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PREFACE: FROM PRAGMATICS AND DIALECTICS TO ARGUMENT STUDIES

Abstract. Pragmatics and dialectics are two disciplines which have been amongst the first and most important partners for argument studies in the exploration of the complex realm of communication. Treating argumentation as a construct consisting of premises and conclusion allows for investigating some interesting properties of the phenomenon of reasoning, but does not capture a variety of aspects related to the usage of natural language and dialogical context in which real-life argumentation is typically embedded. This special issue explores some of the fascinating research questions which emerge when we move beyond logic into the territory of the pragmatics and dialectics of argument.

Keywords: pragmatics, dialectics, argument studies, pragma-dialectics, The Polish School of Argumentation

Introduction

This special issue on *Pragmatics and Dialectics of Argument* is the third of an argumentation series published in the journal *Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric* (SLGR). The series has been established to serve as a publishing platform of the Polish School of Argumentation (see Sect. 1, and also Budzynska et al. 2014). The previous two issues, edited by Koszowy, were dedicated to major research strands in the philosophy of argument (vol. 29, 2009; in its introduction to *Informal Logic*, the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* says of SLGR that it has “published an important special issue on the field”), and computational approaches to argumentation (vol. 36, 2011).

The third issue of the series is devoted to the links between pragmatics, dialectics and argument studies. Many scholars have stressed the importance of taking into account language use and dialogical context if we want to explore some specific aspects or phenomena of the complex realm of argumentation (see e.g. Hamblin 1970, Hitchcock 2006, Jacobs 1989, Johnson 1987, Moeschler 2001, Prakken 2006, Reed 2006, Reed & Budzyska 2011, Walton 1990, Walton 1994, Walton & Krabbe 1995). A similar approach has been adopted by argument studies in Poland from its early beginnings (see Sect. 1.1) to the most recent investigations (Sect. 1.2). These two perspectives have eventually achieved unification within the framework of pragma-dialectics allowing for a rich and multifaceted modeling of the process of argumentation (Sect. 2).

This issue provides a general overview of pragmatic and dialectic approaches to argumentation, but also presents some specific problems related to the speech act of arguing and argumentation in a dialogical context (see Sect. 3). It also introduces a new category of discussion papers which comment on selected contributions to previous editions of the SLGR argumentation series. We hope that these papers will become the main venue for the exchange of ideas between members of the Polish School of Argumentation and the international community.

1. The Polish School of Argumentation

The Polish School of Argumentation (Budzyska et al. 2014) is a research movement that integrates different disciplines and institutions across Poland.¹ Its members are particularly interested in understanding the phenomenon of the force of argument with a special focus on the issues of reason, trust, and cognition. The diversity of approaches to argumentation in Poland is striking – ranging from philosophy, logic, linguistics, rhetoric, social science, psychology, cognitive science, AI to law (*cf.* van Eemeren et al. 2014). One of the reasons for such diversity might be found in the strong Polish tradition of studying the phenomena of reasoning, language, and communication, which is well reflected, in particular, in the research of the Lvov–Warsaw School, and then its successors in Artificial Intelligence and legal theory, as well as in the studies of Polish rhetoricians (*cf.* Groarke 2011). For the Polish School of Argumentation, linking pragmatics and dialectics with argument studies has always been an important part of its research program: from its very early beginnings (Sect. 1.1) to the most recent developments (Sect. 1.2).

1.1. Roots

The important tradition which constitutes the roots of the Polish School of Argumentation is the logico-methodological legacy of the Lvov–Warsaw School (LWS), the Polish research movement that was most active from 1895 to 1939 (Woleński 2013). The philosophical and logical accounts of arguments within the Polish School of Argumentation may well be inspired by the works of those representatives of the LWS who attempted to solve similar problems to those present in the contemporary philosophy of argument (see Koszowy 2013, Koszowy & Araszkievicz 2014): Kazimierz Twardowski (the founder of the School who postulated precision, rigor and clarity in philosophy); Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz (the key representative of the pragmatic movement within the LWS whose ideas are assessed as strikingly similar to the study of argumentation in North America (Groarke 2011)); and many others, e.g. Tadeusz Czeżowski, Seweryna Łuszczewska-Romahnowa, Tadeusz Kotarbiński, Klemens Szaniawski, and Józef M. Bocheński.

