: the two rates should be closer to each other than they would be if income-shifting was not a concern (Piketty and Saez 2013). It should also be noted that the extent of income-shifting is not completely beyond the control of policy-makers. Rather, income-shifting or tax avoidance in general are to some extent determined by the features of the tax system (Piketty If capital income and earned income have the same taxable income elasticity, the two tax rates should be equalized to maximize tax revenue (Piketty
Finally, it needs to be stressed that the above discussion relates to tax revenue maximization only. However, the objective of the government should be to maximize the welfare of citizens, not tax revenue. The analysis is, nevertheless, also relevant for discussions about welfare, as the revenue-maximizing tax rate provides an upper bound for the welfare-maximizing tax rate: increasing tax rates above the Laffer rate would make no sense, because it would make taxpayers worse off (because of lower disposable income) and also would reduce tax revenue (as we would be on the downward sloping part of the Laffer curve). Therefore, it is clear that tax rates should, in most cases, be lower than and never exceed the revenue-maximizing rate. The revenue-maximizing tax rate and the optimal tax rate are equal only if the social welfare weight of top income earners is zero, as in the Rawlsian social welfare criterion. This type of situation may also arise in the context of utilitarianism. Roughly speaking, this would occur if the marginal utility of money goes to zero when income is very high. See, for example, Diamond and Saez 2011, p. 169 for a discussion.