1. bookVolume 5 (2013): Issue 35 (May 2013)
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2182-2875
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16 Apr 2017
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access type Open Access

Dispositional Essentialism and the Nature of Powerful Properties

Published Online: 31 Dec 2018
Page range: 1 - 19
Received: 08 Aug 2012
Accepted: 30 Jan 2013
Journal Details
License
Format
Journal
eISSN
2182-2875
First Published
16 Apr 2017
Publication timeframe
4 times per year
Languages
English
Abstract

Dispositional essentialism maintains that all sparse properties are essentially powerful. Two conceptions of sparse properties appear compatible with dispositional essentialism: sparse properties as pure powers or as powerful qualities. This paper compares the two views, criticizes the powerful qualities view, and then develops a new theory of pure powers, termed Point Theory. This theory neutralizes the main advantage powerful qualities appear to possess over pure powers—explaining the existence of powers during latency periods. The paper discusses the relation between powers and space-time points, whether pure powers need to occupy space, and how to account for the movement of pure powers through space-time. Given Point Theory, dispositional essentialists should maintain that sparse properties are pure powers.

Keywords

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