Amongst the crucial developments of the LWS that are linked with pragmatics and the dialectics of argument there are: (i) the rich conceptual apparatus which allows dealing with the complexity of natural language and (ii) the tools which allow one to analyse and evaluate reasoning and arguments (see Simons 2014, this issue). Some clear examples of pragmatic and dialectic accounts of argumentation in the LWS may be found in (i) Ajdukiewicz’s programme of pragmatic logic and the methodology of science, (ii) Bocheński’s approach to analysing typical dogmas and superstitions, and (iii) Jaśkowski’s system of discussive logic.

Ajdukiewicz’s programme of pragmatic logic and the methodology of science (1974) combines pragmatic and normative insights into the nature of language and reasoning (e.g. Koszowy 2010). This program is based on the idea that general (logical and methodological) rules of scientific investigation should be based upon the actual practice of researchers towards formulating methodological standards (rules, norms) of performing various knowledge-gaining procedures:

The standards of correctness of research procedures, as formulated in methodology, are not dictated by it to researchers in advance. Such standards are derived from the practical activities of competent researchers, who approve of some procedures in research, and disapprove of others (Ajdukiewicz 1974, p. 187).

Another example of pragmatic tendencies in the LWS is Bocheński’s account of authority (1974) and of “One Hundred Superstitions” (1994). The pragmatic goal of these accounts is, among other tasks, to help people

recognize typical mechanisms commonly employed in social communication and cognition; the aim of some of them is to convince someone by means of fallacious discussion moves. Bocheński's analyses of superstitions and of the concept of authority are not only in line with some contemporary accounts of argumentation schemes, but may also be employed in extending sets of argumentation schemes and critical questions for appeals to authority (see Koszowy & Araszkievicz 2014).

Jaśkowski's system of discussive logic (1948; 1949) aims at finding a system of a sentential calculus which (i) when applied to contradictory systems would not always entail their over-completeness, (ii) which would be rich enough to enable practical inference, and (iii) which would have an intuitive justification (Jaśkowski 1948). Hence, the dialogical (and pragmatic) motivation for Jaśkowski's discussive logic lies in his interest in the study of arguments, "not in the formal logical sense of drawing conclusions from premises, but in the ordinary sense of discussions and in particular of disagreements" (Griffin 2013, p. 4). In this respect, Jaśkowski's interests are clearly in line with contemporary attempts to combine the formal and informal features of argumentation.

1.2. Today's approach

The common motif in the research of the Polish School of Argumentation is the force of argument: the logical force of validity, the rhetorical force of persuasiveness, and the pragmatic force of communicative intentions. Evaluation of the argument force is the central object of the School's interest, pioneered by logicians such as Marciszewski (1994), Hołówka (1998), Suchoń (2005), and Tokarz (2006). Polish authors, however, also stress that the importance of logical reconstruction of arguments and evaluation of their force should not be overestimated, especially when applied to everyday reasoning (Kisielewicz 2011) or juristic argumentation (Grabowski 2003, Peczenik 1988, Smolak 2003).

Natural argumentation is a highly complex phenomenon, and thus logic should be supported by other disciplines in order to have the capability of approaching issues related to argument force in an insightful and multifaceted manner. A prominent role has been cast for pragmatics and dialectics in order to help understand problems such as: *how do people express reasons in language? what types of illocutionary acts and rhetorical techniques do they use in argumentative contexts? what are the rules of rational discussion? how do we play dialogue games?*

From the perspective of pragmatics, members of the Polish School are interested in applying the elements of speech act theory when con-

sidering the illocutionary context (Malinowski 2003, Witek 2013, Budzynska & Witek 2014) and ethotic felicity conditions (Budzynska 2013, Załęska 2011) of the speech act of argumentation; the elements of relevance theory when investigating the aims and effects of persuasive dialogues (Budzynska & Debowska 2010, Debowska-Kozłowska 2014); or the elements of theory of conversational implicatures in pursuing so-called arguments appealing to conversational implicature (Puczyłowski 2012). The School is also interested in the formal aspects of pragmatic concepts such as the exploitation of a paraconsistent and nonmonotonic approach to speech acts, argumentation schemes, and dialogues (Dunin-Kępicz & Strachocka 2013), using a 4-valued query language (Małuszyński & Szałas 2013).

