Mindaugas Jurkynas
Vytautas Magnus University, Kaunas

POPULIST PARTIES IN LITHUANIA: CURIOUS CASE OF PARTY ORDER AND JUSTICE AND ITS LEADERSHIP

Author
The author is professor of politics at Vytautas Magnus University and General Jonas Žemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania. The author expresses his gratitude for the comments of three anonymous reviewers.

ORCID no. 0000–0002–9341–9913
e-mail: mindaugas.jurkynas@gmail.com

Abstract
The article discusses conceptualisation of populism, Lithuania's party system and electoral dynamics and their relation to the sustainability of populist parties. Special attention is given to Party Order and Justice, a former populist and protest party, and its leadership, namely to the issues related to scope and competencies of a leader's intra-partisan power, leadership selection rules and history, development of leaders' political careers and their electoral activity. The Lithuanian party system now exhibits moderate fragmentation without centrifugal tendencies. Voter volatility is still relatively high, yet the share of new parties has dropped to zero. The protest and populist parties in Lithuania went into the margins of political establishment. Popularity of the Order and Justice party has long been connected to the formerly impeached president Rolandas Paksas. His long-term leadership in the face of plummeting electoral support and an emphasis on his political martyrdom resulted in poor electoral performances, ensuing internal squabbles and his departure. Party Order and Justice's internal regulations, however, remained favourable to strong leadership.

Keywords: populism, leadership, capacity, Party Oder and Justice, Lithuania

I am not an individual – I am the people
(Hugo Chávez, Caracas, January 2010)

People! I ain't people! I'm a... 'a shimmering, glowing star...'
(Lina Lamont, Singing in the Rain, 1952)

Introduction

Populism as a phenomenon is relevant for empirical and theoretical reasons in the last two decades. First, the media, albeit pejoratively, is replete with references to mushrooming populist parties and movements. Political leaders such as Donald Trump, Jair Bolsonaro, Rodrigo Duerte, Matteo Salvini and Viktor Orban, to mention a few, are frequently accredited with populist features of the right. On the other hand, Evo Morales, Andrés Manuel López Obrador or the late president Hugo Chávez, along with Greek Syriza or Spanish Podemos, attest leftist populism. Populist parties on the far-left and far-right have

tripled their support in 31 European countries from 7 to 25 percent since 1998 and have participated in 11 governments (theguardian.com 2018). The surge in support for populist parties has occurred since the 2008 banking and sovereign debt crises. Cambridge Dictionary declared 'populism' as its Word of the Year in 2017. Second, 'populism', is still a scholarly battlefield for discussions about 'thin ideology', key features and dispersion across the left-right spectrum.

New parties and movements were an inherent part of nascent democracies since the late 19th century. Back then, the urge for a nation-state broke empires, and socialism mobilised masses of blue-collar workers of the industrial era. Before World War II, new political forces – the Nazis and the Communists – turned into anti-democratic extremists. Now the majority of new parties are anti-establishment and somehow less liberal. In terms of 'oxymoronic' liberal democracy, populists advocate for democracy (popular sovereignty and majority rule) of majority rather than for liberalism (rule of law, independent media, rights of minorities and separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers). A plethora of contemporary new parties and politicians protest against multiculturalism, identity politics, immigrants, Islam, sometimes Jews and/or Israeli politics refugees, globalism, the European Union, political correctness and liberal elites in politics, business and the media. Populists frequently label liberal and post-modern attitudes as 'fake news' and claim to defend 'people' against 'elites'. Critics of populists argue when in power they tend to bend democratic norms by curtailing independence of media and judiciary and disregarding minorities.

Lithuania has been no safe haven from protest and populist mood. Populism in Lithuania entered politics in the early 2000s with the arrival of new parties into a hitherto relatively stable party system. However, the share of new parties has been in decline since 2004 (Jurkynas 2017). The outgoing Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaitė stated in her New Year Address in December 2018: "There are many challenges ahead next year – on the international arena and domestically. But we will overcome them if we do not allow militant illiteracy and aggressive populism to prevail" (lrp.lt 2019).

The aim of the article is to discuss popularity of (ex-)populist/protest parties in Lithuania and reveal the dynamics, scope and change of leadership performance in the Party Order and Justice. The main research questions are how can populism be debated, what are the key characteristics of Lithuanian party system and what is the sustainability of populist/protest parties. The study also focuses on the scope and competences of the Party Order and Justice leaders' intra-partisan power in comparison with other party organs, selection modes of leadership, genesis of leaders' appearance in politics and electoral activity of leaders from. The article argues that changes in the leadership of the Party Order and Justice have gone hand in hand with their plummeting popularity and ensuing internal squabbles.

Studies on Lithuanian populism in the last ten years are presented below. Ilze Balcere (2011) argued that populism in the Baltic States is 'narrow' and expressed as antagonism towards elites, centrality of the people and direct democracy without anti-immigrant, anti-globalisation and anti-EU attitudes and even nativist ideas.

Zenonas Norkus (2011) established that, differently from other Central European and Baltic post-communist countries, leftist populism dominated Lithuania. The impeachment of the former right-wing populist president Rolandas Paksas in 2004 induced coop-

eration between ex-communists and anti-communists and thwarted the emergence of the transformation of liberal post-communism to populist post-communism.

Ainė Ramonaitė and Vesta Ratkevičiūtė (2013) argued that the Party Order and Justice has been the most conspicuous example of so-called right-wing populism and anti-establishment organisation in the 2000s. It clearly lacked anti-immigrant or anti-minorities attitudes, thus making the radical right poorly represented in Lithuanian politics.

Dovaidas Pabiržis (2013) analysed the support for populist parties in the Baltic States and found that Estonian populist parties were the most successful in terms of received votes and the Latvian populism was least visible with Lithuania standing in the middle.

Gintaras Aleknonis and Renata Matkevičienė (2016) pondered whether populism was understood as a political style of anti-elitist communication used by political newcomers; the Party Order and Justice, the Labour Party, the National Resurrection Party and the Party 'Way of Courage' have employed anti-establishment rhetoric the most.

