<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> Agencies are an organisational form with regulatory, expert or executive tasks that may ensure better usage of expertise compared to traditional administrative organisations. However, there are certain unintentional effects of the agency model, which are more obvious in transitional countries. Coordination and policy coherence gaps may raise the question of political accountability, provoke robust political interventions, and undermine the level of autonomy and expertise, especially where a firm legal framework does not limit the influence of politics. Another problem is the effective legal control over agencies. Traditional, bureaucratic legal procedures of internal control and courts’ supervision in certain transition countries, like those researched in the paper (Slovenia, Croatia and Montenegro), are not fully suitable and effective for agencies, opening significant room for politicisation hidden behind expertise. The recent proliferation of agencies in those countries causes many new problems of public administration and enhances old ones. Interview-based research conducted in three countries in January 2012 has the purpose to establish the main problems and issues in the functioning of agencies, especially with regard to the legal aspect of agency and politics / policy relations. Basic findings confirm the hypothesis that the agency model in those countries has not been stabilised yet. Professionalism, autonomy and expertise of the agencies are in a precarious position. The legal framework for agencies should be fine-tuned and strengthened, to ensure proper steering within the agency model.</abstract>

Agencies in Three South Eastern European Countries: Politics, Expertise and Law

<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> For a long time, Hungary has been known for its quick and promising development of stable democratic institutions that made it a reference country in the CEE region during the1990s and the early 2000s. However, a series of economic crises threw light on the efficiency defects of the operations of the Hungarian public administration emerging in the late 2000s. Thus a new series of structural and operational reforms was launched recently, inspired by the current stern economic times. These reform steps can be briefly characterized by the labels of concentration and centralization affecting the entire corpus of administration. In practical terms, Hungary makes an attempt to adapt to the current economic conditions via increasing efficiency and via more effective coordination while trying to conserve the achievements of the transition period. The article briefly introduces the major changes so far and offers a rationale to understand the motives of the reform. The article examines these questions based on empirical data and research</abstract>

Does Centralization Serve Efficiency ? De-Agencification in Hungary

<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> This article aims at offering a framework for analysing party patronage and state politicisation based on game-theoretic reasoning. It is argued that in order to reveal the main causal mechanisms behind these phenomena, one can focus on the cooperation between political parties analysis based on the model of prisoner’s dilemma. The article identifies four sets of obstacles to party cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe: unstable and polarised party systems; “the rules of the game” legitimising party patronage; dense party networks and their building through patronage; and insufficient regulation and weak enforcement of the merit principle in state administrations. The influence of these causal mechanisms in the post-communist countries can be explored through historical process-tracing and other methods. Finally, the article proposes several country-specific hypotheses for the empirical study of party patronage and state politicisation in Lithuania</abstract>

Party Patronage and State Politicisation in The Post- Communist Countries of Central and Eastern Europe: A Game Theory Approach

<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> Discussion of politico-administrative relations as well as the research on agencies generally treats the “politicisation” of agency management as a single, “black-box” concept, according to which agency managements (and other senior civil servants) are either political or not. Our paper shows that, using a strict, but widely applied definition of what constitutes a political appointment, agency heads in Slovakia are overwhelmingly “political”, but that the implications of politicisation vary, depending on the type of politicisation. In particular, we distinguish personal nominations of the responsible minister and contrast them with party nominations based on coalition agreements. Based on a series of interviews with senior policy-makers on both sides of the politico-administrative divide, we show that the selection mechanism, incentive structure and robustness of actual accountability mechanisms differs more between these two types of politicisations than between the ministerial and formally “non-political” appointment.</abstract>

He Who Appoints the Piper: Understanding Reasons and Implications of Agency Management “Politicisation” in Slovakia

AHEAD OF PRINT

Volume 16 (2023): Issue 2 (December 2023)

Volume 16 (2023): Issue 1 (June 2023)

Volume 15 (2022): Issue 2 (December 2022)