From the perspective of dialectics, the Polish School of Argumentation explores various aspects of the dialogical context of argumentation, such as the identification and elimination of formal fallacies (Yaskorska et al. 2013, Kacprzak & Yaskorska 2014); the dynamics of questions in a dialogue (Wiśniewski 1996, Urbański 2001); and game-theoretic accounts of strategies in dialogues (Kacprzak et al. in review). The methods of corpus analysis and experimental studies are used to examine issues such as critical analysis of values in political discourse (Sowińska 2013, Kielar 2011), dynamics and structure of argumentation in negotiations (Jochemczyk & Nowak 2010), and argumentative skills in preschoolers' narrative discourse (Rytel 2012). A strong focus is given to practical applications of these investigations, in particular to political (Cap 2013, Skulska 2013) and legal discourse (Nieznański 2010, Stawecki 2012).

2. Pragma-dialectics

2.1. Development of the theory

The pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation was initiated at the University of Amsterdam by Frans H. van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst (1944–2000) in the 1970s and developed over the next four decades. Argumentation is in this theory viewed from a perspective that combines a communicative angle inspired by pragmatic insights from speech act theory and discourse analysis with a critical angle inspired by dialectical insights from critical rationalism and formal dialectical approaches. As the name of the theory indicates, the integration of pragmatic and dialectical insights is the distinctive feature of pragma-dialectics.

Because people use argumentation in all spheres of life to convince others of their views regarding what to believe, think, or do, van Eemeren and

Grootendorst considered it of primary importance to create an adequate theoretical basis for improving the analysis and evaluation as well as the production of argumentative discourse. Their master plan for developing such a theoretical basis involved progressing step by step from an abstract ideal model of argumentation to the concrete reality of the various kinds of argumentative practices. According to van Eemeren and Grootendorst, the systematic combination of empirical description and critical normativity required for developing an adequate theory of argumentation calls for a multidisciplinary – and eventually interdisciplinary – approach integrating insights from philosophy and logic as well as communication studies, linguistics, psychology, and other disciplines.

In *Speech acts in argumentative discussions* van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984) explained the philosophical and theoretical premises of their pragma-dialectical approach for the first time in English. Their conceptual framework for the analysis and evaluation of argumentation was laid out in *Argumentation, communication, and fallacies* (1992), paying special attention to the characterization and classification of the fallacies. After Grootendorst's premature death in 2000, van Eemeren published *A systematic theory of argumentation*, an overview of how their theorizing had developed further in the 1990s (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004).

Van Eemeren and Grootendorst's theoretical reflections on the application of the pragma-dialectical theory to the analysis of real-life argumentative discourse, conducted together with Sally Jackson and Scott Jacobs, resulted in the monograph *Reconstructing argumentative discourse* (1993). Qualitative empirical research concerning a vital phenomenon in the reality of argumentative discourse, undertaken by van Eemeren in collaboration with Peter Houtlosser and Francisca Snoeck Henkemans, led to the publication of *Argumentative indicators in discourse* (2007). The results of experimental quantitative empirical research concerning the intersubjective acceptability of pragma-dialectical standards of reasonableness that van Eemeren carried out with Bart Garssen and Bert Meuffels were reported in *Fallacies and judgments of reasonableness* (2009).

An important extension was given to the pragma-dialectical theory when van Eemeren introduced with Peter Houtlosser (1956–2008) the notion of *strategic manoeuvring* to account for the fact that in argumentative discourse arguers may be regarded to combine, in every argumentative move they make, their aiming for (rhetorical) effectiveness with their trying to maintain (dialectical) reasonableness. Houtlosser's untimely death in 2008 prevented them from completing their project, but van Eemeren presented the theoretical framework of this extended pragma-dialectical the-

ory two years later in *Strategic maneuvering in argumentative discourse* (van Eemeren, 2010). Meanwhile Agnès van Rees (2009) had taken the extended theory as a starting point for the analysis of a conceptual technique that is frequently used in strategic manoeuvring in argumentative discourse.²

A great many other authors have contributed to the further development of the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation, by means of doctoral dissertations or otherwise.³ Most of them concentrate on examining argumentative discourse in specific communicative domains. Among them are Eveline Feteris, Harm Kloosterhuis, José Plug, and Henrike Jansen, who have been exploring the legal domain; Dima Mohammed, Corina Andone, Yvon Tonnard, Marcin Lewiński, Jan Albert van Laar, and Constanza Ihnen Jory, who have focused on the political domain; Lotte van Poppel, Roosmaryn Pilgram, Nanon Labrie, and Renske Wierda, who are engaged in research of the medical domain; and Jean Wagemans, and Eugen Popa, who are primarily examining the academic domain.