Daunis Auers (2017) compared populist tendencies in politics in all three Baltics States and analysed the Lithuanian case of the former president Rolandas Paksas, who presented himself as a political outsider. Paksas' claims about corruption in the country, the influence of domestic and foreign interest groups, let alone low trust in democracy, parliament, parties and the political establishment flamed a populist address. Building on the topic, Daunis Auers (2018) argued the institutionalisation of a political party explains the differing impact of populist political parties – the legal framework that regulates party organisations and electoral participation makes room for populist parties. He also described different populist parties that have recently manifested in the Baltic States. Low barriers to enter the party system allowed populist parties to succeed.

Finally, Jogilė Ulinskaitė (2018) argued two populist parties, the Lithuanian Peasants' and Greens Union and the Electoral Action of Lithuanian Poles – Union of Christian Families, are represented in the Lithuanian parliament now. Discourse of Lithuanian populist parties, according to her, reveals leftist populism.

This article consists of several parts. First comes a short overview of contemporary populism. Then the focus shifts towards a brief history of Lithuanian politics in 1990–2019, the introduction to the electoral system, the characterisation of the party system dynamics and key electoral indices. Third, the empirical part examines ex-protest-turned-mainstream party, Party Order and Justice presenting its electoral performance and dynamics of leadership in terms of its electoral results, selection, intra-party relevance and political genesis.

Populism as concept and context

Today's populism bears quite a few negative connotations; however, its phenomenon in history is equivocal. Populism can rally people on pro-democratic credentials in the fight against non-democratic regimes. Nation-building and calls for democratisation in former Russian, German, Spanish and Austro-Hungarian empires in the 19th and 20th centuries, decolonisation in Africa in the mid-20th century, the peaceful revolutions in Central Europe and the Baltic States in the late 1980s are clear examples of populist movements against oppression. Electoral rules drive political contenders into populist rhetoric too. Dichotomous political choices can serve as a platform for populism. For instance, a run-

off in presidential elections will almost inevitably trigger candidates to address all 'the people' and representation of their needs. Referenda also ask what is best for the populace.

Historically, post-industrialisation, globalism, the weakening of nation-states and the thaw of societal cleavages led to the arrival of new protest parties in 1970s Europe. Quite a few of them had an anti-establishment streak and spoke against the ossified political establishment yet made mixed and unsustainable inroads in the political arena. The manifestation of anti-EU, anti-immigrant, anti-globalisation and other antagonistic parties in the 1990s reignited the emergence of populism. Populist far-right parties such as the French National Front, the Austrian Freedom Party and the Danish People's Party bore nativist and racist features glorifying 'real people' and tarnishing minorities and immigrants. The economic meltdown after the 2008 financial crisis, migration to wealthy Western countries and the increasing inequality (Piketty 2013) have further de-aligned electoral loyalty and directed dissatisfaction towards the political, business and media elite. Reactions to economic insecurity in post-industrial economies, immigrants and progressive values have increasingly found channels of discontent in new parties after 2008.

Theoretical and methodological debates about populism have not yet arrived at the consensus. Cas Mudde (2004, 532) defined populism as "an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite', and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people." Populism embraces the existence of two homogeneous groups – 'the people' and 'the elite' – with an antagonistic relationship between each other, supports the idea of sovereignty of people, praises 'the people' and scorns 'the elite'. Populists imagine politics as a fight between *vox populi* and the 'liberal' establishment with vested interests by emphasising the triumph of people's will (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2015). Therefore, in the eyes of populists, direct democracy in forms of referenda or plebiscites install the will of the majority, whereas the separation of powers, rights of minorities, the role of independent media and tedious law-making are viewed with as obstacles to 'the people's wants'. A category of 'people', like ideas of nationalism, draws on imagined communities (Anderson 1983). Populists choose who can be included in or excluded from the people and by which criteria to choose who belongs to the people (Stanley 2008). The populist perception of 'the people' centres on the moralistic idea of sovereignty that belongs to the oppressed masses, and nothing should obstruct the will of the majority – tentatively represented by the populist politicians (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017). In contrast, 'the elite' is seen as an immoral and self-interested liberal political, economic, business, culture and media establishment. *Ergo*, populism prevents compromise between the 'virtuous people' and the 'wicked elite'. Populists claim they are not part of the traditional political realm of corrupt politicians and are at ease with making broad promises, often with incompatible ends and next to undeliverable democracy and rule of law. Paradoxically, the anti-establishment populist rhetoric does not always go into oblivion. When populists participate in or rein the government, they allege that real power does not belong to the government, but to the 'foes of the people' and has to be re-taken from them. A dearth of trust in the democratic arrangements paves the way for charismatic and 'strongman' leaders who combine a plain-speaking, conspirational thinking and blaming, though blame is a usual suspect in any political debate. Nowadays, populists claim there is contradiction in liberal democracy, as can be seen as an illiberal democratic response to an undemocratic liberalism (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017). Democratic institutions and

rule of law guarantee civic rights and freedoms (liberalism) against majority's will (democracy).

Populism is hardly defined as a separate ideology. At best it, with nationalism, feminism and ecologism, can be called a 'thin' ideology with limited ideational scope and ambition and decreased internal integration (Freeden 1996, 1998). Paris Aslanidis (2016) considers populism as a communicative approach, a discourse to talk about politics rather than to have clear-cut features of ideology. Populist parties do not constitute a separate dimension of political conflict but are scattered across the left-right axis. In a similar vein, the emergence of 'quality of life' values in the 1970s (Inglehart 1971) did not produce a material versus post-material conflict, and the Green parties in Europe since the 1980s are characterised as leftist ideology.

Politics is linked with the conflict of different ideas and ideologies. According to Ernesto Laclau (2005), conflict is an intrinsic feature of political life where antagonism is unavoidable and consensus is sustainably challenged between 'we' and 'them'. A social and political status quo is always questioned not only by existing political actors, but also by the new ones. Political change occurs when demands for or against the existing political system result in change (Easton 1953). Populism, thereby, is just another set of demands with a distinctive style of communication yet fitting existent ideologies of the left or the right. Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (2001) argued that there is no space 'beyond left and right', and right-wing and left-wing populists are similar by contesting who is 'we'. Right-wing populism is exclusionary and focuses on nationalism, nativism and ethnicity while leftist populists have a more inclusionary approach about who 'the people' are.