Volume 15 (2022): Issue 1 (June 2022)

Volume 14 (2021): Issue 2 (December 2021)

Volume 14 (2021): Issue 1 (June 2021)

Volume 13 (2020): Issue 2 (December 2020)

Volume 13 (2020): Issue 1 (June 2020)

Volume 12 (2019): Issue 2 (December 2019)

Volume 12 (2019): Issue 1 (June 2019)

Volume 11 (2018): Issue 2 (December 2018)

Volume 11 (2018): Issue 1 (June 2018)

Volume 10 (2017): Issue 2 (December 2017)

Volume 10 (2017): Issue 1 (June 2017)

Volume 9 (2016): Issue 2 (December 2016) Openness, Transparency and Ethics in Public Administration: Do they Support Each Other?

Volume 9 (2016): Issue 1 (June 2016)

Volume 8 (2015): Issue 2 (December 2015) Issue Title: Towards Meaningful Measurement: Performance Management at the Crossroads of Internal Efficiency and Social Impacts, Issue Editors: Juraj Nemec, Gyorgy Hajnal Wouter van Dooren Jarmo Vakkuri Aleksander Aristovnik

Volume 8 (2015): Issue 1 (June 2015)

Volume 7 (2014): Issue 2 (December 2014) Special Issue: Strong Local Governments: Community, Strategy, Integration, Editors: Juraj Nemec, Calin Hintea, Bogdana Neamtu, Colin Copus, Linze Schaap

Volume 7 (2014): Issue 1 (June 2014)

Volume 6 (2013): Issue 2 (December 2013)

Volume 6 (2013): Issue 1 (June 2013)

Volume 5 (2012): Issue 2 (December 2012) The Politics of Agency Governance

Volume 5 (2012): Issue 1 (June 2012)

Volume 4 (2011): Issue 2 (December 2011) Law and Public Management Revisited

Volume 4 (2011): Issue 1 (June 2011) Editors: Juraj Nemec, Geert Bouckaert, Wolfgang Drechsler and Gyorgy Jenei

Volume 3 (2010): Issue 2 (December 2010) Public Management Now and in the Future: Does Technology Matter?, Editors: Wolfgang Dreschler, Rebecca Moody, Christopher Pollitt and Mirko Vintar

Volume 3 (2010): Issue 1 (July 2010)

Volume 2 (2009): Issue 2 (December 2009) Citizens vs. Customers, Editors: Steven Van de Walle, Isabella Proeller and Laszlo Vass

Volume 2 (2009): Issue 1 (June 2009)

NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy

Online ISSN: 1338-4309  The Journal is predominantly devoted to public administration, public policy and public governance issues in Central and Eastern Europe, but high-level submissions from any other part of the world are also considered, especially if they focus on the issues relevant to the NISPAcee region. The goal is to publish top quality papers based on empirical research (of qualitative, quantitative or mixed character), theoretical articles and literature reviews, developing general public administration, public policy and public governance theory, or their specific dimensions. It is devoted to all interested parties – academicians, politicians and public officials – to help develop public administration and public policy theory and practice in our region. A high-quality standard review process is the principal quality assurance tool of the Journal and its main intention is to become one of the top periodicals in the area.   Why subscribe and read  A high quality standard review process is the principal quality assurance tool of our Journal and our intention is to become one of the top periodicals in the area.  Why submit  Fast, fair and constructive peer review; promotion of each published article.   Archiving  Sciendo archives the contents of this journal in Portico - digital long-term preservation service of scholarly books, journals and collections.  Plagiarism Policy  The editorial board is participating in a growing community of Similarity Check System's users in order to ensure that the content published is original and trustworthy. Similarity Check is a medium that allows for comprehensive manuscripts screening, aimed to eliminate plagiarism and provide a high standard and quality peer-review process. 

Volume 5 (2012): Issue 2 (December 2012) - The Politics of Agency Governance

The Politics of Agency Governance

Volume 5 (2012): Issue 2 (December 2012)