2.2. Short description of the theory

The research programme carried out in pragma-dialectics is aimed at bringing together the normative and descriptive dimensions of the approach. It consists of five interrelated components: a philosophical, a theoretical, an empirical, an analytical, and a practical component. The “normative pragmatic” rationale of this research programme instigates the meta-theoretical starting points of pragma-dialectical research as they are implemented in a theoretical model of a *critical discussion* for resolving a difference of opinion on the merits. The dialectical rules for conducting a critical discussion are conceived pragmatically as speech acts performed in the confrontation stage, the opening stage, the argumentation stage, and the concluding stage of the resolution process. The appropriateness (“problem-solving validity”) of the model is demonstrated by making clear that all violations of the rules for critical discussion can be characterized as fallacies. The intersubjective acceptability (“conventional validity”) of the standards expressed in the rules for ordinary arguers is tested empirically.

Analysing argumentative discourse amounts in pragma-dialectics to giving a theoretically motivated reconstruction of the discourse in terms of a critical discussion. With the help of the notion of strategic manoeuvring the extended pragma-dialectical theory explains how in argumentative discourse the rhetorical aim of achieving effectiveness and the dialectical aim of maintaining reasonableness are pursued simultaneously. In extended pragma-dialectics, the analysis is enriched by including an account of the strategic manoeuvring taking place in argumentative discourse in the recon-

struction. This enrichment requires a contextualization of the analysis by taking account of the conventionalization of the various communicative activity types and its impact on the strategic manoeuvring. In evaluating the argumentative discourse thus reconstructed, fallacies are viewed as derailments of strategic manoeuvring, overstepping the boundaries of dialectical reasonableness in a specific communicative activity type.

The incorporation of the macro-contextual dimension of the communicative activity types in the theorizing has led pragma-dialecticians to examine a great many argumentative practices in a variety of communicative domains, in particular the legal, the political, the medical, and the academic. The primary aim of this research is to find out in what ways the possibilities for strategic manoeuvring are determined in these domains by extrinsic institutional constraints (“institutional preconditions”) ensuing from the conventionalization of the communicative activity types concerned. Taking into account the institutional preconditions and the consequences these preconditions have for the development of the discourse can be of help in explaining the specific (and sometimes stereotypical) *argumentative patterns* of particular types of standpoints, particular argument schemes, and the particular argumentation structure occurring in various communicative activity types.

3. The Special Issue

This SLGR special issue is a result of cooperation between the emerging Polish School of Argumentation and Frans van Eemeren (University of Amsterdam) based on common research interests regarding argument force and pragma-dialectics. The first form of these common activities was the keynote speech van Eemeren presented at the 9th ArgDiaP Conference titled *Applied Rhetoric: Practical Perspective on Argumentation, Dialogue and Persuasion*, which was held in Warsaw on 26 May 2012 (<http://argdiap.pl/>). Since this cooperation revealed a number of crucial affinities between the Polish School of Argumentation and the world’s contemporary argumentation studies, it has recently led to various very successful projects, such as a chapter on developments in Polish argumentation theory in the new *Handbook of Argumentation Theory* (which van Eemeren co-authors with B. Garssen, E.C.W. Krabbe, A.F. Snoeck Henkemans, B. Verheij and J. Wagemans; to be published by Springer in 2014) and a special issue of the journal *Argumentation* which van Eemeren serves as Editor-in-Chief (this special issue will be published by Springer as vol. 3 in 2014). These

and other initiatives have led to our work on this special issue devoted to “Pragmatics and Dialectics of Argument”.

This issue builds upon the success of two previous volumes of the SLGR argumentation series dedicated to informal logic and argumentation theory (vol. 29, 2009) and argument and computation (vol. 36, 2011). The submissions show the interests of many authors representing many different research centers and disciplines. We accepted 26 contributions of 34 researchers from the US, Canada, UK, The Netherlands, Italy, Spain, France, Portugal, Belarus, and Poland – authors who represent a variety of approaches such as philosophy, linguistics, computer science, and rhetoric. This volume is built around two chapters concerning the most general and important topics in pragmatics and dialectics of argument: “Speech Acts and Argument” (Part I), and “Argumentation in a Dialogue” (Part II). Since the main motivation of establishing our argumentation series was to foster and inspire the mutual exchange of ideas, we decided to introduce a new platform and thus, in Part III we solicit “Discussion Papers” that comment on works previously published in the SLGR argumentation series.