Taking stock of the party system dynamics in Lithuania

The Lithuanian parliament, the *Seimas*, consists of 141 members. The electoral system in Lithuania is mixed-parallel. 71 mandates are elected in single-member districts using m*ajoritarian* rules with a two-round system; 70 members of parliament are chosen by using proportional rule in a country-wide constituency. Voters have two ballots: one for a party list in the country-wide constituency and another for a candidate in a single-mandate district.[1] The threshold for parties to enter the parliament is 5 percent and 7 percent for coalitions. A candidate who receives the majority of votes is elected to the parliament. If no candidate gets absolute majority of the votes cast, a run-off between the top two frontrunners is organised, and a contender obtaining the simple majority in the second round becomes a member of the *Seimas*. A minimal turnout for the proportional tier is 25 percent and 40 percent for a majoritarian one.

Parliamentary democracy in Lithuania started with the first election to the *Seimas* in 1990. The pro-independence movement, *Sąjūdis,* led by Vytautas Landsbergis won an absolute majority. Diminishing support for the government led to an early election in 1992, and the ex-communist Lithuanian Labour Democratic Party, under the leadership of former Lithuanian communist Party leader Algirdas Brazauskas, won in a landslide. After four years the Conservative Party, the offspring of the *Sąjūdis*, returned to power and made a coalition with the Christian Democrats. After the 2000 election, two new

---

1   In a vote for a party list, a voter can rate up to five candidates from the list they vote for. The number ratings that a candidate receives in the voted party list determines candidates' final standings in the party's candidate list.

parties – the Lithuanian Liberal Union and the Social Liberals – formed a right-of-centre government, which collapsed after one year when the Social Liberals left the cabinet and joined the Social Democrats. In the 2004 election, other political newcomers – the Labour Party, the Liberal Democrats (later renamed Party Order and Justice) and the Peasant and New Democracy Union – took almost half of the parliamentary seats. Although Labour got a 28 percent share, the smaller Social Democrats made a coalition with the Labour, the Peasants and the Liberal and Centre Union. The 2008 election witnessed a comeback of the Conservatives who wooed two small liberal parties and the populist National Resurrection Party into a government. The 2012 election brought back the Social Democrats to power – they ruled the entire term with the Labour and the Party Order and Justice. In 2016, the underdog of Lithuanian politics, the Peasants and Greens Union, won over 40 percent of parliamentary mandates and made a coalition with the faction of the Social Democrats. The Social Democrats and the Conservatives dominated the politics in the independence period. Since 2008, all the governments and prime ministers have served full terms.

In the 2016 parliamentary election, six parties stepped over the electoral threshold in the multi-member constituency. The parties of the ruling coalition (Social Democrats, Labour and Party Order and Justice) lost heavily in this election, and the number of representatives from the main opposition party – the Conservatives – shrank too. The main winner of the election was the Lithuanian Peasants and Greens Union, led Ramūnas Karbauskis. It became the largest parliamentary faction with 56 MPs. The party promised generous social benefits, professionals in politics and a fight against alcohol consumption while stressing on family and national values (darnilietuva.lt 2018). The Peasants saw themselves as an alternative, professional and scandal-free party compared to the Social Democrats and the Conservatives who had been running the country for the last 26 years. Most of the party's electorate arrived from the former constituencies of the Path of Courage, Labour, Order and Justice and the Social Democrats. The popularity of the Peasants increased because of one of the most popular politicians, Saulius Skvernelis, a former minister of interior, led the party's candidates list and eventually became prime minister.[2] Furthermore, the Peasants won easily in a run-off against the Conservatives, as the former were the least favoured choice in the electorate and the Peasants were second best.

The Social Democrats suffered a serious defeat despite the party's calls for a strengthening of the middle class, reducing social disparities and increasing public sector investments (lsdpklaipeda.lt 2018). The key reasons for the party's flop were poor party management and communication, favouritism, public spats with the President and neo-liberal economic policies. After the election, the party, as a junior partner, joined the Peasants-led ruling coalition.[3] However, after one year, the Social Democrats decided to withdraw from the coalition and the parliamentary faction split in October 2017.[4] The Labour Party from the ruling coalition ended its meteoric dive that began in 2004. The Labour demonised refugees who were non-existent in the country and flirted with Euroscepticism. How-

---

2   The Peasants delegated speaker of the parliament and control 11 ministries out of 14. The party's chairman, Ramūnas Karbauskis, chairs the party's faction at the parliament.

3   Conservatives, the Liberals and Order and Justice decided to stay in the opposition. The Polish party announced it would support the government's socially conservative policies.

4   The splinter's members participate in the governing coalition and established the electorally insignificant Lithuanian Social Democratic Labour Party in March 2018.

ever, pestered by the squabbles in the leadership, incompetence and corruption charges, the party did not cross the 5-percent threshold, losing 27 MPs, and having a paltry two seats from the run-offs. The Party Order and Justice, led by the formerly impeached president Paksas, ran on socially conservative, softly nationalistic and mildly Eurosceptic ideas (programa.tvarka.lt 2018). It barely made it to parliament with a small faction. Yet party's fortunes, like Labour's, had been dwindling since 2004 due to invariable leadership, internal spats and corruption allegations.

The opposition did not fare well. The Conservatives came second in the elections and fell short of forming a government for the second term in turn. The party supports market economy, social market, transatlantic orientation and anti-Kremlin stances (tsajunga.lt 2018). The Liberals barely scrambled over the electoral barrier due to allegations of corruption from the party's leader, Eligijus Masiulis, who lost his parliamentarian immunity before the elections. The Liberal party is all for capitalist market and left-of-centre moral values (liberalai.lt 2018). The Polish minority party, the Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania – Christian Families Alliance, retained a minor faction at the *Seimas,* too. The party, led by Valdemar Tomaševski, represents Polish and partly Russian voters clustered in the south-eastern part of the country. The Polish party expanded its name to embrace Catholic values (awpl.lt 2018).

Table 1. Results of 2016 Seimas elections

Party	Votes in proportional tier (%)	Seats in proportional tier	Total Number of Seats	Total Number of Seats (%)	Change of seats (2012–2016)
Homeland Union – Lithuanian Christian Democrats	21.7	20	31	22.0	-2
Lithuanian Peasants and Green Union	21.5	19	54	38.3	+53
Lithuanian Social Democratic Party	14.4	13	17	12.1	-21
Liberal Movement of the Republic of Lithuania	9.1	8	14	9.9	+4
Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania – Christian Families Alliance	5.5	5	8	5.7	0
Party Order and Justice	5.3	5	8	5.7	-3

Source: Author's calculation.

After the 2016 parliamentary elections, the party system shifted from a moderate multi-party system with even distribution of parliamentary seats to a moderate multi-party system with the dominant party. Voter turnout dropped from 52.9 to 50.6 percent in the national tier between 2012 and 2016 yet increased from 35.9 to 38.1 percent in the run-offs. Voter volatility in the multi-member constituency went up from 30.0 to 37.1 percent. On the other hand, fragmentation of the party system had been decreasing since 2004. The number of effective electoral parties also dropped from 8.3 to 7.4 between the elections

and the number of effective parliamentary parties plummeted from 5.3 to 4.4. The share of wasted votes grew from 12.8 to 18.4 percent, and the number of invalid votes remained slightly above 4 percent. The party system exhibits moderate pluralism with centripetal competition.

Table 2. Electoral indices following general elections, Lithuania, 2004–2016

	2004	2008	2012	2016
Effective electoral parties	5.8	8.9	8.3	7.4
Effective parliamentary parties	6.1	5.6	5.3	4.4
Volatility %*	50.0	29.3	30.0	37.1
Wasted votes %*	9.0	20.7	12.8	18.4
Invalid votes %*	2.7	5.6	4.2	4.1

Source: Author's calculation.
Note: * In the multi-member constituency.

In the last 10 years, the party system fragmentation has reduced as the share of new electoral and parliamentary parties has been diminishing. Voter volatility remained tangible, as every third voter shifted their preferences between the parliamentary elections. Party competition remained centripetal, since no anti-system, openly populist or far-left/far-right parties enjoy popularity. Socio-economic issues are at the centre the left-right dimension. The Peasants draw their support from the provinces, the disadvantaged sector of the population and the anti-establishment mood. People in rural areas and small towns and the socially disadvantaged opt for leftist and new parties. The Conservative and Liberal voters largely come from big cities and urban, educated and economically better-off constituencies.

What's the story, populist parties?

The Lithuanian party system was relatively stable in the first decade after the reestablishment of independence. The ex-communist Labour Democratic party and the Social Democrats dominated on the left and the Conservative and the Christian Democrats attracted voters on the right-of-centre. New parties with populist and anti-establishment streaks appeared on the brink of the new millennium. The Labour Party and the Party Order and Justice (known as the Liberal Democrats between 2002 and 2006) saw their shrinking fortunes. Political 'meteors' like the anti-party National Resurrection Party and the radical and populist party Path of Courage were one-election stands. The Agrarian Party, currently known as the Peasants and the Greens Union, could hardly be considered as new, protest or populist, since the party had been participating in elections since the 1990s and took part in the Social Democrat-led minority ruling coalition in 2006–2008. In sum, popularity of the protest parties peaked at 35.5 percent of parliamentary seats in 2004, 30.5 percent in 2008, 33.4 percent in 2012 and 13.2 percent after the 2016 parliamentary elections. Labour and Party Order and Justice joined the governing coalition in 2012 and acquired mainstream left-of-centre (Labour) and right-of-centre (Order and Justice) political profiles with strong and sustainable leadership under Viktor Uspaskich and Paksas.

Table 3. Percentage of parliamentary seats of protest and populist parties in 2004–2018, (%)

	2004	2008	2012	2016
Labour party	27.7	7.1	20.6	1.4
Order and Justice	7.8	10.6	7.8	5.7
National Resurrection	–	12.8	–	–
Path of Courage	–	–	5.0	–
Anti-corruption Coalition[5]	–	–	–	0.7

Source: Author's calculation

Populist and protest parties had mixed results in the elections to the European Parliament and local elections that are organised according to the proportional formula. Such parties were most popular at the time of their entry into politics and then gradually lost their appeal.[6]

Table 4. Elections to the European Parliament and municipalities, % of votes

	2004 EP	2007 Municipal	2011 Municipal	2014 EP	2015 Municipal	2019 Municipal[7]	2019 EP[8]
Labour party	30.2	2.5	10.8	12.8	4.5	5.1	8.5
Order and Justice	6.8	5.1	10.2	14.3	3.0	3.0	2.6

Source: Central Electoral Commission

After the impeachment of the Lithuanian president and long-time leader of the Party Order and Justice, Paksas, in 2004, none of the candidates from the Labour and Order and Justice had success in presidential elections. The Constitutional Court barred Paksas from running as a candidate and leader of the Labour Party, Viktor Uspaskich, had never participated in presidential elections. The parties did not have candidates in the 2004 presidential election, which was won by Valdas Adamkus with 51.9 percent in the run-off against Kazimira Prunskienė. In 2009, Valentinas Mazuronis from the Order and Justice took 'bronze' with over 6 percent and Loreta Graužinienė from the Labour Party ended in sixth place in the election with less than 4 percent of the vote. Dalia Grybauskaitė won the

---

5   The anti-corruption coalition of N. Puteikis and K. Krivickas (Lithuanian Centre Party and Lithuanian Pensioners' Party) did not get any seats in the proportional tier as the coalition did not cross the 7 percent threshold required for coalitions participating in parliamentary elections. Only the chairman of the Lithuanian Centre Party, Naglis Puteikis, won in a single-mandate district. Puteikis, while fuelling anti-establishment rhetoric, had also stood as a candidate in the 2014 presidential election and received 4.9 percent of the votes.

6   Low-scoring parties with populist and protest appeal are not included in the tables as they received under 1 percent of votes in Seimas elections.

7   The results of the local elections in March 2019 revealed the popularity of societal committees. Different ad hoc political organisations competed with political parties in different municipalities and received 26.8 percent of all votes cast.

8   The nationalist Centre Party led by Naglis Puteikis mustered 4.9 percent. Only the Labour Party received one MEP out of 11.

presidential election in the first round with 68.2 percent of votes. In 2014, Grybauskaitė was re-elected with 57.9 percent for a second term in the run-off against a Social Democrat Zigmantas Balčytis.