The first part of this volume, “Speech Acts and Arguments”, discusses key affinities between argumentation theory and speech act theory. The first two papers are devoted to the most general and theoretical issues. In his introduction to the inquiry into the overlap between philosophy of language and argumentation theory, John. R. Searle presents an exposition of the main problems regarding the nature and structure of language from the viewpoint of speech act theory. In line with the speech-act point of view on argumentation, Francisca Snoeck Henkemans presents a systematic account of main links between speech act theory and argument studies. These two contributions lay the foundations for more domain-specific issues. Corina Andone employs the link between speech act theory and argumentation theory to examine the burden of proof in the argumentative confrontations taking part in practices of political accountability. The paper authored by Jean Goodwin refers to van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson, & Jacobs’ idea that argumentation theorists should continue to take speech act theory seriously, if they want to claim a fit between their theories and the conceptions of argumentation as employed in everyday argumentation. As a clear example of a study which is in line with this claim, Goodwin analyzes the discussion among scientists in natural resource fields concerning the appropriateness of the speech act of advocating in policy settings.

The second part of the special issue explores topical themes devoted to “Argumentation in a Dialogue”. The first three papers analyze general issues regarding the roots of contemporary study of linguistic (especially

dialogical) approaches to argumentation. Peter Simons explores two areas of employing the tradition of the Lvov–Warsaw School in the study of language (i.e. the complexity of language) and argumentation (i.e. argumentative unity). Jim Mackenzie discusses another important tradition in argumentation studies by giving an introduction to formal accounts to dialogue understood as a game. The dialogue approach to argument manifests itself in Dale Jacquette’s analyses of the concept of a dialogue in terms of its referential presuppositions and collective intentionality. The following three papers discuss these topics by analysing more specific issues regarding argumentation in a dialogue. David Botting continues the issues concerning the complexity of language by proposing a linguistic approach to the fallacy of *secundum quid* (which was traditionally classified by Aristotle as an extralinguistic fallacy). Simon Wells goes along the line of dialogue approaches to argumentation by exploiting argumentation schemes within dialogue games. In the final paper of this section, Marcin Lewiński draws a unique line of inquiry aimed at making a transition from dialogical approaches to fallacies towards the new polylogical perspective.

The third part, “Discussion papers”, contains three contributions: Jan Albert van Laar comments on Douglas Walton’s theory of criticism and shows the possibility of elaborating a new way of criticizing arguments by motivating an opponent’s doubts. Krzysztof Szymanek discusses Lillian Bermejo-Luque’s conception of epistemic justification in the study of arguments. Finally, Gábor Forgács comments on Frans H. van Eemeren’s views on strategic manoeuvring between the dialectical reasonableness of argumentation and its rhetorical effectiveness.

This special issue consists of 13 excellent papers, the selection of which was made on the basis of scholarly reviews by the members of the international Review Board (see the list of reviewers at the end of the *Preface*). We thank them all for their hard work, fruitful discussion and strong support at all stages of the editing process. We also gratefully acknowledge the support of the Polish National Science Center for Budzyńska and Koszowy under grant 2011/03/B/HS1/04559.

N O T E S

¹ The School’s Manifesto (Budzyńska et al. 2014) is a statement of over 50 scholars representing a variety of disciplines from 20 Polish institutions.

² Some of the monographs mentioned were translated (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984, into Russian (1994) and Spanish (2013); van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992, into Bulgarian (2009), Chinese (1991), French (1996), Romanian (2010), Russian (1992b) and Spanish (2007); van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, into Bulgarian (2006), Chinese

(2002), Italian (2008) and Spanish (2011); van Eemeren, 2010, into Italian (2014) and Spanish (2013) [Chinese and Japanese translations are in preparation]).

³ Since 2010 they are all part of the International Learned Institute for Argumentation Studies (ILIAS).

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Preface: From Pragmatics and Dialectics to Argument Studies

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