Table 5. Support for parties' candidates in presidential elections, (%)

	2004	**2009**	**2014**	**2019**
Labour	No party's candidate[9]	3.6	12.0	No party's candidate[10]
Order and Justice	No party's candidate[11]	6.1	No party's candidate[12]	No party's candidate[13]

Source: Central Electoral Commission

One-man show finale: leadership at party Order and Justice

Paksas, perhaps, could be a champion of political renegades in Lithuania, as he has been a member in six parties and movements during the post-independence period. The former aerobatics champion in the Soviet Union and a construction businessman entered politics in the early 1980s as a member of Lithuanian Communist Party. With the arrival of independence in 1990, he continued his membership in the ex-communist Lithuanian Labour Democratic Party that won the 1992 parliamentary elections. He rose in the ranks until becoming a member of the party's council. After the ex-communists lost the *Seimas* election in 1996, he abandoned them and switched to the winners, the Conservative party, in 1997 and became a chairman of its coordination board for Vilnius County. In the 1997 municipal elections, the Conservatives received the biggest share of votes both in the country and the capital, and Paksas, who led the party list (vrk.lt 1997), became a member of the municipal council which elected him as mayor of Vilnius, a position he held until June 1999. Then the Conservatives chose him to run the ninth government of Lithuania. His premiership had lasted only a few months: in October the same year, he resigned from the office, protesting against unacceptable privatisation conditions of selling the oil refinery "Mažeikių nafta" to the US company Williams International.

Not long after, Paksas hopped from the Conservatives to the Lithuanian Liberal Union, becoming its chairman in December 1999 and advisor to President Valdas Adamkus. In the 2000 municipal elections, the Liberals, led by Paksas, won 18 mandates out of 51 in the municipal council of Vilnius, and Paksas became a member of the municipal council and was elected mayor for the second time (vrk.lt 2000). His second mayorship lasted for a half a year until he ran for parliament in October 2000 and was elected in the Antakalnio single-mandate district (vrk.lt 2000).[14] The Liberals, under his leadership, in turn crossed the

---

9   The Labour Party did not raise their own candidate and supported Petras Auštrevičius from the Liberal and Centre Union Party.

10   The Labour Party did not raise their own candidate and supported an independent Gitanas Nausėda in the second round of the presidential election.

11   The party's leader, Rolandas Paksas, supported a candidate in Kazimira Danutė Prunskienė from the Union of Peasants and New Democracy in the 2004 presidential elections.

12   The party's leader, Paksas, supported a candidate in Zigmantas Balčytis from the Social Democratic Party in the 2014 presidential elections.

13   Party Order and Justice neither raised a candidate nor supported other candidates in the run-off of the presidential election.

14   Rolandas Paksas received 49.5 percent and was elected in the first round, since the majoritarian

5-percent threshold and, for the first time ever, became the second-largest faction in the *Seimas* with 34 MPs and formed a so-called 'New Politics' ruling coalition with another new party, the Social Liberals. In November 2000, Paksas for the second time took reins of the government. However, after another half a year Paksas became the leader of the opposition faction, since his coalition partners, the Social Liberals, ditched the Liberals for the Social Democrats in July 2001. The Lithuanian Liberal Union dismissed Paksas from the party's leadership in September 2001, thus he with his acolytes established the Independent faction in December the same year. In early 2002, the members of the Independent faction left (or were fired from) the Liberal Union party and set up the Liberal Democratic party[15] in March 2002 – Paksas was elected as its chairman.[16] In December of the same year Paksas participated in the presidential election .

Paksas was the first real populist, as he spoke widely about the 'corrupt system and elites', while portraying himself as a defender of 'the second and forgotten Lithuania'. He finished second with 19.4 percent of the vote in the first round (vrk.lt 2002). The incumbent president, Valdas Adamkus, received 35.1 percent of votes and went into the run-off with Paksas, who got 54.2 percent and became the third president of Lithuania in January 2003 (vrk.lt 2002). Since Lithuanian law forbids party members to be the president, Paksas resigned from the leadership of the Liberal Union party.[17]

However, his presidency did not last long. Suspicions arose over his links to the Russian underworld. President Paksas interfered into privatisation processes and granted Lithuanian citizenship to a wealthy Russian businessman who generously financed his electoral campaign. The State Security department initiated the investigation that led to his impeachment, the first of that kind in Europe. The Constitution Court found Paksas guilty of breaking the presidential oath on several occasions and violating the Constitution in March 2004. In April, the *Seimas* passed the vote to impeach the president who, instead of serving for five years, served in office for 13 months and 11 days. In turn, the Constitution Court barred him indefinitely from holding any office that requires a constitutional oath.[18] Afterwards, Paksas returned to politics by re-taking the position of leader in the party in December 2004.

Since then, Paksas could not participate in presidential and parliamentary elections. He led his party in the local elections in the capital in 2007 and was elected to the council of Vilnius municipality (vrk.lt 2007). He resigned from the municipality in 2009 due to his participation in the election to the European Parliament and ran successfully for the European Parliament in June 2009 (vrk.lt 2009). Paksas repeated this success five years later

---

part in the 2000 parliamentary election had a first-past-the-post (simple majority in the constituency) rule.

15   The party changed its name into the Party Order and Justice in May 2006.

16   The Independent faction in the Seimas changed its name into Liberal Democrats in July 2002.

17   Valentinas Mazuronis became the new chairman of the Liberal Democrat Party.

18   In 2011, the European Court of Human Rights established that the lifetime ban to be elected to the parliament was disproportionate and violated the European Convention of Human Rights that guarantees a right to participation in elections. In December 2013, the Lithuanian parliament voted against a constitutional amendment enabling an impeached politician to run for parliament. Another vote, to allow an impeached person to participate in presidential and parliamentary elections ten years after the impeachment, took place in October 2018 and was 16votes short to amend the Constitution and pave the way of the participation for Rolandas Paksas in elections. In December 2018, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe urged the Lithuanian parliament to implement the decision of the European Court of Human Rights.

(vrk.lt 2014). He joined Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy Group at the European Parliament in 2014. After the party's dismal results in the 2016 parliamentary elections, Paksas resigned from the chairmanship of the party in September 2016.[19] Currently, Paksas is a member of the European Parliament, but his attachment to the party is over. Due to internal disagreements, he withdrew from the party in September 2018 and established a societal electoral committee called the 'Movement of President Rolandas Paksas'. It participated in the elections to the European Parliament in May 2019 and got 3.8 percent of the vote and no seats at the European Parliament (vrk.lt 2019). Paksas has also registered a societal movement named 'I Call for the Nation' and intends to rally "patriotic Lithuanian forces in the Europe of nations" (15min.lt 2019).[20]

The Party Order and Justice has long been associated with Paksas as its leader. He has steered the party virtually all the time and did not consider resigning despite the party's fading luck since 2008. Paksas has been playing the victim card after his impeachment and actively sought the 'restoration of justice', thus effectively remaining as the party's leader. The only interim *de jure* chairman of the party was Valentinas Mazuronis, a former architect who got involved in politics by joining the ranks of the Lithuanian Liberal Union in 1993. He participated in the 1996 parliamentary election. The Liberal Union received 1.84 percent of votes and Mazuronis ended as number 22 in the party list after the election (vrk.lt 1996). He was also a candidate in the Aušros constituency and took eighth place among 13 contestants (vrk.lt 1996). With the split of the Liberal Union, he switched to the newly established Liberal Democrat party, becoming the right hand of Paksas and his first deputy. Mazuronis has been electorally active ever since by taking part in all elections. In the 2004 parliamentary election, Mazuronis led on the party's list, which got 11.4 percent of the vote and with nine MPs in the multi-member constituency (vrk.lt 2004). He was elected to the *Seimas* becoming the party's chairman (vrk.lt 2004). However, he failed to obtain a seat in the Dainų constituency finishing the fourth with 13.1 percent of the votes (vrk.lt 2004). Mazuronis led the party list (vrk.lt 2008) that finished third with 12.7 percent of the votes (vrk.lt 2008) and he was re-elected to the parliament in 2008. Also, he received 13.1 percent of votes in the Dainų constituency in the first round (vrk.lt 2008) and went for the run-off in which he lost with 29.9 percent (vrk.lt 2008). Mazuronis tried his chances in the 2009 presidential elections and received 6.1 percent, ending up the third among seven candidates (vrk.lt 2009). He repeated his success in the 2012 *Seimas* elections, topping party's list (vrk.lt 2012) which attracted 7.3 percent of the votes in the multi-member constituency (six parliamentary seats). In similar fashion, his results in the Dainų single-mandate district was second with 14.3 percent in the first round (vrk.lt 2012), followed with 37.0 percent in which he lost the run-off (vrk.lt 2012). After the elections, the Party Order and Justice with the Labour and Polish parties joined the ruling Social Democrat-led coalition and Mazuronis became Minister of the Environment. In the 2014 election to the European Parliament he was number three on the list, and the party won two seats. Nonetheless, the party's constituency ranked Mazuronis as number two and he became a member of the European Parliament (vrk.lt 2014). Now he belongs to the Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (europarl.europa.eu 2015). Due to disagreements with Paksas about his replacement in the party leadership, Mazuronis left the Party Order and Justice in February 2015 and joined

---

19   The Party Order and Justice elected a new chairman, Remigijus Žemaitatis in December 2016.

20   In early 2019, the General Prosecutor's Office presses corruption charges in court against Rolandas Paksas' activities in 2015.

the Labour party, becoming its chairman in May 2015. He did not take part in the 2016 *Seimas* elections with the Labour Party which fell short of the 5 percent needed to enter parliament. Mazuronis resigned from the party's leadership in October 2016 and suspended his membership in December the same year due to his disapproval to the new leader of the Labour Party. Finally, Mazuronis participated as an independent candidate in the presidential election in May 2019 and finished the last among nine candidates with barely 0.65 percent of the votes. Now Mazuronis considers returning to the Labour Party (klaipeda.diena.lt 2019).

The current chairman of the Party Order and Justice, Remigijus Žemaitaitis, started his political career in 2007 as an adviser to Vilnius mayor Juozas Imbrasas and served this stint also for the former party leader Paksas. Žemaitaitis' first attempt in the parliamentary elections in 2008 was successful. He was number 45 in the party list yet was ranked by the party's electorate into the parliament and became a member of Committee on Legal Affairs. On the other hand, he ended third in the first round in the Šilalės-Šilutės constituency with 6.8 percent (vrk.lt 2008). Another attempt was in the 2009 elections to the European Parliament. His position in the party list was number 16, and the party won two seats (vrk.lt 2009). In the parliamentary election of 2012, Žemaitaitis stood as number 12, yet the party received six mandates in the proportional vote. However, he won the Šilalės-Šilutės constituency in the run-off with 69.6 percent (vrk.lt 2012) and became a chairman of the Committee on Economy in the *Seimas*. In the 2014 elections to the European Parliament, Žemaitaitis was sixth on the list (vrk.lt 2014) and was not elected, as the party received two seats. In the 2016 parliamentary election, Žemaitaitis led the party list and was elected to the *Seimas* in the proportional vote; he also won the Pietų Žemaitijos constituency with 66.3 percent in the run-off two weeks later and his party obtained an additional MP from the party list (vrk.lt 2016). He became head of the party's faction and member of two committees: Rural Affairs and Health Affairs. In September 2018 the parliament elected him as deputy speaker of the *Seimas* (seimas.lt 2018). In the 2019 municipal election, Žemaitaitis ran for mayor and out of 17 candidates ended up as number 10 with 1.15 percent of the votes (vrk.lt 2019). Finally, Žemaitaitis led his Party Order and Justice in the elections to the European Parliament. The party got 2.6 percent of votes and finished with no seats in the EP.

Table 6. Participation in Elections: Leaders of Party Order and Justice (Rolandas Paksas (RP), Valentinas Mazuronis (VM), Remigijus Žemaitaitis (RŽ)

	RP	VM	RŽ
1996 Seimas	–	P/N/L	–
1997 Local	P/E/C	–	–
1997 President	–	–	–
2000 Local	P/E/L	–	–
2000 Seimas	P/E/L	–	–
2002 Municipal	–	–	–
2002 President	P/E/OJ	–	–
2004 EP	–	–	–
2004 President	–	–	–

	RP	VM	RŽ
2004 Seimas	–	P/E/OJ	–
2007 Local	P/E/OJ	–	–
2008 Seimas	–	P/E/OJ	P/E/OJ
2009 President	–	P/N/OJ	–
2009 EP	P/E/OJ	–	P/N/OJ
2011 Local	–	–	–
2012 Seimas	–	P/E/OJ	P/E/OJ
2014 President	–	–	–
2014 EP	P/E/OJ	P/E/OJ	P/N/OJ
2015 Local	–	–	–
2016 Seimas	–	–	P/E/OJ
2019 Local	–	–	P/N/OJ
2019 EP	P/N/IN	–	P/N/OJ
2019 President	–	P/N/IN	–

P – Participated, E – Elected, N – Not elected, C – Conservatives, L – Liberals, OJ – Party Order and Justice, IN – independent
Source: Author's calculation

Selection of leadership and its scope of power

According to the Party Order and Justice's statute (tvarka.lt 2019), a party congress[21] is to convene at least once a year selects and dismisses a leader of the party. Simple majority is needed for the election of a chairperson of the party. The party has never dismissed its leader (all of them have resigned), but it has been regularly electing its leadership since the party's inception. The first election for the party's leader took place in March 2002, where Paksas received 99.5 percent of the votes (563 out of 566) (delfi.lt 2002). After Paksas had become president of Lithuania, Mazuronis, as the only contender, took over the party's leadership in March 2003 by winning 90.8 percent of the votes (466 out of 513) (diena.lt 2003). After his impeachment, Rolandas Paksas returned to the party's helm in December 2004 with 82.3 percent of the vote, whereas another contender got 11.8 percent (tv3.lt 2004). In May 2007, Paksas was again re-elected with 89.4 percent (565 out of 632), whereas his contender received 9.8 percent (delfi.lt 2007). Another re-election occurred in February 2009. As the only candidate, Paksas enjoyed 97.6 percent of the votes (576 out of 590) (delfi.lt 2009). The same electoral procedure was repeated in December 2010 – nobody contested the party's leadership and Paksas received 98.7 percent (853 out of 864) (15min.lt 2010). Another re-election was in December 2012, and Paksas got an absolute majority as the only candidate (lzinios.lt 2012). The last time a former president was re-elected as a party's chairperson was in 2014, by winning 80.2 percent of the votes (607 out of 757). As

---

21   Party's congress consists of representatives of party's local branches, heads of executive committee, council, commissions on discipline, on control and party committees.

the party's former leader and a critic of the impeached president, Mazuronis threw down a gauntlet against Paksas yet lost with 19.8 percent and was not included into the party's ruling bodies after the contest for party leadership (diena.lt 2014). His disagreements with Paksas made him pull out from the Party Order and Justice and …be elected as the chair of the Labour Party.

After the resignation of Paksas from the Party Order and Justice, Žemaitaitis replaced him as the party's only candidate by receiving 96.7 percent of the votes (479 out of 493) in December 2016 (delfi.lt 2016). He, despite part of party's branches' vote against him in July 2018, was nonetheless re-elected as the chair in the congress in September 2018. Žemaitaitis got 66.8 percent of the votes (177 out of 265), winning over another candidate who received 30.6 percent (15min.lt 2018).

Table 7. Election of Leaders at Party Order and Justice, (%)

	Rolandas Paksas	**Valentinas Mazuronis**	**Remigijus Žemaitaitis**
2002	99.5	—	—
2003	—	90.8	—
2004	82.3	—	—
2007	89.4	—	—
2009	97.6	—	—
2010	98.7	—	—
2012	Absolute majority	—	—
2014	80.2	19.8	—
2016	—	—	96.7
2018	—	—	66.8

Source: Author's calculation

Given the incredibly high numbers of support for the party's leadership at congresses and next to non-existent contest for the chairpersonship, it hardly comes as a surprise that a party leader has immense intra-party power according to party's statute. First of all, a leader is considered as a single-person governing body who is elected for two years at the congress and possesses broad competences. They submit candidates of their first deputy, other deputies and chairman of discipline commission and the whole control commission for the approval of the party congress. They can choose personal advisers without consent of other party's bodies. A chairperson also submits the party's secretary for the approval of the executive board. The secretary runs the party's day-to-day affairs. In case the executive committee does not appoint a secretary, one of the chairman's deputies heads the secretariat. A leader also convenes the congress[22] and delivers a report on party's activities. Besides, the party's chairperson chooses heads and deputies of committees for the executive committee's approval. A leader chairs executive committee meetings that

---

22   A right to convene a congress also belongs to one-third of all party members, half of the party's branches, the council and, in special cases, the executive committee.

can terminate mandates of the executive committee's deputy and members. An executive committee is the party's political and managerial governing institution, consisting of a presidium and ten members from local branches.[23] The presidium, convened and chaired by a leader of the party, runs a party between executive committee's meetings, convened at least twice a year and consists of party's chairperson, deputies and head of party's faction at the parliament. An executive committee is closely connected to the party's leaders, since the change of a chairperson automatically triggers an election of a new executive committee at the congress. The presidium submits candidates for parliamentary elections in the multi-member constituency (the party's candidate list) and candidates for the election to the European Parliament for the executive committee's approval. The executive committee, in turn, prepares the party programme, establishes quotas for participants in the party congress, approves of the party's financial reports, sets up the party's committees, submits candidates for the elections to the *Seimas* and the European Parliament for the approval of the congress and submits a candidate for the presidential election for the approval of party's council.[24] The executive committee submits regulations of the council for the congress and approves regulations of the presidium, control commission and municipal and regional coordination councils. Upon the suggestion of the commission on discipline, the executive committee can dismiss the executive committee's deputy, an executive committee and a party member and freeze a mandate of a chair of a local branch. Since the executive committee votes according to simple majority, the chair's vote is decisive in case of a draw in voting.[25]

The overview of the party's statute reveals broad intraparty competences of the party leader, who is recognised as a single-person ruling body at the party. The party's chairperson convenes a party congress and seeks its approval for the leader's chosen deputies and heads of two commissions that foresee the party's inner workings. As for the council, which is number two in the party's hierarchy, the leader summons the council and their chosen first deputy chairs it. The concentration of powers of the party's frontrunner lies within the 'government' of the party, being the executive committee and the presidium. As the chairman of the executive committee, a leader runs the show: chairs its meetings, selects candidates for elections, sets up the party's internal institutions, controls members of the executive committee, prepares regulations and oversees the party's finances. Even for the secretariat at the administrative level, the party's leader chooses the secretary or has the leader's chosen deputy to run as secretariat.

Conclusions

The article discussed the conceptualisation of populism, institutionalisation and dynamics of populist parties in Lithuania, party system development and shed light on the leadership performance, change and legal capacity in the Party Order and Justice. The

---

23   Party members of the parliamentary faction, a secretary, heads of Vilnius, Kaunas and regional coordination councils can vote in the executive committee's meeting.

24   A council is the highest ‚legislative' body between party congresses. It is made of heads of local branches and party committees, executive committee members, head of commission on discipline and members of the parliamentary faction. The party's leader or one third of the council's members convene the council. The first deputy, chosen by the party's leader, chairs the council.

25   In case of the party leader's absence, a draw in voting implies a non-decision.

Lithuanian party system now shows decreasing and moderate fragmentation and centripetal competition. The number of effective electoral parties is just above four. On the other hand, voter volatility scores remain relatively high – one in three voters changed their voting preferences between the two last elections. The share of new parties has been dropping since 2004, and no new parties entered the parliament in 2016. Populism in Lithuania fell on deaf electorate's ears. It did not take long for former populist parties to join the mainstream by taking part in ruling coalitions and cooperation since 2012 and ditching their own populist zeal. New topics of populism emerged, yet they fell short of becoming a credible alternative to established parties. The protest and populist parties in Lithuania did not take root and they squandered once robust electoral support. The case of Party Order and Justice revealed the party's close association with its former chair, an impeached president of Lithuania Rolandas Paksas. His intra-party supported clinging to party's leadership and an emphasis on political martyrdom and self-victimisation after the impeachment resulted in the party's dwindling fortunes and his resignation both from the leadership and the party. However, Paksas' long-term legacy left the party's internal regulations favourable next to unconstrained leadership at the Party Order and Justice. The presidential and European Parliamentary elections in May 2019 did not become harbingers of populist tendencies. Former leaders of populist and protest parties have been in gradual decline or political extinction and the new ones did not make any tangible inroads in Lithuanian politics.

References

Aleknonis, Gintaras and Renata Matkevičienė (2016), Populism in Lithuania: Defining the Research Tradition, *Baltic Journal of Law and Politics*, 9(1). https://www.degruyter.com/downloadpdf/j/bjlp.2016.9.issue-1/bjlp-2016–0002/bjlp-2016–0002.pdf

Anderson, Benedict (1983), *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London, Verso.

Aslanidis, Paris (2016), Is Populism an Ideology? A Refutation and a New Perspective, *Political Studies*, 64 (1).

Auers, Daunis (2017), *Populism in the Baltic States*, in Kudors, Andis and Artis Pabriks, eds, *The Rise of Populism: Lessons for European Union and the USA*, Riga, University of Latvia Press, http://appc.lv/eng/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2017/11/APPC_Populism_2017_web.pdf

Auers, Daunis (2018), *Populism and Political Party Institutionalisation in the Three Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania,* Fudan Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences (2018) 11.

Balcere, Ilze (2011), *Comparing Populist Political Parties in the Baltic States and Western Europe*, 6th ECPR General Conference in Reykjavik (August 25–27, 2011), http://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/1de703e8–4516–4ed9–92a3- 858ed010c393.pdf

Cambridge Dictionary's Word of the Year 2017, https://dictionaryblog.cambridge.org/2017/11/29/cambridge-dictionarys-word-of-the-year-2017, Accessed 12 January 2019.

Easton, David (1953), *The Political System. An Inquiry into the State of Political Science*, New York: Knopf.

Freeden, M. (1996), *Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Freeden, M. (1998), Is Nationalism a Distinct Ideology?, *Political Studies*, 46 (4).

Inglehart, Ronald (1971), The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in Post-Industrial Societies, *American Political Science Review* 65 (December)

Jurkynas, Mindaugas (2017), The parliamentary election in Lithuania, October 2016, *Electoral Studies*, Volume 47, June 2017.

Laclau, Ernesto (2005), *On Populist Reason*. London, Verso.

Laclau, Ernesto and Chantal Mouffe (2001), *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*, London, Verso.

LSDP 2016 m. rinkimų į LR Seimą programa, Party programme, http://www.lsdpklaipeda.lt/32869–2/

Mudde, Cas (2004), *The Populist Zeitgeist*, Government and Opposition 39 (4).

Mudde, Cas and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser (2015), *Vox populi* or *vox masculini*? *Populism and gender in Northern Europe and South America*, Patterns of Prejudice 49 (1–2).

Mudde, Cas and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser (2017), *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

New Year Greetings From President Dalia Grybauskaitė, 2018–12–31, https://www.lrp.lt/en/press-centre/press-releases/new-year-greetings-from-president-dalia-grybauskaite/31626

Norkus, Zenonas (2011), Lietuvos politinė raida: antrojo pokomunistinio dešimtmečio lyginamoji analizė, *Politologija*, 64 (4).

Pabiržis, Dovaidas (2013), Populistinės ideologijos partijos Baltijos šalyse 2011–2012 m., Politikos mokslų almanachas, 14 (9). https://eltalpykla.vdu.lt/bitstream/handle/1/31622/2335–7185_2013_V_14.PG_115–137.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

Party programme of Lietuvos Valstiečių ir Žaliųjų Sąjunga, www.darnilietuva.lt

Party Programme of the Liberal Movement, 2016, http://www.liberalai.lt/rinkimai/

Piketty, Thomas (2013), *Le Capital au XXIe siècle*. Le Seuil.

Ramonaitė, Ainė and Vesta Ratkevičiūtė (2013), The Lithuanian Case: National Populism Without Xenophobia, in Karsten Grabow and Florian Hartleb, eds, *Exposing the Demagogues. Right-Wing and National Populist Parties in Europe.* Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, https://www.kas.de/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=a55421fd-dc8c-3cff-261d-95488dfc8672&groupId=252038

Rinkimų programa LLRA-KŠS, Party's programme, http://www.awpl.lt/?p=4768&lang=lt

Siekiai ir siūlymai Lietuvos programai (2017–2020), Party's programme, http://www.programa.tvarka.lt

Stanley, Ben (2008), The Thin Ideology of Populism, *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 13 (1).

Statute of Party Order and Justice, Partijos Tvarka ir Teisingumas Įstatai, http://www.tvarka.lt/lt/apie-mus/istatai

TS-LKD Planas Lietuvai, Party programme, http://tsajunga.lt/rinkimai/programos/ts-lkd-naujas-planas-lietuvai/

Ulinskaitė, Jogilė (2018), *Lietuvos populistinių partijų atstovavimo samprata ir jos santykis su atstovaujamąja demokratija*, Daktaro disertacija, Vilniaus universitetas.